KOSOVO AWAITING DENOUEMENT OF THE SERBIAN CRISIS

AIM Pristina, 14 January, 1997

Albanian alignments and non-alignments in relation to the crisis in Serbia are very interesting. At first, the leadership of the Albanian movement in Kosovo was very surprised not only with the force of the rebellion and split in Serbia, but also with high influence these events had on Kosovo and Albania. As soon as the reaction of the opposition and citizens of Serbia developed from being just a protest and reached a critical mass which announced the change of the system and fall of the regime, the effect of connected vessels was immediately felt on the Albanian political scene: strong polarization was felt which shook up the very top of the "parallel" Albanian authorities. Both in Belgrade and in Pristina, those in favour of status quo became the target of a powerful offensive by forces which demand changes and quick resolution of the crisis. And just as Milosevic was becoming more lonely with every new day of the protest, Rugova found himself under increasing fire of criticism both from the right and the left. Some people even started to believe that destiny of Rugova will be connected to that of Milosevic. If the latter should fall, the abyss will also open underneath the first - it was claimed in some commentaries.

Nevertheless, it seems that these conclusions are too schematic and hasty. There is a big and essential difference between the profile of a militant and Machiavellian politician personified by Milosevic, and Rugova who is in favour of a political resolution of the problem and who has indeed endless patience in expectation of such a solution. This makes the situation which Rugova has found himself in even more paradoxical. His policy has met with the most severe attack at the moment when he had once again confirmed the high rating he enjoyed in offices of great powers, primarily in the USA. In mid December, Rugova visited Washington once again and met with American Secretary of State Warren Christopher and got new guarantees that Kosovo Albanians would enjoy strong support in the process of seeking a lasting resolution of the status of Kosovo.

This time the support from the USA did not have the expected effect. Rugova was at the same time attacked from Pristina, Tirana and Paris (it is suspected that this was preceded by an agreement). All the three attacks were directly inspired by developments in Serbia. In Pristina, Rugova's policy was questioned by Adem Demaqi, who said that it was colourless, slack, speculating and defeatist. To Rugova's strategy of waiting and relying on the international community (he uses the metaphor of "a solution which comes ready made served on a platter"), Demaqi juxtaposed the vision of active Gandhism and policy also not based on force, but which did not hesitate to resolutely defend national and political rights, regardless of risks and possible victims. State-controlled media in Albania also declared themselves in favour of Demaqi's concept of active resistance rather than Rugova's. For a few weeks the Albanian television which is via satellite partly watched by the entire Kosovo, organized quite a campaign against the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) and Rugova. The climax of this campaign was an interview given by Ismail Kadare, the greatest and most influential Albanian writer to the Albanian television from Paris where he has been living since 1991. Kadare accused Rugova and the DSK that they had endangered a just resolution of the issue of Kosovo with their despondent and half-hearted policy.

All these attacks against Rugova and the DSK took place on the basis of analyses of developments in Serbia. In the beginning, especially Tirana manifested pronounced interest, if not even open support of the democratic revolution which was taking place in Serbia, recognizing especially in the students' movement a force which led to overthrowing of the regime and denouement of both the Serbian and the regional Balkan crisis, and as part of it - the Albanian issue. Since the students in Tirana in 1991 were the ones who struck the decisive blow to the communist regime, it is expected that the students' protest in Serbia will certainly overthrow communism in Serbia. This puzzling support from Tirana and inclination to oppositionist Serbia was received with great indisposition in Kosovo. In Kosovo press there were sharp commentaries on this topic in which official Tirana was warned to be cautious or even reproached for being naive to trust wolves dressed in lambskin. Was not that same opposition until recently even more militant than Milosevic concerning Kosovo? If the Serbian opposition is truly a democratic alternative, why is it hesitating to state its stance about Kosovo?

On the other hand, Demaqi's public support to Serbian opposition which was welcomed in Belgrade, but also among democratic forces in Kosovo itself, had a disturbing counter-effect: the regime in Belgrade started using Demaqi's support and official Albanian media as evidence of Albanian involvement in developments in Serbia, claiming even that Draskovic and the other opposition leaders were "Albanian mercenaries"! Public support to awakened democratic Serbia became delicate and counter-productive. That is why official Albania and Demaqi stopped issuing euphoric statements about events in Serbia, in order to prevent abuses by regime propaganda in Belgrade.

As concerning the DSK and Rugova, they reformulated their initial disinteredness into a somewhat modified stance of principled support to the process of democratization in Serbia, insisting on keeping a significant distance until they saw what stance the oppositionist Serbia would take concerning the key issue of Kosovo. This argument of disassociation from the Serbian opposition was most clearly presented by the main ideologist and Vice-President of the DSK, Fehmi Agani when he concluded: "the democratic movement in Serbia should enjoy support and inclination to the extent to which it is truly democratic. But the long and bitter experience and situation in which we are seems to force us not to be euphoric and not to identify ourselves much with the Serbian opposition... Aware of the organic links which exist between democratization of Serbia and the manner of resolution of the issue of Kosovo, we cannot but observe inconsistency and limitation in democratization of the Serbian opposition". In the end, Agani concluded that although the issue of Kosovo was "the key issue for democratization of Serbia, the Serbian opposition is silent about it".

Agani who is not directly involved in the latest inter-Albanian disputes, believes that the current processes in Serbia are of far-reaching significance, or rather that Milosevic's regime will inevitably fall if not now than in the course of the year, and therefore warns the Albanians "that they must prepare for this change". This inevitability of great changes in Serbia causes an increase in tensions among various factions within the Albanian movement. In considerations of the future strategy of the Albanian movement, there are two main trends: one is more realistic and believes that the status of Kosovo will be resolved gradually through a process of negotiations and compromising solutions; and the other is idealistic and believes that the demand for independent Kosovo should not be abandoned at any cost, and that any compromise which would leave Kosovo in any connection with Serbia or Yugoslavia is completely out of the question. These two options are curiously interwoven concerning their objectives and methods. While the first, the realistic one is moderate concerning its objective, it is radical concerning the method, and the latter which is on the contrary radical concerning its objective, is moderate concerning the method. The conflict between Demaqi and Rugova goes along these lines. The stance concerning this issue can explain the position of the official Tirana which has become close to Demaqi and disassociates itself from Rugova's inflexibility concerning independence of Kosovo. Demaqi and official Tirana believe that the demand for independence does not enjoy support of great powers (it can be achieved only gradually and indirectly, through transitional models) and that therefore a specific formula of a new community must be sought; a confederation advocated by Demaqi would be ideal, and even more realistically, ensuring of the status of a republic for Kosovo in a conceivable federal reconstruction of present Yugoslavia, perhaps broadened to include some new members, if anything of the kind is possible (for example, Macedonia is mentioned).

Demaqi's activation and taking over the main opposition party (Parliamentary Party of Kosovo) announced restructuring of the Albanian political scene. Demaqi may gather around him many minor political parties as well as influential independent personages. But, the main battle is at the moment fought within the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, since it is assumed that Demaqi has high influence on one of its factions which controls majority of votes in the main bodies of the party. Some people even tend to expect a split in the DSK, and its division into two parties, just as it happened to the main Albanian party in Macedonia. After the initial sharp attack against Rugova and the DSK, Demaqi does not seem to be in a hurry to make a radical move. H e will probably wait for the denouement of the crisis in Serbia in order to decide whether he will try to replace Rugova or enter into a coalition with him. Rugova is facing the same challenge and has the same narrow manoeuvreing space.

Shkelzen Maliqi