THE ELECTION YEAR

Zagreb Jan 8, 1997

AIM ZAGREB, 29 December, 1996

The year of 1997 is the election year in Croatia. Starting from March when the local elections are scheduled and elections for the Parliamentary Chamber of Districts up to September which is the deadline for presidential elections, all the political parties will once again stand at the starting line so that the balance of new forces at all levels of power could be measured.

If the hitherto rather stable trends continue, it is realistic to expect this measuring to happen within the following frameworks - further moderate decline of the HDZ influence at the state level, steep decline at the local level and firm and stable position of the current President Tudjman. However, this trend might change due to new circumstances, primarily the illness of President Franjo Tudjman and conditions which fundamentally differ from those prevailing in 1992 (when the last elections were held at all three levels simultaneously). It is most probable that it will accelerate so that the HDZ domination that has already decreased at the local level will start dissipating at the higher levels. However, if this is the most probable scenario then HDZ must also be aware of it and will therefore do everything in its power to prevent, or at least, alleviate the situation.

The start of the election carroussel in early spring was first announced a month ago at the HDZ Main Board by Ivan Valent, Secretary General. Undoubtedly he is not the most suitable person for this, because HDZ is only a participant in the elections, and not their organizer. However, soon after that Valent announced the replacement of Jarnjak, Minister of the Police (which was in vain expected from Jarnjak's direct superior, the Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa) so that such choice of spokesmen for key state decisions is not accidental. At the mentioned HDZ party gathering Tudjman more or less openly claimed that his party was the only guarantee of Croatia's survival and quoted data from a pool commissioned by HDZ, according to which this party allegedly still has greater prospects than all other parties together (from this same rostrum Defence Minister Gojko Susak will later on practically order both membership and leadership of the ruling party to believe in the election victory).

However, preparations for the elections have started much before this explosive party session. For months now, without much noise, both in the Government and Parliament amendments to the election laws are initiated and voted (with greater share of proportional representation in the local authorities) thereby decreasing the risk for the party which has not won the majority, while at the same time benefits are determined for socially most vulnerable population, especially pensioners, free textbooks are introduced, and similar. In addition, HDZ tried, with less success, to picture itself as a party committed to struggle against illegal amassing of wealth of its members, while the recent suspension of Krunislav Olujic, President of the Supreme Court, who is ex officio President of the Republican Electoral Commission, appears to be the most radical move aimed at ensuring the most certain possible election prospects. In late 1995 Olujic in this capacity already supervised the election for Parliament's Chamber of Districts. Although the opposition had many objections against him, Tudjman obviously did not think him reliable enough for the greatest election race ever - in which he himself will appear after five years - when the HDZ will attempt at rigging the election much more than before.

Still, despite all these preparatory activities - adequately accompanied by literally daily campaigns against the alleged desire of the major West European countries to restore another, but now "global-regional" variant of Yugoslavia, the HDZ cannot idly wait for the elections. The gravest concern is Tudjman himself, who till now was the incomparable trump card of the ruling party, but now after his illness, this monumentallity of his is acquiring a double meaning, unknown until now. Namely, it is quite clear that vast authority which he enjoys as a state ruler cannot be mechanically transferred to some other mortal from his own, let alone some other party. The HDZ officially keeps silent about this, just as it keeps silent on the seriousness of Tudjman's illness, but it seems, at least within the circle of those like-minded, that a possibility is being explored of redefining presidential authorities under the Constitution in case Tudjman decides that he is not physically capable to serve another term (no one else would dare intimate anything similar).

There are rumours on the following several combinations about silent and painless transfer of power from the potent "sovereign" to a less powerful "successor": the introduction of the institution of Vice-President of the Republic (which the Constitution does not recognize for the time being and on account of which the "half-presidential" system has been transformed into purely presidential one); the strengthening of Government's authorities, which would serve as some sort of "collective successor" under the HDZ control; a turnabout from the presidential to parliamentary form of power which in the last instance would mean that in the future the President would be elected by the Parliament. Interestingly enough the only combination explicitly envisaged by the Constitution did not find its place among the aforementioned ones: i.e. that "permanent incapacity" of the President should be determined (by the Constitutional Court at the initiative of the Government) and a new one elected within sixty days (in the meanwhile the President of the Parliament would serve as acting President).

