NEVER DIVIDED CROATIA

AIM Zagreb, July 10, 1996

When negotiations with the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) and President Tudjman were announced, many wondered what did Vlado Gotovac and his Croat Social Liberal Party (HSLS) wanted with it? There are a few theses which offer themselves as the answer - from the one which says that this is simply a matter of buying ministerial posts, to the one that the Liberals have realized that it was necessary to negotiate because it was in the interest of Croatia, i.e. in order to avoid possible conflicts. After operation "Storm", and as Tudjman likes to say, and indeed this is a fact, when the Serb issue has ceased to exist, in other words, when the Croat-Serb conflict has disappeared, the Croat-Croat one is becoming more obvious. According to certain hints, but never explicitly, that is exactly what leaders of the Liberals - Gotovac, Budisa, Kramaric, Rados... tried to show. But, although journalists were accused of being responsible for failure of the negotiations, which is ridiculous, because apart from Novi list and Feral Tribune, all the other media, including the most powerful one - television, offered support to Tudjman-Gotovac "coalition", it was obvious that the disposition of the members of the HSLS was decisive for interruption of the talks. Gotovac himself declared, when panic-stricken he publicized his 50 requirements, that he had overestimated credibility of his personality.

The fact that the negotiations were interrupted, and reactions of a large portion of the public and opposition parties showed that Croatia was divided more than ever. As well as that HDZ is on one end, and all the others on the other, regardless of whether they belong to the so-called nation-building or leftist and civic parties. However, let us turn the question the other way round: why does the ruling party which out of 127 seats in the Chamber of Representatives of the Assembly holds 75, or nearly 60 per cent, need a coalition partner when it is quite clear that with its voting mechanism it can adopt whatever laws it likes? It is also true that the HDZ had tried to negotiate with other parties as well, such as the HSS or the SDP, so why were the Liberals chosen this time?

First of all, such a large advantage in the parliament is a delusion and does not correspond to actual support Tudjman's movement enjoys in Croatia. The state list of HDZ candidates won 45.20 of votes, another 20 deputies, often under shady circumstances, won in 28 electoral units, but the final enormous advantage was brought by 12 deputies of the diaspora, which means Bosnia & Herzegovina, or more precisely western Herzegovina. When the fact is added to this that Tudjman has experienced a fiasco in Zagreb and won only 36 per cent of votes, and that the outcome was similar in almost all major cities, it becomes clear that there was no reason to be triumphant after the elections. Tudjman himself was surprised by this relative "success" which he was forced to achieve but applying various "cosmetic" interventions, various small and large thefts and with the help of "emigrant Croatia" which has never been Croatia, especially since after the "Storm" he had expected a two-thirds majority.

At this moment, after the Zagreb crisis, decline of the standard of living, accumulated discontent due to numerous robberies, scandals, growing isolation of Croatia in the world, Tudjman is aware that his position has never been worse. Some polls show that at this moment the HDZ would win thirty per cent of votes, and in Zagreb even below 15 per cent. Tudjman himself enjoys support of between one quarter and one third of the voters, and he has definitely become a hostage of his rightist faction whose embrace he is trying to tear himself away from. These are in brief main reasons why he had been ready to negotiate with the Liberals and share power with them. But, why the Liberals? Primarily because the HSLS has certain international connections and reputation which could be helpful in getting out of certain unpleasant situations, and especially in repairing relations with Germany. Along with it, the Croatian Liberals, according to many of their characteristics, are not liberals at all, but just a decent or more decent variant of Croatian nationalists. Figuratively speaking, they know how to use a knife and a fork, as opposed to the members of the HDZ who prefer eating roasted oxen or lambs with their greasy hands.

Even though the Liberals proved to be the sharpest critics of the HDZ, it is quite certain that there was no difference between the two parties in their so-called nation-building policy, moreover, the Liberals had at times even advocated more radical stances than Tudjman himself, not wishing to knuckle under demands coming from Europe and the world. For instance, the Liberals publicly warned that they did not support the Washington agreement, they were not enthusiastic about what was signed in Dayton either, they were not in favour of the Croat-Serb negotiations, they advocated the military option and nowadays they criticize negotiations with Milosevic before he recognizes Croatia in its pre-war borders. That is how the Liberals were in fact closer to the righist faction of the HDZ than it seemed on the basis of sharp public declarations made by Gotovac, Budisa, Granic and others. Of course, it would be unfair to say that they are merely a more sophisticated replica of the HDZ, because the HSLS advocated quite a different transformation, raised its voice against plunder, was in favour of freedom of the media (but in places where they had won they acted according the same recipe as the HDZ), claimed that Croatia must join Europe, they have never been in favour of division of Bosnia, they warned against the disastrous situation in the economy, numerous social problems...

But, concerning key issues, Tudjman and Gotovac would certainly manage to reach an agreement. However, it is the time of peace, when Prime Minister and important ministers declare that the Croatian state is an undoubted fact, and now it is questionable only how to fill it and with what. Gotovac made a mistake when he initiated talks at the time when the HDZ had become most vulnerable and weak. Time will show how much the HSLS has lost of its credibility along the way and who has profiteered the most from this episode. But, even if it is true that two large blocks have been created in Croatia, it is also more and more obvious that powerful convulsions which are shaking the HDZ ever since the conflict with Manolic and Mesic, continue. The HDZ is divided to such an extent that it is impossible to hide it from the public. And is there a better example for such an allegation than the open conflict between the minister of defence Gojko Susak and foreign minister Mate Granic?

It has been known for some time that Susak, generally believed to be the second man of Croatia, is the head of the hard-core rightist faction, as the leader of the Herzegovinian lobby, but it is also true that he has never publicly contradicted Tudjman. But, how can anyone possibly interpret the recent interview of lawyer Zvonimir Hodak given to Vjesnik (who is also Susak's personal lawyer) in which he accuses minister Granic that he would extradite half Croatia if anyone asked him to. The official defence attorney of general Blaskic did not spare even his own wife, vice prime minister Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, and he also wondered why was Croatia trying so hard to join an unimportant organization such as the Council of Europe? And all that is contrary to what Tudjman is publicly saying and the calm and persistent Granic so skillfully implementing. It is no secret that Miomir Zuzul, Croatian ambassador in Washington has aspirations to take Granic's place, and it is known what faction he belongs to. The question is whether Granic will survive and whether the HDZ is entering a new dramatic period?

On the other hand, open conflicts about assessments and evaluations of the economic situation are also becoming evident. Indeed, while Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa is persistently repeating that there is no recession in Croatia, nor will there be, some other ministers and respectable economists, as for example minister of the economy Davor Stern, do not share his optimism, nor are they sure that Croatian monetary policy of stable kuna is wise in a long term. There are also differences concerning freedom of the media, future of Herzeg-Bosna, which all together indicates that Tudjman not only failed to unite the Croats, but has problems even with his own party. These are all reasons why Tudjman has agreed to negotiations about division of power, but one should also count on his cunning, because even if he did not succeed in signing the "historical compromise", if that had been his primary aim in the first place, at least he has most probably got rid of one of his main rivals in presidential elections. At the same time, he caused discord among the opposition, which is best illustrated by the fact that a few presidential candidates are already being offered, such as the President of the HSS Zlatko Tomcic or Vice-President of the SDP Zdravko Tomac.

He did not succeed in one thing, after all. The people are still losing confidence in the HDZ and in him, and despite the attempt to keep up appearances that Granic and Susak are in idyllic relations, it is clear that the HDZ is irretrievably splitting into its components, and Tudjman is still a hostage of his own radical right wing.

GOJKO MARINKOVIC