SERBIAN ELECTIONS AND POSSIBLE RADICALIZATION IN

KOSOVO

AIM Pristina, 30 November, 1996

Kosovo Albanians still persist in their paradoxical exaggerated disinteredness for the events in Serbia. Just as they without any hesitation boycotted the federal and the local elections in FR Yugoslavia and Serbia, they are now more or less "indifferently" following the crisis caused by flagrant and insolent theft of the electoral victory of the opposition in the local elections. When speaking against participation in the elections, all ethnic Albanian politicians mostly gave the argument that "these were their, Serb elections, which do not concern us Albanians because we have our own elections". The same stance, although not yet publicly stated, they have concerning the current mass protests in Belgrade and Serbia: "Their demonstrations do not concern us; we have had and will have our own demonstrations..."

With this refusal of any form of participation and cooperation in the political life of Serbia, the Albanians in fact wish to manifest their will not to be part of these events and to prove that they, in fact, in no way are and cannot be part of Serbia.

Tha fact that Kosovo is still considered to be a part of Serbia, and that over here various Serbian farces such as the latest elections still take place, for the Albanians is just another proof for the status of forcible annexation and occupation, for which responsibility lies not only with the Serbian regime but with the Serbian opposition as well, since in its program it does not have any democratic proposal either for resolving the issue of Kosovo. On the contrary, the Serbian opposition often advocates even more radical stances on Kosovo than the regime. The regime has, moreover, taken the obligation in the presence of the world powers to work on finding a compromising solution for Kosovo; the Serbian opposition has, on the contrary, sharply criticized readiness of the regime for a compromise, without essentially presenting any positive vision concerning resolution of the issue of Kosovo.

In such circumstances when the Serbian party is in essence eliminating a democratic solution, Kosovo Albanians in fact have no other alternative but to feel as a corpus separatum and out of the game. That is why they are constantly staying aloof, practically in the position of neutral observers. Kosovo press, primarily the only daily Bujku (substitute of the banned Rilindja), devotes hardly three to four short paragraphs to the latest dramatic developments in Serbia. These short and colourless information are carried on inside pages of the journal, as a rule in the column devoted to the news from the world, which is intended to create the impression that Belgrade for Pristina has become a foreign country equally (if not even more) as Rome, the Hague, Washington or Adis Abeba.

Nevertheless, despite these appearances of refusal to be part of anything presented by Bujku and certain circles of radical isolationists who consider every link with Belgrade dubious and treacherous, there is also the elite and middle political strata among Kosovo Albanians, who regularly read independent and opposition press from Belgrade and who, therefore, have a different stance concerning the crisis in Serbia, the stance which mostly inclines not towards indifference and rejection, but rather towards concern and deep interest for the outcome of the current crisis in Serbia. The Albanians who are in independent and opposition press actively following developments in Serbia in principle are not in favour of the Sernia opposition. Essentially, they too feel equally distrustful towards the Serbian regime and the opposition. However, they believe that manifesting disinteredness for the outcome of the current crisis in Serbia which is approching the verge of a civil war, is irresponsible and dangerous for the Albanian interests. Since Kosovo, whether they like it or not, is a part of a ship which is on fire, it can by no means be all the same for the Albanians whether that fire will be localized like in 1991 and 1992, when fall of Milosevic's regime and the beginning of a civil war were just a breath away, or this time the fire will spread all over Serbia and then spill over to Kosovo as well. Moreover, there is a realistic fear that the regime might this time, if things start going really badly for it, seek to clutch at the straw by setting Kosovo on fire and provoking a Serbian-Albanian war, similarly as in 1991 and 1992 when it avoided and postponed social and political revolution in Serbia by starting the war first in Croatia and then in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Instead of the now predominant indifference, many recommend sounding of general alarm, and even mobilization. Top alertness is recommended and preparation of an adequate reaction to a possible provocation of war coming from Serbia.

Curiously enough, responsible instances of the Albanian movement do not seem to pay any attention to such recommendations. At the public Albanian political scene there are practically no signs of anxiety. Is this the result of their several-years long passivity and tactics of waiting which has blunted their feeling of danger of a radical temptation which might be brought about by the sudden transfer of the seat of the crisis from Belgrade to kosovo? Or are they too certain about foreign guarantees, especially the American, that no war in Kosovo would be allowed to break out due to causing a strategic disbalance in the region? Are guarantees of the USA really as reliable as Kosovo Albanian politicians believe them to be?