As we said the ruling party denies that there is any talk about this, while the author of the Constitution Smiljko Sokol, to whom most questioning eyes are turned, now emphatically denies the possibility of incorporation of the vice-presidential function and not to mention the promotion of the status of the Government.

He did not comment on the last possibility - the shift towards parliamentary system of authority, while it seems that this option could have the greatest prospects, especially since it doesn't bring into question Tudjman's possible presidential ambitions but, what is more, could simplify and facilitate them. Namely, the new presidential candidates would not appear at direct elections, which always, and consequently in Tudjman's case too, carries an embarrassing risk, but would be elected by Parliament. The stand of the opposition in this regard - which is important primarily because of the two thirds of parliamentary votes which are needed for constitutional redefinition of the purview of the head of state - is ambiguous.

The opposition is unanimously in favour of the reduction of the presidential authorities, but only some parties (HNS - The Croatian Popular Party) have explicitly agreed to parliamentary election of the President, while other demand that similar to other parliamentary democracies (Austria), the election of President in direct elections. In addition, before shifting to parliamentary model of power, new extraordinary parliamentary elections should be called (according to regular schedule they would be held in 1999). It is obviously estimated that with sick Tudjman the HDZ's elections prospects are rapidly declining, while without new elections, even if Tudjman decided to withdraw from the election race, the present relations in the state top could be frozen for the next three years.

The opposition has good reasons to cautiously monitor and measure the HDZ's pre-election moves because it has failed to find a common presidential candidate. Initiatives for the nomination of someone from the opposition ranks (Gotovac) or a non-party figure (Supek) have died down even before they were seriously taken into consideration, and the opinion prevailed that the voters themselves should select the strongest opposition pretender in the first election round, after which the opposition parties would stand behind him in the second round. This alleged honouring of the electoral will of citizens - and equally ostensible disregard that it is up to the opposition parties to chose in time its competitor in the "race of two horses" - is but an attempt to mask the notorious, although fully legitimate, wish of the majority of large and medium parties to go to the elections alone, or within only limited coalitions.

The fear that they might be stigmatized as destroyers of the opposition unity probably results from the fact that at the last elections late last year - for the Chamber of Representatives of the Parliament and the city and district Assembly of Zagreb - the opposition parties scored exceptionally good results precisely by forming coalitions and alliances. In Zagreb, the alliance of seven (later on six) opposition parties scored a convincing victory and continued to exist for another year attempting to realize in practice the electoral victory which Tudjman and his administration contested. But it was clear from the very beginning that this opposition alliance, rallied around an ad hoc objective to preserve the democratic institute of the rotation of power, could not survive for ever on this but limited goal. It had to realize it within the shortest possible time because the next elections will inevitably take very different parties along different ways.

And indeed, finally the alliance's "provisional administration" of sorts (the informal leading function of which played Zdravko Tomac, President of the Zagreb Assembly) decided several weeks ago to dissolve the Assembly in order to transfer the responsibility for the Zagreb crisis to the state authorities who have caused it in the first place. However, in the meantime the membership of the alliance has fallen that its two-third majority has decreased to mere majority so that the resignations of the opposition delegates are no longer sufficient guarantee for the self-dissolution of the Assembly. Therefore the abstaining during voting of the city budget had to be resorted to, in order to, as it is believed, force the Government to dissolve the Assembly.

As things stand at the moment, this possibility is quite realistic, but other ones cannot be totally ruled out, including the worst one: that HDZ would win the majority in Parliament by wooing over the opposition delegates, which already happened in many other cities, so that it would no longer be necessary to call new elections in the capital.

In any case, the opposition lost initiative in Zagreb and since the spring elections will probably determine the elections at the state level, HDZ is still starting with better prospects than it objectively deserves.

MARINKO CULIC