SOCIALISTS DEFEATED BEFORE THE ELECTIONS
Coalition Shifting in the RS
Fitting Predrag Radic into the saddle on the bridled horse causes doubt among the Socialists that Slobodan Milosevic had not meant to actually put them in power in the Republic of Srpska. A source close to the leadership in Pale claims that during Milosevic's negotiations with the Socialists and Radic, intimate associates of Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik and Aleksa Buha, were already waiting in the adjoining room.
AIM Banja Luka, July 5, 1996
The last day for official application to run in the elections, 4th of July, will be remembered by the Socialist Party of the Republic of Srpska (RS) as the day of its worst defeat. It was the second unexpected blow from Belgrade in the past month.
First, some twenty days ago, also quite unexpectedly, by a directive from Belgrade, they were pushed into a coalition, called the "Alliance for Peace and Progress" with minor parties of leftist orientation. The recommendation given in a tone of an order was accepted with a good deal of grumbling. "Political hooligans whose parties exist only on paper will profiteer on our account", it could be heard among the leadership of the Socialists. For the sake of party discipline and as a sign of obedience, the Socialists gave up almost half of the election mandates to their coalition partners.
When this prematurely born coalition, after the tedious childbirth, was finally swaddled, and when the heads of the Socialists sighed with relief, the scenario for a new coalition game was revealed. In his office, Milosevic brought them face to face with Predrag Radic and leaders of his Democratic Patriotic Block (DPB) and demanded from them to run in the elections together with him and agree about a joint proposal of candidates in all election lists. Both the ones and the others agreed that unity and harmony were of joint and general interest. They say that the "boss" acted the role of a democrat to the end, convinced that he was finally dealing with persons who were as good as their words.
However, it turned out again that return from Belgrade would be challenging. When they were back in Banja Luka, trouble stirred up almost immediately: the Socialists proposed their candidate for the president (Zivko Radisic), and the Democratic Patriotic Block their own (Predrag Radic). Therefore, the two men from Krajina found themselves on a log like two stubborn rams which could not turn back.
In an atmosphere of unpleasant haggling, just a day before the time limit for registration of candidates in the elections expired, a letter arrived from Belgrade giving advantage to Radic, and leaving Radisic the post of the vice-president. "It was a night of despair and hopelessness. We even considwered collective resignation", says the interlocutor from top echelons of the Socialist Party.
Aware that they must agree to the game, the Socialists reconciled themselves to this concession too. They were ready to continue the election game with Radic according to the rules "prescribed" by Belgrade. However, another unexpected turn occurred: Radic refused to share the role and demanded that Radisic join the DPB. When negotiations got into a blind alley again, on the day when the lists had to be submitted, Nikola Sainovic, official in the Government of FRY and Bosko Perosevic, president of the Socialist Party of Serbia for Voivodina, arrived from Belgrade to disentangle the Gordian knot. At first Radic refused to come to a meeting scheduled for noon, and then three hours later, finally appeared with vice-president of the RS Nikola Koljevic and the celebrated Serb commander from Bijeljina, Nebojsa Savic alias Mauser, who has developed political ambitions lately. Sainovic and Perosevic said what they had intended to say, and the coalition partners were forced to make up their list of candidates and submit it in the last minute to the Election Committee.
The unexpected denouement of the drama caught the Socialists unprepared. What they had feared the most was thrown in their faces in a cruel, inappropriate and insulting manner. "He should have told us - you will not be in power, your role is to create a parliamentary atmosphere and you will enjoy protection for it...", a member of of the Main Board expresses his disapproval and for understandable reasons asks not to have his name mentioned.
Fitting Radic in the saddle of the bridled horse causes doubt of the Socialists that Slobodan Milosevic had actually never really meant to bring them in power in the RS. His aim and strategic interest in the RS is moderately nationalistic leadership which has credits earned in the war and which is an accomplice in the policy of the ruling set, and which he will, therefore, be able to influence and if necessary lay a part of the responsibility at their door. Such a leadership must assume the burden of responsibility for the war, because accounts will be made out immediately after the elections.
Had power been given to the Socialists, this burden would have fallen on Milosevic, too, and he wishes to avoid that at any cost. For that reason, doubts that a silent coalition between Pale and Belgrade exists are not unfounded. A source close to the leadership in Pale claims that while Milosevic was negotiating with the Socialists and Radic, intimate associates of Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik and Aleksa Buha were already waiting in the adjoining room.
According to one version of the election game, sacrificing of the Socialists and selection of Radic is a concession made to Karadzic in return for his withdrawal. This should be confirmed by Sainovic's previous visit to Pale and frequent meetings of Milosevic with the vice-presidents Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic.
The fact that creation of an independent television promised to them is inexplicably delayed also contributed to sudden disillusionment of the Socialists. Reliable sources claim that television equipment, having waited for a long time at the border, was sent back four days ago. Recent interruption of broadcasting of the central news program produced by Radio-Television Serbia, and soon after, of the Belgrade program as well, caused discontent of the public, but no reactions from Belgrade. Milosevic has not addressed a single word of reproach, least of all condemned, repeated bombing attacks against the Socialists. The past few days marked the final phase in the process of replacement of all managers - members of the Socialist Party. Noone in RS believes that Milosevic could not have prevented such moves of Pale.
The avaylanche of discontent with Milosevic has started suddenly from among his most devoted hard-core supporters. The most frequent question which can be heard is - why has Milosevic never come to Banja Luka, while Tudjman is touring villages around Herzegovina? The just made move with Radic is a signal for the Socialists that support is still offered to the nationalists.
(AIM) Branko Peric