DISCREET PRESSURES

Beograd Dec 11, 1996

Western Diplomats as Mediators Between the Authorities and Opposition in Serbia

AIM, Belgrade, December 10, 1996

For the time being the most important thing for Belgrade diplomats is to persuade both the opposition and the authorities that violence in streets could have disastrous repercussions for both sides

Under the present circumstances, the relation of Western countries towards the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic can be reduced to a profound analysis of the dilemma whether it is possible to fully implement the Dayton/Paris Peace Accords without him, or not? Opinions of individual diplomats in Belgrade somewhat differ: from claims that he is "still an unavoidable political player", to statements that "Milosevic has already played through a major part of his role" and that the mentioned Peace Agreements can be carried out in practice without him. Naturally, it is often very difficult to fully decipher diplomatic formulations, but from reading between the lines it is obvious that his reputation in the West is slowly diminishing with the very fact that by annulling the election victory of the coalition "Together" he has been caught up in the witches' brew which he cannot get out from without making certain "concessions". For the opposition coalition this term is somewhat offensive as it is not demanding any "concessions", but rather what it has won at the elections.

What the Western diplomats are doing can be hardly termed classical mediation between the opposition and the authorities in power. This type of assistance does not suit either side, at least not openly. In the first place, this gives cause to the coalition opponents to claim that the opposition is asking for assistance from abroad, which is most frequently treated as treason of sorts. Such mediation does not suit the authorities either as it could raise doubts among its followers about the regularity of the local elections. Consequently, they would become suspicious of the constantly repeated claims of the state media that the victory was crystal-pure.

From little that could be found out, the Western diplomats are not so much engaged in "reconciling" the injured opposition and the "winning" authorities, as they are in drawing their attention to the fact that a way out could, nevertheless, be found if both sides were to approach the problem more rationally. In other words: at this moment it is unrealistic to expect the dethroning of Milosevic as he counts on support from three sides: the military, the police and a sizeable number of those who, thanks to the most powerful media, still believe that the war has bypassed Serbia only thanks to him. This feeling is much more widely spread in Serbia than it may seem at first sight. It is cherished by a large number of people who are literally on the verge of survival, but subconsciously still fear what could have happened to them had the armed conflicts spread to Serbia.

According to AIM sources, a large number of European diplomats are trying to make the opposition groups and the authorities see the standpoint of their governments regarding current events, and are only indirectly mediating in an attempt to find a way to compromise. At the moment, the most active in this respect is the British Ambassador, Sir Ivor Roberts, with much help from Nicholas Bonsor, The Foreign Office Minister, who suggested three possible solutions. One was for the international representatives to thoroughly analyze the election results and records.

The second solution might be the establishment of the Serbian Assembly commission, and the third to organize new elections. As a rule, the Ambassadors do not maintain direct contacts with the opposition coalition leaders and the authorities, but leave that to their associates. The objective of such contacts goes far beyond mere information on the stands and possible suggestions of individual governments.

The most specific were the USA, which sent a public request - suggestion to President Milosevic to establish dialogue with the opposition. At the same time, the opposition has been warned to abandon the rhetoric about overthrowing Milosevic from power, which is at the moment its primary demand, after the Supreme Court of Serbia has rejected the appeal of the Municipal Election Board and the coalition "Together". It seems that the balancing of the American diplomacy is only a part of an overall diplomatic strategy and public demonstration of impartiality. Because if Washington was to support the opposition coalition too directly that could be treated as interference in internal affairs of a state the status of which is not yet fully defined within the international community.

Representatives of the German Embassy also maintain contacts with the opposition and the authorities, but its Secretary Herr Dirk Lelke was unwilling to disclose his contacts and their contents. What is most important is the fact that the German government proposed to the Serbian authorities to invite the OSCE and European Union experts to analyze the election results and get to the bottom of claims of both sides. The authorities in Belgrade will not agree to this since they are the organizers of the elections and would thus indirectly admit their own incompetence.

However, the pressures exerted on Milosevic are increasing more than he had expected, just as are the number of protesters in the streets of Belgrade and other major cities in Serbia. According to Slobodan Antonic, scientific associate of the Institute for Political Studies, he is willing to make concessions "only when driven into a corner". He cites the examples of Milosevic giving in after 1991 and 1992 demonstrations, when he allowed live broadcasting of Assembly sessions, relieved of duty the Director of Radio&Television Serbia and made some other "smaller" acts. According to Antonic, Milosevic makes concessions only until things fall back to normal and then "it's the same old story".

According to what we could find out the most important thing for Belgrade diplomats for the time being is to persuade both the opposition and the authorities that things could become too dangerous if events got out of control or violence was resorted to by either side. One thing is certain, the Western world knows that there were great manipulations at local elections and that is reason enough for it to significantly slow down the admission of present Yugoslavia into Europe and international institutions.

(AIM) Ejub Stitkovac