BOSNIA AFTER PARIS
HEADACHE FOR ZAGREB?
* By agreeing to diplomatic relations with Sarajevo, Yugoslavia has formally dodged responsibility for the future of B&H, but it has also created preconditions for establishing new political relations within the state *
AIM Sarajevo, October 4, 1996
It is almost unbelievable with what quantity of frantic foaming the agreement on establishing full diplomatic relations between Bosnia & Herzegovina and Yugoslavia was received in Pale, the political headquarters of the Bosnian Serbs. Biljana Plavsic, the new and not acting any more but true President of Republica Srpska, interpreted this as "treason of Slobodan Milosevic" and in her initial reaction "explained" that it had become clear now that he was not a leader of the Serb nation.
Discontent in Pale is understandable, since with his signature in Paris, Slobodan Milosevic buried the idea on Greater Serbia and that on all the Serbs in a single state for a long time to come. In return, he got lifting of economic sanctions and subsequently will probably get a loan or two for economic reconstruction of Yugoslavia.
But, results of the Paris meeting of the President of B&H, Alija Izetbegovic, and President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, especially those concerning economic cooperation and mutual concessions between the two states, as well as abolishment of visas, will certainly be closely and with concern, studied in Zagreb, too. State leadership of Croatia, primarily President Franjo Tudjman, will recognize in this agreement flight of B&H from the firm and somewhat unpleasant grip of its western neighbour. It is possible that Sarajevo might be accused of turning towards the east, of Yugo-nostalgia, because if Paris conclusions on economic cooperation and non-visa turnover become effective, customs officers will hardly be needed on the Drina - the border between B&H and Yugoslavia. By getting a new exit into the world, and it might be the one via Yugoslavia, Bosnia & Herzegovina would practically wiggle out of the patronage of Croatia, and this is a fact which will cause greatest concern of Franjo Tudjman after the Paris meeting.
However, the President of Croatia must be aware that by his policy he himself had greatly contributed to such developments in the former Yugoslav space. By offering assistance very sparingly and often demanding great big favours in return, he practically forced Sarajevo to seek refuge from this dangerous iron embrace in Belgrade.
As a reminder, Croatia was indeed among the first to recognize integrity and sovereignty of the state of Bosnia & Herzegovina. However, Tudjman was at the same time constantly stirring up hopes of Herzegovina Croats on their possible annexation to Croatia. Two and a half years he skilfully evaded constitution of the Federation of the Bosniacs and the Croats on half of the territory of Bosnia & Herzegovina. He has never allowed giving up the port of Ploce, so badly needed by B&H economy. These are just some of the moves of Zagreb that made Sarajevo turn to Belgrade and forced Bosniac leaders to see in Zagreb the greatest threat to the future of the state of Bosnia & Herzegovina.
Without doubt, after the meeting in Paris of Izetbegovic and Milosevic, political representatives of the Bosnian Croats, concentrated in the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ), will also be in an unenviable position. Tudjman will not be able to publicly present himself as their tutor any more, because if Serbia has abandoned aspirations to Bosnia, so will Croatia be forced to do. And while the Serbs in Bosnia have their Republica Srpska which guarantees them a big deal of independence, local Croats will have to divide power in the Federation with the Bosniacs and with much more attention than before listen closely to messages coming from their partner - the Party of Democratic Action (SDA).
Perhaps it will become clear now how much has been lost because for two and a half years strengthening of the Federation was avoided. Although it was clear that dying down of "Herzeg-Bosna" was inevitable, the HDZ constantly tried to prolong its life. In Sarajevo, on Monday, Presidency of the HDZ finally reached a decision on creation of a political community of the Croats in B&H, which will probably be called "Herzeg-Bosna" again, but this time it will have no attributes of a state. This was the first actual step made towards abolishment of the Croatian republic "Herzeg-Bosna", more precisely its transformation into new, para-state aurthorities again. With its intention to gather in the political community everything that calls itself Croat, the HDZ has obviously shown that it will not allow power which it held for four years in a significant part of B&H slip from its hands so easily.
Although authorities in B&H have still not been constituted on the basis of the elections, the latest political changes in the space of former Yugoslavia will certainly cause significant disturbances on the political map inside the state of Bosnia & Herzegovina. The Bosniacs, or rather the ruling SDA will probably gloat after Paris and be convinced that the Serbs and the Croats in B&H whose political interests are expressed through the SDS and the HDZ, must turn to creation of the joint state. It is possible that this self-satisfaction of the SDA will cause a counter-effect, and even result in rapprochement of the SDS and the HDZ on the state level, which these two parties might explain as resistance to unitarian system in B&H advocated by the SDA. Bozo Raic, President of HDZ B&H has already announced readiness for cooperation with the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), recognizing in that party the legal and legitimate political representative of the Serbs. It would be, in a sense, an attempt of transferring the former cooperation between Tudjman and Milosevic but in a new form into B&H.
It is obvious that inside Bosnia & Herzegovina, various forms of political alliances can be expected among until recently warring parties and that they will be formed arbitrarily, that is, depending on momentary interests of the new/old partners in power: SDS-HDZ-SDA. It could unfortunately all result in an unstable political and state system. Because, by the final agreement of Milosevic to establish full dilomatic relations with Sarajevo and reinforce economic cooperation external threat to B&H has been removed. Now, the problem is inside the state, in an enormous negative charge which may explode and cause a new fire. Without cooperativeness of September election winners with the international community, the circle will be closed again.
SEJAD LUCKIN