Truly, Rugova and the top echelons of the Democratic Aliance of Kosovo (DSK), who have spread this disposition to the broad membership of the leading political formation in the Albanian movement in Kosovo, are not manifesting even the slightest sign of concern due to straining of relations in Serbia. They are just waiting for the denouement and appear to be indifferent about what it will be like. Even if there is going to be a civil war in Serbia, they are absolutely certain that this will be "their, Serbian war" and that it cannot spill over to Kosovo. Not even threats of the radical forces in Serbia are taken seriously over here, and not even of the local Serbian militant groups that they will organize an "armed defence" of Kosovo in case of treason of Belgrade or external intervention which would work in favour of realization of aspirations of the Albanians.

In Kosovo so far, just a few serious commentaries were published of the events in Serbia and their possible repercussions on the Kosovo crisis. One of them was the commentary of Fehmi Agani, Vice-President of the DSK, who in his Sunday column in Zeri, usually devotes much attention to developments on the Serbian political scene. This time Agani stressed mostly the key destabilizing role of Serbia in the region. According to Agani, the main problem of the Balkans, are "neither Kosovo nor other regions which are making democratic demands, but Serbia and its regime, since they are the constant source of crisis and permenent instability". Historically and strategically, Serbia was in the past few years sentenced to mark time due to "an organic connection of the current regime with the past". When speaking of the latest elections amd the unexpected defeat of the Socialists in the local elections, it is assessed that Milosevic overestimated the silent support he had from the West, among other because of the expectations that he could be a better interlocutor in resolving the explosive Kosovo issue. It proved, however, that urban Serbia has finally become fed up with mutant forms of socialism, control of media and police repression Milosevic's regime is founded on.

The split in Serbia, as well as settling of accounts in Serbia are a historical inevitability. Whether it will take place along the line of a conflict between the "partisans" and "Chetniks", as some people wish to present it, is not so important, as it is important that without overcoming the dispute having that disfigured form and establishment of a new relation of forces, democratic transformation of Serbia cannot even be initiated, and therefrom neither can democratic resolution of the Kosovo crisis begin.

The position of the Albanians in relation to the current configuration is not a position in which they can make a choice. If Rugova is expected to choose between the "partisans" and the "Chetniks", his hesitation to state his view is understandable. In a way, he is acting like Azem Vlasi and the provincial leadership at the 8th session of the communist party in 1987, when in the then configuration Milosevic in the role which was closer to that of "Chetniks" and Ivan Stambolic, who was closer to the "partisan" tradition, were fighting a fierce and hard battle for power. Vlasi was at the time advocating a policy of non-intereference in the internal affairs and struggle for power in Serbia, and this policy in a way objectively helped Milosevic because it ensured him to win with a slim majority.

Rugova's policy of non-interference and observing sitting on the fence is also helping Milosevic, because Kosovo in the internal struggle for power in Serbia leaves everything in the hands of the regime. For Rugova and the Albanian elite this is the choice of a lesser between two evils; Milosevic's regime at least has an imposed on it but compromising vision of a solution of the issue of Kosovo, while the opposition - as Agani says in the mentioned article, "has no clear vision". It is stated for the opposition that it "knows what it does not want, but knows not what it wants". This latest conclusion, Agani links to a part of a statement of Zoran Djindjic according to which the Serbian opposition does not wish to play the role in Serbia the Albanians are playing in Kosovo. Djindjic, therefore, believes that the Albanians with their non-violent and passive policy, have become one of the pillars of the regime, and that is why he announces a more militant political position. However, Djindjic and other leaders of the Serbian opposition, as a loose unprincipled coalition of the right and the political centre, do not offer anything more but the change of the regime. Their vision of a democratic Serbia includes an enormous blind spot - the problem of Kosovo. Agani therefore concludes that the "attitude towards Kosovo is one of the greatest weaknesses" of the Serbian opposition. In pre-election speeches, although a part of the fierceness may be attributed to the rhetoric of pre-election exaggerations, Vojislav Kostunica announced the beginning of the Serbian-Albanian war in 1998, as a reaction to Milosevic's betrayal of Kosovo.

Let us summarize. Just as the democratic world has lately and in the latest elections, almost openly offered support to Milosevic, the Albanians are betting not on the democratic solution which appears as a chimaera to them, but on the authoritarian solution of the problem of Kosovo. They believe that it is better for them to place their bets on the weakened authoritarian Milosevic than on the cacophonic nationalistic opposition. Agani quite clearly formulated pragmatism of the current Albanian policy. He says: "At first sight, it seems that the crisis in Serbia is slowing down and posponing the process of seeking solution for Kosovo. However, by weakening Milosevic's position, (this process) cannot but increase his obedience in relation to the international community as well as the need to seek solution for open problems".

Shkelzen Maliqi AIM, Pristina