AUTONOMY OR AUTOGOAL
AIM Zagreb, June 11, 1996
Rumours which circulated Osijek in the past weeks that in just several days time, as soon as the school year ends, the Croatian army would start an action which would lead to establishment of Croatian state legal system in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, were certified by an article published a few days ago on the front page of Nedjeljna Dalmacija. Allegedly, it was just a matter of minutes when the Croat Army would intervene in order to protect the oil field in Djeletovci. The other state media also did their best to every now and then threaten the opposing party, so that the results of this (new) radicalization were soon felt among the citizens which, at least according to these same media, give considerable advantage to a military option over the negotiating peaceful solution.
On the other hand, however, whenever in similar circumstances the pointer of the balance of war and peace swung back and forth nervously not knowing which side the balance would finally be tipped - exactly as it is done now - fuel was always added to the fire. If before the operation "Lighting", that was the provocative closing of the highway accompanied by the bloodshed near Okucani, and before operation "Storm" interruption of negotiations between Zagreb and Knin about the beginning of peaceful reintegration, now it could be the new demand for broad autonomy which, emitted from Vukovar, significantly chilled relations of the official Croatia with "Croatian Serbs" in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja, so that many tend to interpret it as a point scored to the advantage of the opposite party.
The demand for political autonomy is in fact a kind of a digest version of Z-4 plan which, with a touch of new make-up, in fact includes a list of demands which Knin and Zagreb had bargained about a long time with mediation of the international community. The demand for autonomy, although it recognizes the framework of the Croatian state as its own, is actually a somewhat moderated version of a "state within a state", an autonomy with broad political autority (even with a kind of a parliament of its own), with separate currency, bank, state symbols, customs, post, information and television system. The only softening of the current proposal of autonomy in relation to what was once proposed by plan Z-4 is that the authors of the current proposal accept demilitarization of the region and abandon the idea of any form of their own army.
Based on this change and the fact that according to the data of the UNTAES, demilitarization of the region is proceeding as planned, and that signing of a joint document which is expected to result at the end of this job towards the end of June by two generals of the opposing parties - Djuro Decak on behalf of Croatia and Dusan Loncar in the name of "Croatian Serrbs" - has in no way been jeopardized, many rather tend to believe that the demand for autonomy means something completely different. Even the Serbs in the Croatian part of the Danube river valley know it only too well that what they are asking for is actually not feasible any more. For such unrealistic political demands to be satisfied, they can count not only on the Croatian party, but not even on the international community which has not enough patience to insist any more on something that Milan Martic and his team could have easily had in their pockets, but refused to accept with disgust even from the hands of the American ambassador Peter Galbraith.
It seems that the Serbs from the eastern part of Croatia have decided to attempt with maximalist demands in order to get at least the "a" of autonomy, and that even they do not believe that anyone would be ready to give them anything of the kind at this moment. Their threat that - if their demands for the autonomy were not met - they would all emigrate collectively, is actually highly convenient for certain circles in Croatia. It is hard to believe that the Serbs are not aware of this fact, so they evidently expect some kind of sponsorship of their demand from the international community. However, for the time being, at least publicly, there is no indication of anything of the kind.
This journalist who had the opportunity to visit Vukovar for the first time after five years, could see for himself that the political structures over ther were quite disoriented. While the hard core ones are still rejecting the very idea of their reintegration which would end up by introduction of the legal system existing in other parts of Croatia, there are certain more flexible opinions. Ljubica Stanojevic from the organizazion for salvation of Vukovar sees the problem of reintegration just in introduction of Croatian symbols - such as the currency (kuna), the flag and the insignia with the chess board - so in the name of the non-governmental organization she represents, she advocates the "blue flag of the United Nations instead of the chess board" and "payments in ecus instead of kunas". Simultaneously, in Darda, in Baranja, as part of a pilot project, first pensions were distributed to the inhabitants of that village, not in ecus but in kunas. At the marketplace in Vukovar, however, where smuggled cigarettes and alcohol beverages, along with Yugoslav dinars, are paid in dollars and German marks, kunas are not desirable.
Ivica Vrkic, head of the Government office for transitional administration, just recently bought furniture for his offices. As he himself sometimes says, he made up his mind to do it only after he had become convinced that on the Croatian side a firm will exists to proceed with peaceful reintegration of this region. He thought what would he had done with new furniture, if there had been no peaceful reintegration. Although it is not easy for him to deal with initiatives which will be accepted on both sides, especially among the desperate banished people who look upon peaceful reintegration with decreasing patience and understanding, Vrkic acts quite independently in the moves he makes. He is truly convinced that peaceful reintegration suits Croatia the best - not only that it will reach its eastern border without firing a single shot, loss of human lives, but for reasons which cross the mind of hardly anyone in Croatia nowadays. Vrkic is convinced that military action for taking that region by force would sow the seed of terrorism which would grow luxuriant and reproduce for decades.
The Serbs, there is absolutely no doubt, in case of Croatia's military action, regardless of what kinds of appeals anyone would send them by radio calling them to remain, would repeat a mass departure already seen after operation "Storm". But, consequences of their departure, since this part of Croatia directly borders with Serbia, would be far more complex than those of abandoning Knin Krajina. For any of the Serbs who wished to square accounts and return to Knin it would be necessary to perform quite an exploit in order to cross a large part of Croatian territory. All anyone who wishes to take vengeance on someone in Vukovar or Baranja has to do is cross the Danube.
Vrkic's advocating the need for the Serbs to remain in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja is not motivated only by general civilizational, but also by strictly pragmatic reasons. This is in compliance with certain geo-political views which see the Serbs as some kind of a "buffer" in Croatian part of the Danube river valley, useful for ensuring peaceful border with Serbia in the future.
But, what will be in the end and what solution for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem will be found, depends a great deal on the success of the two-week mission of Jacques Paul Klein, transitional administrator of UNTAES, who devoted his stay in the USA to collecting money necessary for the main preconditions of peaceful reintegration. This region is economically so neglected that - it is openly said in Vukovar - it is threatened by hunger should Serbia completely stop sending assistance altogether. If Mr Klein has succeeded in finding the money, the peaceful option has better prospects. Not only because "money makes the world go round", but primarily because there are few who would be willing to invest money where accounts are not settled in banks but in battlefields with tanks.
DRAGO HEDL