KOSOVO AFTER FIVE YEARS

AIM Pristina, July 15, 1996

During the eighties, the systematic crisis of former Yugoslav federation was focused and refracted mostly in the problem of Kosovo. It is also a fact that dramatic developments in Kosovo in the late eighties and in the beginning of the nineties contributed to strengthening of Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia and to the unexpectedly quick and bloody dissolution of the former federation. However, in the end of 1990, the centre of the crisis suddenly "moved" from the south (Kosovo) to the west of former Yugoslavia ("Serb" Krajinas in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina), where after rebellion of the Serbs and proclamation of "secession" of Serb republics - war broke out. On the other hand, in Kosovo, although all analyses forecast that the crisis would inevitably end in war, also quite unexpectedly, a specific hibernation of the situation occurred. Since 1991, practically nothing has happened here. A status quo was maintained based on an equilibrium of fear. "Parallel" political and other institutions were established (education, economy, culture, etc.), i.e. a symbiotic coexistence at a low but comparatively stable level of tolerance.

This status quo in Kosovo was, of course, forced on both the parties. Serbia has continued to maintain the same level of police and political repression as at the time when Kosovo was in the focus of interest, but the situation seemed much less dramatic in reference to proportions of the conflict and crime in Bosnia and Croatia. The war has not only overshadowed Kosovo, but even made it appear as an "oasis of peace". The Serbian regime-controlled media, since Kosovo was "once and for all" annexed by Serbia, did their best to artificially create an almost idyllic image that the problem of Kosovo did not exist any more, but that there was only the problem of separatist leaders who were acting opposite to the interests of Kosovo Albanians.

On the other hand, straining of relations was not in the interest of either the Serbian regime or the Albanian leadership in Kosovo. Of the first, because the war in Croatia and Bosnia engaged and tired them out so much that they must have been afraid of opening another front. Of the latter, because they realized comparatively too late to what extent Belgrade was in fact afraid of an explosion in Kosovo and the war with the Kosovo Albanians. And by the time leaders of Kosovo Albanians finally discovered that Serbian belligerent threats were more an expression of fear than their actual resoluteness "to go to the end", they were faced with the obstructing factor of their own internal weaknesses. Radical faction which was in the minority, claimed that a unique and unrepeatable historical opportunity was missed to start war and open a new front at the time when the Serbians, due to a conflict with almost all the neighbours and practically with the whole world, were the most vulnerable. Instead of such a stab in the back, the leaders of Kosovo Albanians preferred to adopt variant of the strategy of waiting they consuidered to be more beneficial for the Albanian movement. The problem was actually in the fact that neither Kosovo nor Albania were prepared to start the adventure of waging war, both militarilly and organization-wise. Radicalism of Kosovo Albanians had its wings clipped primarily because of Albania which was at the crucial moment for them experiencing a systematic, social and economic collapse. While the parent country, after the collapse, was receiving an infusion, one could not expect from it any form of mobilization concerning Kosovo. That is why the radicals and militarists in Kosovo were forced to withdraw, and the main role was given to the moderate and cautious Dr Ibrahim Rugova and his supporters.

Of course, the five-year long relative peace in Kosovo was by many analysts assessed as a form of "hibernating war". In catastrophic forecasts, it was claimed that immediately after the war in Bosnia ended, conflicts in Kosovo would start, and then spread into a general Albanian-Serbian war, with by far greater regional repercussions than the previous, Bosnian war, which was despite everything somehow controlled by Belgrade, Zagreb and world offices. (The Bosnian pot was covered to prevent it from spilling over and causing a broader regional war). It was believed that the Kosovo war would inevitably spill over to Macedonia, which would be a shot at the very backbone of stability in the Balkans, provoking not only war conflicts among immediate neighbours (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania), but also those which could lead to dissolution of a very important southern wing of the NATO (conflict between Greece and Turkey), and therefore, lead to disturbance of the entire strategic equilibrium in the Meditarranean and the direction leading to Near and Middle East.

