ARMY USED AND REJECTED

Interview: Milovan Stankovic, M.S., Colonel in the Army of Republika Srpska

AIM Banja Luka, September 27, 1996

The army of Republika Srpska (RS) is awaiting transformation, the outcome of which is still not quite certain. The Government has announced adoption of the Law on National Defence, and its Prime Minister, Gojko Klickovic, made it public that as of October 1, active officers of the Army of RS, who were on the payroll of the Army of Yugoslavia, will be paid by Republika Srpska from now on.

"Former officers of the JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) in Republika Srpska could experience the same destiny as those in Kucan's, Tudjman's and Alija's army. They were used and rejected as toilet paper. Now they will have to decide whether they want to be professionals or politically apt and obedient. Those who choose professionalism will end up as pensioners and street vendors. Those who have proved to be politically apt and obedient, will remain in the Army of RS", Milovan Stankovic, M.S., known war commander from mount Ozren and retired colonel of the Army of RS, explains the intentions of the Government.

Stankovic who was forced to obey the decision of the authorities of RS and leave the commander's post, was at a post in General Staff of the Army of RS when the war ended. We are talking to him about organization and structure of the Army during the war and nowadays, about its transformation, reinforcements and problems of financing.

AIM: Mr. Stankovic, the Army of Republika Srpska has passed the road from war victories to heavy defeat in the end of the war. The impression was that it also waged a silent war with political and state leadership. What was actually happening?

Stankovic: The attitude of politicians and the state towards the army was strange and stepmotherly. President Karadzic wished to knock general Mladic off his pedestal during the entire war and could not do it. General Mladic could have knocked Karadzic off his political pedestal during the entire war, but did not want to do it. This strange chess stalemate position reflected on the situation in the army. Concerning planning, organization, finances and personnel, many things proceeded spontaneously and by inertia. This spontaneity and independence bordered with anarchy. The result was an unwieldy, sluggish, slow, inert, home-guarding, inefficient and functionless army. As the war continued, it was threatened by complete disorganization, crumbling down, dissolution along all seams.

AIM: Which are the real causes of such crumbling down?

Stankovic: Political and state leadership of RS has never clearly defined objectives it wished to attain by the war. Neither national, nor economic, nor military, nor spatial objectives were clear. It is the same thing as building a house without a plan and a sketch, and without craftsmen and tools.

AIM: Transformation of the Army of RS is mentioned a lot lately. What can be expected of such a transformation?

Stankovic: Prospects of the Army of RS are in its highly-organized and professional status. The contingent of the Army of RS is numerically determined by the Dayton accords. In its transformation, it will have to rely on its professional part (commanding officers, experts for important communication systems, anti-aircraft defence, armoured motorized units and silimar) and recruited contingent. Irreplaceable and inevitable form of military organization lies in firm and close linking of structures of civilian police and its reserve forces as part of a peacetime professional defence echalons.

AIM: There were problems in financing the Army during the war. Will they continue?

Stankovic: Many commanders have turned to various sponsors, donors and patrons during the war and brought the units to the level of mere survival. And donors were people from the ruling party and the authorities who used this as a way to get away from the war and put members of their families away.

Military theoretician of ancient China, Sun Zu Woo wrote two thousand years ago that "the state and the people who are not capable of sustaining their own armed force must sustain someone else's". We did not know that, so now we have someone else's army cruising our state. Financing of the army must be centralized and stable, and the source of financing must be the state budget. Special problem of financing will be the item of equipment protection and maintenance, its repair, and supplementing war supplies. Resources for transformation of the army must be found, but also for its accomodation, food, equipment and training. The task of politics must be development of good neighbourly relations, relieving of tensions and creation of conditions for military cooperation, even by application of the concept of partnership for peace.

AIM: Will professional army with the prescribed contingent be able to carry out the tasks of defence?

Stankovic: Dayton accords limit the number of soldiers and commanding officers in Republika Srpska to 12,403. Reserve contingent is very small and has a tendency of becoming even smaller. Possibilities of supplying even such a reduced professional army is limited by humble possibilities of the economy of RS. With all that in view, it is clear that the professional army in a possible war could not be able to meet all the demands of defence without support from all human and material potentials and without assistance from allies.

AIM: What is the regular number of recruits and in what way will reinforcement of the army of RS by recruits take place?

Stankovic: Only the Ministry of National defence of Republika Srpska can give precise data on the contingent of recruits. According to my evaluation it amounts to about 7,400 recruits. Out of this number, about ten per cent should be subtracted, which includes those who are not capable, who are partially capable or who will postpone serving the army. Regular reinforcement contingent of recruits could be hardly 6,800 soldiers, which is approximately about 50 per cent of what would be necessary. A solution should be sought in two directions: either in an increase of the number of contracting reserve forces, that is creation of a professional part of the army, or in prolonged military service to two years. The first solution is much more expensive and the latter is unpopular and could result in avoiding altogether service in the army.

x (AIM) Branko Peric y