MINORITIES EXCLUDED FROM THE GAME

Serbia before the Elections

AIM Belgrade, October 10, 1996

There is not much understanding for ethnic minorities in Serbia. The regime has not succeeded in constructing a bridge towards the Albanians in Kosovo, the Muslims in Sandzak, the Hungarians nor other minorities in Voivodina. They mostly do not vote in favour of the Belgrade authorities, and those who do, do it out of fear or pure personal self-interest. Minorities are pushed aside as tainted and undesirable groups and they live in fear for their families and national existence. They are not incorporated in the ruling party, since in 1988 the ruling Socialists pursued extremist Serb nationalistic policy which caused exodus of minorities.

The Albanians left Kosovo in great numbers, and Voivodina was abandoned by the Croats, the Ruthenians, Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanians. Several hundred thousand of domestic Serbs have also left, confirming in this way the undemocratic nature of the political system and economic degradation of the economy. The old truth was confirmed that in a state where minorities are threatened, freedom of majority nation must necessarily also be threatened. Nationalism is a false front for oligarchic rule of uncontrolled elite.

A million and seven hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians will occasionally, only because of international pressure, negotiate with the regime in Belgrade, without a wish to construct joint state agencies with them. They have chosen the policy of economic victims and cultural degradation of their own nation until the minimum of their tactical objectives is achieved: federal Kosovo within Yugoslavia, equal with Serbia and Montenegro. The maximum demand is well-known: independent Kosovo. Having agreed at least to return of pupils and students into state school buildings, Rugova has reduced the proportions of cultural sacrificing of the Albanian children, but he has not renounced his final aim because of it.

In Kosovo, Belgrade has organized lawlessness and dictatorship, having shown that it is uncapable of introducing a decentralized political system and modern market economy by means of which it would attempt to propitiate the Albanians and acquire international support. The Albanians will therefore, not vote in the 1996 federal elections, because they do not see who could be their ally in Serbia. For them, overthrowing of Milosevic in favour of any of the opposition nationalistic group is worthless, since Belgrade opposition has no program for Kosovo and does not understand Kosovo any better than the ruling Socialists. Between them on one and Belgrade authorities and the opposition on the other side, a cold war is going on which awaits arbitration of Washington or Brussels.

Sandzak Muslims are the least understood ethnic minority in Serbia. They are a small ethnic group, they are even unrecognized by Belgrade and the Serb natuionalistic opposition. They have no state, the so-called parent state, nor does anyone abroad pay much attention to them. They have nothing but their internal endurance and expectations that some day a better group of politicians than the current one will come to power in Belgrade.

With the establishment of coalition called Voivodina (which is in favour of autonomy of the province, privatization and ethnic equality) the Serb-Serb relation concerning issues of the political system of the state has been opened. Theferore, it remains to be seen how Hungarian national parties will behave. The Croat party of Bela Tonkovic has no special significance, because Voivodina Croats do not even vote for it due to its inclination towards the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ). Hungarian national parties, especially the one headed by Andrasz Agoston, were aware, just like the leading Serb autonomy-fighters, that during the recent war in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegiovina, there was no sense in reaching out for the constitutional reform of the system in Serbia. Hungarian parties would stand in favour of the autonomy of Voivodina, but probably not before the Serb autonomy-supporters gained enough strength to be able to resist joint attacks of Belgrade authorities and the Serb nationalistic organizations, that they in fact wished to secede from Serbia. Serbs who are in favour of the autonomy have a long road in front of them of trying to attract for their cause majority of the local population poisoned for decades by propaganda from Belgrade which is in fact aimed at draining the profit from Voivodina into Serbia and concealing it by slogans about centralist unity.

Hungarian parties in Voivodina have so far advocated direct and indirect negotiations with Milosevic's government, interested only in saving the lives of the Hungarian population in the clash with the Serb state nationalism. That is why they did not wish to squander strength on the demand for territorial autonomy of Voivodina, because that would have been an incursion into a civic program which has not been backed by majority Serb population yet.

Strangely, minor ethnic groups in Voivodina, like the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, do not feel threatened because of the lack of a great Serb potential which would favour autonomy. This refers also to the Romanians. They have not established nationalistic parties. The coalition Voivodina has opened the door to a new dialogue within the great Serb body, especially between the Serbians and the Voivodina Serbs. Those in favour of the autononmy are fully aware of the difficult situation they are in. Population colonized in Voivodina after the Second World War has not been seriously imbued with the idea of autonomy, many Serbs trust Belgrade nationalistic organizations more than local parties, while the entire state infrastructure is in the hands of colonists who are grateful to Serbia for their privileged position. Economic protest of the citizens of Voivodina against plunder of the local oil, agriculture and industries, is the initial platform for their gathering. How far they will be able to go, will soon be seen

• in 1997 already.

(AIM) Dragan Veselinov