THE FEDERATION STILL WITHOUT THE DEFENSE LAW

Sarajevo Jun 17, 1996

HELPLESS MINISTER AND HIS DEPUTY

AIM,SARAJEVO, June 11, 1996

The Bosniacs and the Croats, partners in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have violated another mutual agreement they had signed in the presence of international representatives. This time they have outwitted the leading world power, the United States of America, as the USA sponsored the signing of the Washington Agreement, according to which the Federation was to get its Defense Law by May 29.

This deadline has long elapsed, and it is still unknown when, and whether at all, there will be any agreement on this legal act which many have assessed to be the main obstacle to further promotion of relations between the Croats and the Bosniacs within the Federation.

At the last session of Federal Parliament the Croatian side tried to speed up the process. Namely, a representative of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Tomislav Obrdalj, resorting to his right from the Assembly Rules of Procedure, offered his (actually, the Croatian version, as it later turned out) version of the Defense Law insisting for the Parliament to consider and adopt it as a matter of urgency. After several hours of discussion, Bosniac representatives managed to forestall the plans of their Croatian colleagues by outvoting them. The Bosniacs insisted that misunderstandings regarding the Law be first cleared within the Federal Ministry of Defense, after which the entire Government would give its support to the final text.

However, Vladimir Soljic, Federal Minister of Defense and his Deputy Hasan Cengic admitted in the Parliament that the problems which hindered the harmonization of the Law, surpassed their capacities. They stated that it was a matter of political rather than professional disagreement and asked the two national leaders for help.

After the session of the Federal Parliament Minister Soljic held a press conference at which he was even more precise. He directly accused the Bosniac side for opposing the adoption of the Defense Law, stating that the President and Vice-President of the Federation have resolved all disputable issues in mid May in Washington and that only the shaping of that agreement remained to be carried out. But, added Soljic, the Bosniac side does not intend to honour that agreement and Hasan Cengic, Deputy Minister was entrusted with a task to try to accomplish what the Minister had failed at, through additional negotiations.

The Defense Minister stated that there still remained the problem of command structure over the two components of the federal army (Croatian Defense Council - HVO and the B&H Army), as well as the free choice of recruits in which of these two components to do their military service. "The Bosniac side is aiming at placing as many competences as possible outside the Federation's authority whereby the Law on Defense would be less federal and more republican", said Soljic explaining the essence of the dispute.

He denied that there any agreement was reached in Geneva according to which until the elections Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be in command of the B&H Army and Kresimir Zubak, President of the Federation, in command of the HVO. He said that in Geneva they only had friendly discussions in a relaxed atmosphere and that neither he nor Cengic could translate that into a law.

In his view the Bosniac side is not satisfied with the way in which the Dayton Agreement regulates defense at the level of B&H. The purview of the future three-member B&H Presidency has, in Soljic's opinion, been constricted in that sphere. It may only declare war, order mobilization and movement of troops from one entity to the other, but only with the approval of the Government of the entity in question. But, apparently that is not enough for the Bosniac side and Soljic accused it of wishing to invest the Presidency with power of ranking officers (from a major up), as well as of regulating the overall defense system of the future B&H.

The Croatian side opposes this and insists that the responsibility for the Federation defense system should rest with its President and Vice President. It justifies its stand with the Washington Agreement, also referring to it in defending the right of recruits to choose where to do their military service: in the B&H Army or HVO.

Insisting on its demands the Croatian side launched a major offensive in federal institutions, as well as in the public, so as to secure the acceptance of its version of the Law. At the same time, the international public has been made clearly aware of who is responsible for violating the Washington Agreement and who will be responsible in the event the Parliament fails to adopt the Law.

The Bosniac politicians, as a rule, respond with silence to the apparent pressure of the federal partner. Only Dzevad Mlaco, President of the Club of Bosniac deputies to the Parliament, tried to explain to colleagues of his nationality the intentions of the Croats. But he did it in rather dilettantish and clumsy way in the middle of the parliamentary session by ordering that some articles from the daily "Slobodna Dalmacija" (Free Dalmatia) and texts on the regulation of the defense systems of Croatia and the USA, be distributed to the Bosniac representatives.

Ivan Bender, leader of the Croatian deputies, took advantage of his clumsiness. He first ordered the Croats to leave the hall, interrupting the session and making Mlaco sweat because of his own stupidity. He then gave him a dressing-down by characterizing the disputable material as "propaganda" and a move made "with a purpose". And the purpose of the Bosniacs is to prevent the adoption of the Defense Law.

Bender took a step further stating to the journalists that "there was no integral Army" in the Federation, and that even in three years there will not be one, although according to the Washington agreement it should be constituted by that time.

The Bosniacs are concerned over precisely such developments and are therefore obviously attempting to offset those consequences of the Washington Agreement which are negative for them. Separate supreme commands of the HVO and the B&H Army for the Bosniac politicians mean the beginning of the final separation of the two armies. They openly ask whether the command of one army can order its troops to engage in battle with the other component, recalling bitter experiences of their mutual fightings. Also, for the Bosniacs the armed forces are the pillars of the state, and if that army is divided then B&H cannot be integral either. That is why they see the Croatian standpoint as an introduction to the breaking up of B&H, i.e. Federation into two parts.

For their part the Croats want to avoid any situation in which they would be outvoted, particularly concerning the army. Vladimir Soljic says that former YPA was a joint and people's army which, as it turned out, was in the service of only one, Serbian nation.

Soljic understands the Bosniac fear that B&H might be divided and the Federation eventually annexed to Croatia. But, he also asks for the Bosniacs to recognize the Croatian fears of the possible abuse of one army. He thinks that an atmosphere needs to be created in which it will be quite clear that there are no victors or losers in the war between the Bosniacs and the Croats, and that there need not be any in their mutual political negotiations either.

But such conciliatory approach will hardly bring the Croats and Bosniacs closer in bargaining over the Defense Law. The politicians inside the Federation have undoubtedly exhausted all their means and the only ones who can cut this Gordian knot are Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic personally. For, only their word is strong enough to be respected.

However, it is a question how long can the USA wait for their answer. In case the interest of Clinton's administration decreases, the Bosniacs and Croats will have everything to lose, as HVO and the B&H Army, even if separated, will be left without significant assistance they have been promised.

SEJO LUCKIN