I believe that the catastrophic scenario is rather a simulation of a potential situation than a realistic option. It is necessary to imagine a situation of complete spontaneity and irresponsibility of international factors for such a scenario to start happening, with all the clearly predictable consequences, including dissolution of the NATO. Such things, nevertheless, cannot be left to whims of tribal chiefs in the Balkans. After all, external factors, and I primarily mean the Americans, have already set up the demarcation line in Macedonia and along the Serbian-Albanian border, in order to prevent a new war.

Apart from this powerful external limitation, there are internal limits to new radicalization of the Serbian-Albanian conflict. Although it is true that in Kosovo there is a basic military distribution of interests in Kosovo, or a situation which can hardly be resolved without open conflicts and a new "ethnic demarcation", Serbian-Albanian war cannot break out at the moment for quite the opposite reasons from the ones in 1991 and 1992 when it seemed inevitable to many. If collapse of Albania at the time affected the choice of Kosovo Albanians to wait and seek a "political solution", nowadays, a collapse of Serbia. i.e. FR Yugoslavia, which is becoming more evident every day, is a factor which restrains belligerent passions. In the meantime, Serbian militarism has been greatly subdued. Not only because of the total defeat in Croatia and partial defeat in Bosnia, but because internal potentials (political, strategic, systematic, economic, etc.) of Serbia, without which it is impossible to wage war, had been largely used up. Milosevic has not suddenly become a peace maker because he had become aware of his delusion, but because he had realized that he had no ammunition even for an honourable military suicide in the struggle for "sacred Kosovo".

Therefore, the five-year hibernation has not passed without strong implications on the actors of a potential war in Kosovo, and the regional and broader international environment has completely changed. If the war in Kosovo was in a sense mostly "spent" in Croatia and Bosnia, in other words, if the previous wars had tired out the Serbs to such an extent that they have practically been left without any political and military and strategic credits for the planned war in Kosovo, the Albanians have managed to internationalize their problem, and - especially when speaking of Albania - to quickly shift their strategy towards alliance with the USA and the NATO, and in this way essentially, if not completely, improve their inferior military and political position in relations to the one they held a few years ago. Relation of forces in this 1996 is nevertheless quite different from what it used to be in 1991, for instance, when Serbia was at the height of its militaristic aggressiveness and resolved all problems and aspirations by force.

Because of that change in the relation of forces, the problem of Kosovo, of course, has not become less complex and risky than it used to be back in 1991. It still involves the same irreconcilable positions of the two ethnic aspirations which cannot be resolved in any other way but by war. Kosovo Albanians plebiscitarily insist on independence of Kosovo. Official Serbia still claims that it will do anything not only to keep Kosovo, but also to change the present ethnic "domination" of the Albanians.

For the great powers which have quite awkwardly and hesitatingly mediated in resolution of the crisis in the Balkans, the issue here is how to find a resolution which would bridge the gap. But, it is doubtful whether in the present basically belligerent constellation it is possible to find a compromising formula which would lead to a peaceful solution of the Kosovo issue. The international factors have been insisting on such a compromising formula ever since May 1993, when the so-called Washington Agreement on resolution of the Balkan crisis was reached, which prescribed a high level of autonomy for Kosovo, similar to the one it enjoyed in the former Yugoslav federation.

Until spring this year, the international factor did not insist much on testing the Washington formula in practice, which both Belgrade and Pristina claimed was unacceptable. Constant postponement of opening of the issue of Kosovo was justified by engrossment with and complications concerning Bosnia. And only after implementation of peace in Bosnia had begun, world centres of power increasingly and more openly announced final opening of the issue of Kosovo, without resolution of which noone can imagine a lasting peace and stability in the region.

