MILOSEVIC'S LESSON TO THE DISOBEDIENT

Messages of the Purges among Socialists

Slobodan Milosevic has activated his old style in personnel dealings: no pardon. On the political scene he is applying the system already tested during his ten year rule in which everything is and is not, and everything can and cannot be. In all likelihood, the supreme master of destruction, havoc and confusion is looking for an excuse to introduce the state of emergency.

AIM, Belgrade, January 17, 1997

When in mid this week the Electoral Commission of Belgrade announced that the contested mandates were being returned to the coalition "Together" many thought that that famous light has appeared at the end of the tunnel. On that day Vesna Pesic was not in Belgrade, but had she been, she would have certainly said "that she had good news". Naturally, there was some caution, because everybody knew whom they were dealing with, but it was difficult to hide certain positive anticipation. Vuk Draskovic was even ready to forecast the end of protest gatherings which have been shaking Serbia since November 17.

However, dark clouds, as poor writers would say, started building immediately after that sign. First the Socialists initiated a purge in their own ranks, expelling from membership all those wavering and sinful, after which the President of the Belgrade University, whose removal the students demanded, got the support of the University Council and finally the return of the Belgrade mandates was relativised to such an extent that the revision of electoral results seemed nothing more than a whirl of dust. More broadly speaking, the whole situation became so to say complicated; observed more strictly, it returned to the starting point which marked the beginning of Serbian demonstrations.

If we look at these focal point more carefully, we shall se that the fundamental reversal occurred on Tuesday afternoon when the Socialists decided to remove from their ranks the until-recent Belgrade Major Covic and the Belgrade Television favourite, head of the Belgrade Socialists, Ivkovic. (In that context, the expulsion of the Nis bey, Mile Ilic, was nothing more than a decoration). However, the point is not in these names, as they never had any meaningful individual manoeuvering space, but in the message this new purge in the ranks of the ruling party brings. Perhaps unintentionally, but correctly according to our estimates, a regime paper called this "a consolidation of ranks".

The message has another meaning. It follows from two things: a simple question - what is the function of such "a consolidation of ranks" and, naturally, from the answer to that question. And the answer is: the purge has been carried out not - as some naive and well-meaning people thought - to give the public, waiting for sinful regime scapegoats, the satisfaction, but to continue the fight. That is where the emphasis lies: Milosevic has firmly decided not to give in. He proved that the very next day, on Wednesday when the obscure Council of the Belgrade University kept the President Velickovic in the saddle. Velickovic was the first test.

During these two months the question of firmness of the established fronts was the only strategic point in testing of strength of the Serbian democratic opposition and the Serbian regime. Each tried to find or make a loophole on the other side. First, the regime gambled on the vanity of the coalition "Together" by promoting Djindjic into the boss, and pushing Draskovic to the back which he, reckoned that wise head of Socialist counter-propaganda, would not tolerate. But, there was no visible result. Some other opposition leaders, mostly Kostunica and Seselj, also played a part. Kostunica, a participant in the coalition "Together" at the federal elections, withdrew from the game at the local, and when he realized he could have benefited, it was already too late. Finding himself in the position of an outsider in the broad and mass movement created during demonstrations, he fussed until he decided to formally leave the coalition. He did that this week at the moment when the swords were being crossed.

His departure, no matter how dramatically intoned, did not provoke any special effect, nor consequences.

Seselj, also, did not like being only the President of the Belgrade commune of Zemun, while masses of Belgrade and other citizens poured out into the streets. Bocassa from Zemun exerted enviable efforts in favour of Milosevic, his deadly enemy until recently, and his, as he liked to call them, "damned Jerinas", slandered the coalition "Together" allegedly in fear that "a Serb might go against a Serb". The coalition systematically ignored him until Vesna Pesic lost her temper, and on one occasion called him a bum. She probably bit her tongue that same moment. Seselj was only waiting for the material. But he did not make much of it and was again left alone in the ring.

Finally, the students were also worked on, perhaps most persistently, because that would produce greatest effects. As it is known, the attempt at breaking their lines was realized through some phantom student organizations. Also with no results. Finally, a misunderstanding - which actually happened at the celebration of the "old" New Year - between Draskovic and student leadership was blown out of proportions, but the leaders of two protests realized that they had to behave as responsible politicians, not as infuriated housewives.

All in all, as regards the strength of fronts, the ruling block ranked worst. Mihajlovic and his "New Democracy", a coalition partner of the Socialist in the Serbian government, were undecided from the very beginning after the protesters endured first cold days. Dramatic nervousness caught the left SPS-JUL block, which is only natural for the state in which the regime found itself. All of a sudden Nebojsa Covic started using dissident rhetoric, and and until he was expelled from the party it all seemed as a plot agreed with Milosevic because for a long time no one else attacked him. Now it is clear that Covic as a prodigal son was only given a chance to return, while Milosevic was making calculations and searching for the right move to make on the domestic scene.

This move was made with the initiation of the purge. When speaking of the ruling party it should be said that these breaks have produced a rather paradoxical result. As matters stand now, this result is reflected in a greater, rather than lesser, resoluteness of Socialists to defend their power. And judging by all things, the angle from which they intend to do that, is the most rigid one: both the policy and practice shall be shaped by party hawks of the toughest kind. In the future, the SPS might resemble more an enraged sect, than fairly civilized political party.

This line is announced not only by the so called leaks of confidential information which do not have to be trusted, but also the official statements which - in the absence of a spokesman and any other form of communication with the public - are issued from time to time. This line is also confirmed by the activation of Milosevic's old style in his personnel dealings. Namely, he could never tolerate the wavering around him, nor did he - apart from extremely rare exceptions - ever forgive them. Therefore, Mihajlovic from the "New Democracy" can consider himself removed from the political alliance in the same manner in which Covic was eliminated from the party.

Such an act always has an educational function. Much time will pass before new dissidents appear, irrespective of the external circumstances outside the party, which favour their appearance. When the news came on the return of the mandates to the opposition in Belgrade there were those who observed: that is true Milosevic, whenever driven into a corner he gives in. When he started the purge and left the President of the University to drive students mad (to whom Milosevic devotes special attention, doesn't he), there were again others who said: No, this is real Milosevic, the one who stirs up mud. One or the other, seems irrelevant, although it is obvious now - what is worst - the true is the one with both faces. In front of the OSCE he wants to give the impression that he has obeyed its, i.e. Gonsales' orders; in front of his local public he tries to appear indifferent to foreign pressures. Actually, with him everything is and is not, can and cannot be. It is not once they called him the master of destruction, havoc and confusion.

And what then can be the forecasts of the events, but disquieting. It is true that now the game is not only up to Milosevic. But, it is indisputable that he is still has the lead. The method he obviously chose can encourage only the pessimists.

(AIM) Radivoj Cveticanin