CROATIA NOT RECOGNIZING ERDUT AGREEMENT

Zagreb Sep 26, 1996

AIM Zagreb, September 19, 1996

Even if yesterday there had been any doubt what Granic's, the Assembly's and refugees': "UNTAES go home" meant, today it is quite clear that such a decision was actually made by President of the Republic, Dr Franjo Tudjman. In the course of the assembly session, news arrived from the Presidential palace that the Defence and National Security Council had reached the conclusion that there were no obstacles and that therefore all conditions would be created in time for the elections in Croatian Podunavlje to be scheduled to take place on December 15, in other words, 30 days before the agreed mandate of UNTAES expired. The elections, it was also said, should be organized pursuant Croatian laws and in accordance with electoral registers made in 1991.

Tudjman, that is, his main advisory body which is in fact a specific politburo, after having been until just recently ready to prolong the mandate of UNTAES for another three months, and foreign minister Granic even for additional three months, has now officially confirmed that it had changed its stance. The question is, of course, why is it doing it right now? It is no secret that Tudjman had agreed to elections in Bosnia under the condition the part of the Dayton and Erdut calender referring to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Srijem was also respected. He was also forced to agree to dissolution of Herzeg-Bosna, in other words to the transfer of its competences to the B&H Federation.

According to the assessments of both the USA and Europe, Tudjman has done that part of his task correctly, and even did more than that. By international dictate, having first been briefed in Washington and then having paid a visit to Milosevic while he was on vacation, Tudjman has accepted also the Agreement on normalization of relations with the FR Yugoslavia. This was a considerably risky adventure, especially due to numerous dilemmas the Agreement left open, so it is quite understandable that Tudjman, whose rating in Croatia is not very high, cannot be satisfied with mere promises that there are no obstacles for Croatia becoming a member of the Council of Europe. He needed something stronger, something more specific, which would help him improve his image of an indulgent pawn, especially since the elections are approaching, first local, then for the Chamber of Districts anmd finally presidential. Tudjman and his Council have estimated well that a large victory would be necessary for them to remain in power. In summer 1992 it was international recognition, in spring 1993, it was operation "Maslenica", in autumn 1995, a series of military operations from "Flash" to "Storm".

It is true that this mish-mash made of the flag, sovereignty, independence etc. could not deceive all, which was best seen in Zagreb and all the big cities, but with the help of election engineering, the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) won a large majority in the Chamber of Representatives, and by means of a series of manoeuvres and tricks failed to give up the power in the metropolis. The last trump card Tudjman could play was Croatian Podunavlje and that is exactly what he reached out for now. He ordered spontaneous gatherings from the banished persons, he arranged the decision of the Assembly to end the mandate of UNTAES, and then publicized that the Agreement with Belgrade in fact meant nullification of the Erdut document. Minister Granic declared in the Assembly that Belgrade Agreement had no secret annex, especially not at the expense of third countries, and Podunavlje evidently is not a problem of the third countries. According to the provisions of the Agreement, it is in fact solely the internal issue of Croatia, so, following this logic, it can be concluded that Tudjman does have the right to schedule elections there whenever he sees fit, especially since the situation there is much simpler than that in B&H.

A fortnight ago, general Jacques Klein declared that the elections in Croatian Podunavlje would take place when fundamental preconditions were created for it, and this meant when general amnesty was proclaimed, when electors were listed, when citizenship of the local population was defined and when political parties were registered. The American general was not optimistic at the time and stated that Belgrade had asked for prolongation of the mandate of international forces for another year, and that the same was done by the local Eastern-Slavonian assembly, in order to enable the process to take place peacefully and slowly, without disturbances and in order to eliminate the possibility of a new avalanche of refugees.

Tudjman is now responding that all conditions will be created. And this means that the Assembly will adopt a law on general amnesty, that the census of electors is not a problem because it exists ever since 1991, noting that the right to vote will be enjoyed only by those who possessed Croatian cerificates on cititzenship, the parties also exist, although the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) is banned, of course, but registration of new parties will soon be possible. Tudjman's advisory council never explicitly mentioned in the statement that the UNTAES would have to leave after expiry of the agreed deadline, but declarations of the men from the state leadership, and members of the Council, such as Granic and others, clearly show that Croatia is not satisfied with what was accomplished in the eight months of the previous mandate. Moreover, they claim that UNTAES, similarly to formerly UNPROFOR, is an obstacle which slows down peaceful reintegration, but such a demand made by the Assembly is even more serious. Because it shows that, apart from the banished persons who have expressed it at rallies in Osijek and Vinkovci, the entire people share the opinion.

There are two major questions which one cannot but wonder about: is this just another form of pressure exerted by Tudjman on the international community and a reminder of given promises, or does the Croatian President hold more trump cards than it shows at the moment? Both possibilities should equally be taken into account, but with the inevitable remark that Tudjman is in no situation to give false promises, because even the ordered protests of banished persons could return to him as a boomerang, because it is true that so far not a single banished person has retuned home, and they had been promised to do it by the end of this summer. Those who believe that Tudjman has bluffed, refer to the Erdut Agreement signed on November 13, 1995 by Hrvote Sarinic for the Croatian party and Milan Milutinovic for the Serbian, but also by American ambassador in Croatia, Peter Galbraith and Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, Thorvald Stoltenberg. In the very first article of this document it is stated that "there will be a transitional period lasting 12 months which may be prolonged for another period of the same duration at the most, if demanded by one of the parties concerned". Therefore, it is as clear as may be: one of the parties may ask for the transitional period to be prolonged, without justifying it in any way, because this is left to the Security Council to decide about. The fourth article ensures "to all persons who abandoned the region or have come to the region, but whose places of residence were previously in Croatia, the same rights as to other inhabitants of the region". In this way the change of ethnic structure was actually accepted, because the right to vote would be given to the Serbs from western Slavoania and former Krajina, if they were not war criminals, of course, if the law on amnesty referred to them and if they were issued Croatian citizenship certificate. This has obviously nothing to do with 1991 population census. And finally, Article 12 says that "elections will be organized for local authorities, including municipal, district and regional, not later than 30 days before the expiry of the transitional period, and Serb community will be asisted to nominate a joint Council of Municipalities". In this provision Tudjman seeks a foothold for the elections until December 15, but obviously disregards that the agreement uses the term "30 days before the expiry of the transitional period", and it may last 12, 15 or even 24 months. Apart from it, those who claim that the Erdut Agreement is not in compliance with the Croatian Constitution are right, but Croatia must have known what it was signing when it agreed to the obligation to form the Serb Council of Municipalities. It is worthwhile to cite also article 10 which says that after the expiry of the tarnsitional period, the international community will supervise and report on safeguarding human rights in the long run.

It seems that Tudjman in fact wishes to recede from the Erdut Agreement, regardless of the fact that the USA and the Geneva Conference, that is the UN, were its guarantors. What is then his wish founded on? All things condidered - it must be the Belgrade Agreement, because as Minister Granic would say, "this document is the best message to local Serbs that Podunavlje is a part of Croatia and no group of extremists will be permitted to impose the rate of reintegration on Croatia". It is true, Granic will say, that the Erdut Agreement prescribes the possibility of prolongation of the mandate of UNTAES, but that is something not decided by the Serb extremists but by the Security Council in agreement with Croatia. Tudjman and Granic perhaps do have something up their sleeve, and America might after all be ready to give them a large pre-election gift, and it can also be expected that Milosevic will also add a small gift of his own. Tudjman will certainly, like so many times before, be willing to pay him back.

GOJKO MARINKOVIC