Due to such announcements, but also due to the awareness in Serbia and in Kosovo that it is impossible to maintain forever the status quo based on parallel systems and equilibrium of fear, in the past two months tensions in Kosovo have quite suddenly started to increase, and even unexpected shifts occurred. It has all begun with a series of simultaneous assasinations of Serbian policemen and civilians in five places in Kosovo. This happened towards the end of April, and then almost every week, more or less serious shocks followed, announcing a rapid change in the configuration of the five-year old status quo. The first to cross the Rubicon was Adem Demaqi who reformulated the demand for independence of Kosovo in the beginning of May into the idea of creation of a Balkan confederation in which Kosovo as a republic would still be linked to Serbia and Montenegro. Demaqi called his project "Balkania", forecasting that the three-member confederation could consequently be joined by other states, e.g. Albania and Macedonia. Although Demaqi's idea seemed naive and unfeasible in the present circumstances, it was still a signal of a certain tactical mitigation of the position held by the Kosovo Albanians.

Polemics about this controversial proposal of Demaqi's had hardly died down when a crisis of legitimacy of the Albanian movement was stirred up when on May 25, the mandate of the Kosovo parliament elected in 1992 expired. The problem was that this parliament had actually never held its constituting session, nor had conditions been created for scheduling new elections. Opponents of Ibrahim Rugova on the political scene of Kosovo wished to use this situation and take legitimacy away from his so far unquestioned leadership. They claimed that after May 25, Kosovo would not have a legal parliament and government, nor any form of full representation of state and national interests. The solution was found in a decree issued by Dr Ibrahim Rugova, in the capacity of president of the republic of Kosovo, which prolonged the mandate of the parliament for another year.

Rugova's considerably shaken position was in the meantime strengthened by two consecutive events - results of elections in Albania and opening of the American Information Centre in Pristina. Defeat of communists in Albania (although under shady circumstances) against whom Dr Rugova openly opted, reinforced his alliance with Sali Berisha and "policy of continuity" which compensates for its basic moderation concerning the problem of Kosovo with expectations that, under pressure exerted by international factors, a political solution will be found. Opening of the American Information Centre in Pristina just additionally stressed the presence of the powerful ally in the forthcoming political game.

Serbian reactions to these developments were unexpectedly quite defeatist. First, President of the Serbian Academy od Sciences and Arts, Aleksandar Despic, "opened his heart" and presented to the Serbian public what at his time Dobrica Cosic called the "bitter truth", that Kosovo ethnically and in every other sense was lost for the Serbs and that therefore an adequate longterm solution should be found. Despic placed the dilemma in prespective of a predictable demographic expansion of Kosovo Albanians who would, if they remained in democratic Serbia of the future, practically eventually have an equal number of inhabitants as the Serbs. Are the Serbs ready to accept the fact that they will be forced to share their state with the Albanians, or is it after all better to proceed with demarcation before it is too late, and cede the bigger part of Kosovo to the Albanians?

The serbian public has already without major shocks swallowed Despic's bitter pill. Only the Kosovo Serbs, those who had inaugurated Milosevic's absolute power in the end of the eighties, tried to revive the "resistance movement" by inviting Milosevic to Vidovdan (June 28 - great Serbian holiday) celebration, to render an account to them for his national policy, that is to tell them what will become of Kosovo. At the gatharing in Gracanica, however, Milosevic's chair remained empty, just as did the chairs of Serbian opposition leaders. Does this mean, as the Serbs from Kosovo fear, that at a certain moment in the future they would be left at the mercy of their destiny as the Serbs from Krajina?

In the meantime, preparations for negotiations are being made on both sides. There are speculations concerning the possible role of Albania in the forthcoming elections which will be decisive for the faith of Milosevic's regime. Although it is not likely that a spectacular progress will be made in negotiations, which have formally not even started yet, to the end of this year when federal elections will take place, the possibility for a variant of an indirect coalition with Rugova should not be completely excluded for the Serbian elections in the end of 1997 or in the beginning of 1998. Milosevic is pressed hard again, and in such situations he is known to have made certain unexpected moves. Has he already made such a move in Kosovo by leaving his chair in Gracanica empty?

Shkelzen Maliqi AIM Pristina