KOSOVO - FREE HUNTING-GROUND FOR THE AUTHORITIES

AIM Pristina, 21 November, 1996

When it comes to Kosovo, the results of the elections for the Chamber of Citizens of the FRY Assembly and local authorities have only confirmed the existing situation. Slobodan Milosevic has won a stable power at the level of the federal state, while Ibrahim Rugova won a confirmation of his hitherto policy of rejecting the authority of that power. With 12 out of 13 delegate seats which he won in Kosovo (one went to Vojislav Seselj's SRS) Milosevic has reached and strengthened the absolute majority in the more important of the two parliamentary chambers of the Federation and secured his election for the head of the federal state in the next year (if that is what he plans). At the same time, his Socialist Party has secured a two-third majority (together with the DPS) necessary for amending the Federal Constitution with a view to ensuring greater authority befitting a state chief such as Slobodan Milosevic.

Ibrahim Rugova may also be satisfied with the way the elections proceeded. He did not get either deputies or councellors, but one single move, with nearly zero Albanian turnout at the elections, confirmed practically the absolute denial of the Serbian rule in Kosovo. The Albanians and their representatives are aware that by this they made the elections easy for Milosevic, but this time it was also the question of principled commitment and not of calculated behaviour. Therefore, here in Pristina it is considered that there is no ground for speculations about some sort of a political swap between Milosevic and the SPS on one side, and Rugova and the DSK, on the other.

Last time the Kosovo Albanians took part in the elections organized in Serbia was in late 1989. Then they demonstrated their good will to avoid all that had happened during this decade. It turned out that right were those who claimed that it is "useless to expect anything good be achieved under the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, in Serbia and with Serbia". In only few months the Kosovo Albanians went through the great "Purgatory" and it was the ideologically-political delegate elite of the Assembly of Kosovo, elected in late 1989, which proclaimed the Independent Republic of Kosovo and adopted its Constitution. At that moment the Albanians renounced all their rights unilaterally granted to them by Serbia as their capital, including the right to vote in the function of confirming the Serbian rule in Kosovo.

Since then the Albanians do not live in Serbia, either psychologically or in any other sense. For them Serbia is a coercion that cannot be avoided for the time being, or is avoided wherever possible.

Victory of Slobodan Milosevic and his certain taking over of leadership in the Serbian-Montenegrin Federation means that for many years to come the Albanians, unless a totally unexpected turnabout occurs, will have to count with the present Serbian President whose second presidential term of office in Serbia is expiring next year. The Albanians are aware that during the last ten years Milosevic's "either-or" has brought Kosovo in the state of neither war nor peace and the current political and diplomatic blockade. However, it is also emphasized that Milosevic has not yet achieved his basic political target. First, he did not manage to drive away the Albanians from Kosovo and to break their political will to have an independent life and separate themselves from Serbia.

The local analysis of the Milosevic's position vis-a-vis Kosovo does not disregard the fact that he had also introduced Serbia and the Serbs into a vicious circle of antagonism from which he himself can find no way out without the assistance of the international community. Such Milosevic, entangled in the unsolvable intrinsic controversies and forced to be cooperative with the international factors, is a lesser evil for the Albanians and their leadership than Seselj, Kostunica, the Serbian disunited opposition and the Kosovo extremists from the Serbian Renewal Movement, better known as leaders of the anti-Albanian rallies from the end of last decade.

Somewhat similar is the political-diplomatic position of Ibrahim Rugova. Apart from boycotting the elections and the Serbian authorities he seems to have lost the energy for further developing indigenous institutions in accordance with the general Albanian political commitments. Among other things, because of material problems, Rugova has, much earlier than Milosevic, agreed to arbitration of the international community in the resolution of the Kosovo problem, although it may not seem so judging by his rhetoric.

It is as if the dependence of Rugova and Milosevic, although not to the same extent, brings closer and equalizes their political-diplomatic positions in the Kosovo paralysis. Rugova still firmly insists on the well known separation of Kosovo, although it is obvious that these are but first maximalistic positions. On the other hand, it is considered here that at the last elections the Serbian electorate has provided Milosevic with not only a stable majority for him to rule at the federal level, but also with a mandate to continue negotiations on the post-war rearrangement of the territory of former Yugoslavia in accordance with international guidelines in which Kosovo features as an important unresolved and potentially dangerous international problem.

These guidelines (no change of borders) place Ibrahim Rugova before a grave dilemma. Same as Milosevic, he could hardly survive if he decided to agree to a joint Serbian-Albanian compromise so as to break free from the present Kosovo paralysis. Namely, compromises are possible only as mutual giving up on some essential political elements. Both are firmly bound by great promises and therefore both need someone third to save their face. In the Kosovo pot, boiling with emotions, the help of a third party, from which other major benefits are also expected, seems as the only realistic possibility for a less painful renouncing of promises and expectations.

In the Kosovo post-electoral distribution of political forces Milosevic and his Socialist Party still remain in power. No one deserves credit for this nor is it a result of "great electoral deceit", as the Serbian opposition calls it. Ever since the first elections here, the Kosovo Serbs mostly voted in favour of the authorities, and not for this or that party. Same happened when greater numbers of them declared their support for Vojislav Seselj's SRS and Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan's SSJ, who were or are still considered integral parts of the power mechanism. Because of the constant repressive character of the Serbian-Albanian relations, the Serbs sought and found their power in Belgrade, not in Kosovo. Consequently they have been more or less a constant element of manipulation and until some historic agreement is reached with the Albanians, Kosovo will remain for them a desirable, but always insecure home.

What is most interesting in the latest choice of the Kosovo Serbs is their electoral decision on the total political marginalization of the Serbian Resistance Movement from Kosovo Polje. Announced with much noise by its leaders as the only authentic Kosovo organization and the most consistent defender of the interests of the Kosovo Serbs, this Movement won only 7,000 votes and did not realize its ambition to be represented in the FRY Chamber of Citizens. It seems that the Serbian voters have assessed that their threats to the Albanians, but also to the Serbs in Serbia and Belgrade authorities, were frivolous and inadequate for the resolution of the Kosovo issue.

These elections neither have proceeded without electoral rigging so common in these regions. Kosovo is from many aspects a free hunting ground of sorts for people in power. In order to secure their positions or eliminate any uncertainties, some of them have committed such an abuse of power with the ballot-boxes that it was impossible to mask it later on. Namely, ballot-boxes were subsequently stuffed. Before these elections much greater caution was exercised in such rigging of results. It was considered that because of the national population structure it would be hard to hide uncontrolled abuse of this type. Therefore the previous practice was rigging of results during counting of votes and data processing. However, simple registering and adding of votes is "easier job" than "complicated" calculations and matching figures. It is assumed that at these elections in Kosovo, ballot-boxes were stuffed with between 40 and 50 thousand voting slips. And claims that the turnout of Albanians was significant do not even deserve a comment. Even less do those on a drastic growth of Serbian population "with voting rights" in these regions...

Fehim REXHEPI AIM Pristina