SAVE THE MYTH, LEAVE KOSOVO!

AIM Pristina, June 18, 1996

After forcible annexation of Kosovo in 1989 and then several years long maintenance of a fragile status quo during which it tolerated Albanian parallel authorities, Belgrade seems to be preparing to face openly the issue of Kosovo. And just as the issue of Kosovo was ten years ago opened in the so-called Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) as part of a radical, and as it later turned out, militant approach to the Serb national issue, the problem of Kosovo has been opened again for profound and radical reconsideration by the same politicized part of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts which has aspirations to play the role of a creator and guardian of strategic interests of the Serbian nation. Even the scenario of a public scandal is in many ways similar. Again, a journal, this time Dnevni Telegraf, has revealed something that was allegedly an internal debate about the problem of Kosovo in SANU, just as it had once been claimed that publication of the "Memorandum" had been unauthorized, "theft" of an internal and uncompleted document. This repetition of the scenario probably serves to provide a possibility of a retreat if opening of the sensitive issue of Kosovo meets with strong reaction of the Serbian public. Should that happen, it could always be said that the Academy as an institutions was not behind this approach, but that it was just an individual opinion of some of its members. But, in order to give the experimental balloon the appearance of a semi-official proposal which would at the same time have a powerful and sobering effect on the Serbian public, as the proposer of the radical new approach to the problem of Kosovo appeared the current President of the SANU, Aleksandar Despic.

In his speech at the annual assembly of the SANU, Mr Despic warned his audience that Kosovo was "the most significant strategic problem from the aspect of the future of the Serbian nation and present Serbia and Yugoslavia". He believes that the Serbs have very little time for a well-balanced approach to this issue, not more than ten years, and that is why it is necessary to act resolutely and quickly: "We are at another historical crossroads with two roads leading to the future: one insists on territorial integrity of Serbia, the other is the road of agreement to the aspiration of the Albanians to create an independent country by secession of a part of Serbia". The reason for Despic's strategic fear is high birth rate among the Albanians which will condition Serbia "in twenty or thirty years to become a country of two nations with approximately the same number of people" and that the dilemma whether the Albanians are a nation or a minority "will have only an academic meaning" because, according to Despic's arguments, "once they (the Albanians) have a large majority in the parliament of Kosovo, and in the parliament of Serbia when they begin acquiring first a significant and then a domineering position, it will be all the same both to them and to us what category they will belong to".

His generally reasonable contemplation about the two roads to resolution of the issue of Kosovo, Mr Despic concluded with a comparatively shocking proposal that as soon as possible "talks with those who are insisting on secession of Kosovo should be initiated, about peaceful civilized separation and demarcation, in order not to repeat the tragic experiences from recent history".

In reactions and initial analyses of this proposal, the greatest attention was devoted to the timing (why now?) and explanations were mostly sought in increased pressure on Serbia to proceed with resolution of the issue of Kosovo as a precondition for overcoming the dangerous Balkan crisis and discovering a new formula of regional balance of forces and stability. Strategic analyses show that the current efforts to settle the crisis in Bosnia will not only be questioned but could even escalate into a new war of much broader proportions if as a preventive measure, the issue of Kosovo is not resolved. A clear signal for cementing such preventive presence of the international community was the recent opening of the American Information Centre in Kosovo. In a combination with the preventive presence of American troops in Macedonia which is also justified by the situation in Kosovo, the world super power has clearly drawn the strategic demarcation line of planned future configuration of security in the Balkans which implies an agreement between the Serbs and the Albanians about Kosovo.

The extracted diplomatic brekthrough of the Americans in Kosovo, although it apparently has only a symbolic significance (it is after all just an information centre) it was rightfully understood by guardians of strategic national interest of the Serbs as the end of the illusion that anything could be settled in Kosovo by force or on the basis of unilateral dictate from Belgrade. That is why one may say that Mr Despic's speech came at the right moment, when it has become clear to all reasonable Serbs, but to all political parties as well, that resolution of the issue of Kosovo can no longer be postponed. In this context the recent statement made by Milosevic for Der Spiegl, when he said that the Albanians in Serbia enjoyed the greatest rights like no other minority in the world, can be understood as his making a smoke screen for the almost simultaneous Despic's bomb on possible secession of Kosovo.

While presenting the future of Serbia with Kosovo in dark colours, with "the Albanians conquering it from within", Aleksandar Despic casually mentioned the idea of the deception of the traditional enemies of Serbia (he probably meant the Germans and the Italians) who at the moment support the idea of unchanged borders and autonomy for the Albanians, but in the long run dream about a breakthrough of the Albanians and gradual internal disintegration of the Serbian entity. Just as the Albanians used to be instruments in the hands of the Turkish conquerors, nowadays they are becoming strategic weapons of a future German expansion into the Balkans...

However, it was not only the external pressure which caused opening of the issue of Kosovo. It is much more complicated. It could in fact be said that nowadays, all Serbian troubles intersect and accelerate in Kosovo. It is indeed, as Mr Despic determined, a great strategic crossroads. Belgrade is simply overwhelmed by a series of urgent problems. It is on the verge of a series of catastrophes or decisive challenges such as: the strategic dilemma whether Serbia will remain in the East or turn towards the West; the still uninitiated or wavering transition of the system from state socialism to disorganized state capitalism; economic collapse and gradual encounter with consequences of the technological blind alley of large systems (steel works in Smederevo, Zastava car industries, electronic industries in Nis...); paying dearly social consequences of the technological blind alley and the already acute technological surplus manpower which is assessed to have reached about one million; paying for the consequences of the war (taking care of about one million refugees in Serbia); enormous social appropriations of funds for pensioners, especially military who are concentrated in Serbia; national and strategic obligations to the state entity of the Bosnian Serbs; maintenance of a large military, police and administrative apparatus; consequences of removal of constitutional anomalies of the so-called Zabljak Yugoslavia, i.e. the issue of facing the problem of Montenegrin statehood; problems with minorities (without Kosovo) and defining the status of Vojvodina, etc. In such a catastrophic situation of Serbia, Kosovo is just an additional burden, the major immobilizing factor for moving the driving-wheel of changes from a standstill

When observed from this angle, Despic's speech is not a surprise. It can even be considered to have come too late. This is evident from the reactions in Serbia. It was feared that they would be vehement, but it turned out that they were quite luke warm and essentially expressed general defeatism both of the Serbian nationalists, the liberals and the democrats. Both consider Kosovo to be a black hole which is "sucking in" the future of Serbia, the first because it prevents creation of a Serbian ethnic state, and the latter because profoundly anomalous relations in Kosovo lead to constant militarization of Serbia and prevent its true democratization.

The other question which was posed in reaction to Despic's proposal was by whose order and in whose name he had spoken. It was claimed that Despic was a high official of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and that his proposal was in fact Milosevic's experimental balloon of the idea of secession of Kosovo, which is actually assumed to be part of the secret agreements from Dayton. The dilemma whether Despic spoke by instructions of the regime or not is comparatively irrelevant. The issue of Kosovo is an imperative for all the political subjects in Serbia, and not any more just a question of party polarization as it ised to be. For a long time Kosovo has beeb a topic of severe internal discussions between those who are believed to be responsible for the destiny of Serbia and the Serbian people. Dobrica Cosic was the first to assess back in 1968 that the issue of Kosovo was opened too late. His later speeches were also mostly imbued by defeatism. Cosic's frequent allusions to the new defeat in Kosovo are now just clearly articulated in Despic's main dilemma: to accept coexistence with the Albanians with all the risks such a decision may bring to the future of Serbia and the Serbian people, or to perform the painful amputation which will enable secession for the Albanians?

When speaking of the current Serbian regime, the idea of regionalization of the FR of Yugoslavia is probably dearer to it, and division of Kosovo into two regions as part of it, which is advocated by another member of the Serbian Academy, Miodrag Jovicic. Regionalization is the magic formula of "administratrive triumph" of Serbian nation-building idea which is expected at the same time to annul the statehood of Montenegro and abolish all remaining relapses of half-century old autonomy of Kosovo. Supporters of this idea suffer from a severe case of hypocrisy and dual principles, because in Bosnia they are in favour of the quite the opposite idea of ethnic division and creation of ethnic state entities, while in the case of the FRY, through an alleged model of regionalization, they pretend to be in favour of a civic state and not of territorial division of ethnic rights.

Despic's and Jovicic's (probably Milosevic's as well) model of resolving the problem of Kosovo must have a meeting point in the search for a formula of division of Kosovo. Jovicic's division of Kosovo into two regions, the topical administrative division of Kosovo into two districts, and partly Despic's suggestions are all aimed at the possibility of such a historic deal. In Albanian reactions to Despic's proposal, which were quite restrained (in some cases they even spoke of an interesting idea, of "sobering up", and "growing awareness of the reality" under pressure from abroad), the only thing which was absolutely rejected by all was the possibility of division of Kosovo.

The problem of Kosovo is included in the fact that relations have become so anomalous that the possibility of coexistence and integration of the Albanians is not recognized at all. Keeping Kosovo by force or the attempt to continue endless perpetuation of the state of neither war nor peace and parallel authorities, in the end must lead to an explosion and war. To a war which cannot be won. If big Russia could not subjugate small Chechnya, how will Serbia pacify Kosovo which has Albania in its background together with its Western allies which are gaining in power?

Despic's (and not only his) idea of demarcation with the Albanians probably implies, although it has not been explicitly stated, simultaneous powerful pushing of Serbization of western and northern ethnic borders, or rather of the just created Serb entity in Bosnia and complete Serbization of Vojvodina. For gathering "all the Serbs in a single state", Kosovo is ethnically irrelevant, because only about 1.5 per cent of the total number of Serbs live here. New, realistic Serb Irredentism therefore comparatively easily agrees to amputation of the "cradle of Serbian statehood", lamenting more over natural and power resources of Kosovo than over mythic past or manipulated Serbian population in Kosovo. And after all, for the "ethnically concentrated" Serbian state, according to these plans, it would be much easier to gain longterm strategic control over Montenegro and Sandzak.

In any case, the balloon pumped up by Serb nationalism in the eighties with the myth of Kosovo in order to reach united "heavenly Serbia" has started losing gas and falling headlong. In order to keep the balloon of Serbian Irredentism up, it is necessary to get rid of excessive ballast. It is a paradox that Kosovo will be on top of the ballast to be rejected. In order to preserve the Kosovo myth of ethnic statehood, the Serbs will have to lose Kosovo once again.

Shkellzen Maliqi AIM