TUDJMAN'S RISKY GAME

AIM Zagreb, May 26, 1996

Strong pressure is being exerted on Croatia in an attempt to meddle in its internal affairs, which has no precedent in diplomatic history. This surprisingly severe judgement which would burden any ordinary Croatian mortal with the accusation that he were a defeatist, was uttered by Franjo Tudjman himself. He did it at a gathering of 130 highest state officials, Croatian ambassadors, heads of opposition parties, editors-in-chief of state-controlled media...

During the two days of last weekend, all these people formed the Presidential Council, an "advisory" body convened by the state leader whenever he pleases and formed of who ever he pleases. One would say, this could be ideal for consideration of delicate issues concerning which state politics blundered and about which it would not be recommendable to open a regular debate. The topic chosen by Tudjman this time was exactly of that sort: new postponement of reception of Croatia in the Council of Europe which occurred after more than three years of futile expectations of a favourable answer. How great significance attributed to this issue was is best illustrated not only by the extraordinary number of participants, but also by the fact that a strict rule was abandoned - the session was not closed for the public, moreover Croatian Television informed comprehensively about Tudjman's speech and even a little about presentations of the others. Obviously, main messages of the gathering were in fact addressed to the public.

The main thesis of Tudjman's speech was that Croatia was left to wait in front of the closed doors of the Council of Europe because there was a general tendency to push it out of Europe for a long time yet to come and leave it in the Balkans, in a redesigned form of former Yugoslavia. He corroborated this with the allegation that various international meetings are held almost daily on all levels - state, media, sports and others, which had this on the agenda, which must have been news even for the best informed people from state-controlled media. It is hard to believe that they would not publish an indicretion about such a meeting, since even quite incidental contemplations of certain scientific circles in the West about reintegration of the Yugoslav space immediately get enormous publicity. Besides, there must be a terrible confusion in state-controlled media concerning perception of Croatia's position in the world. Because, if Tudjman had until recently claimed that Croatia constructed its firm and respected position in the world on the military "miracle", even a "partnership" with the USA - which is an expression which the Americans use for a series of countries, B&H among others - if, everything went so well until now, how can anyone convince the readers that all important countries of Europe and elsewhere have suddenly started plotting against Croatia.

And that is exactly what Tudjman established in his weekend speech. He said that Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, which had different interests concerning everything else, agreed about opposing the current Croatian politics and its authorities. The reason for this, as the Croatian President claimed, was that they were "spiteful" of the United States because of its efficiency in B&H and because of the important role Croatia had been given by the USA, but he also added that even among friendly Americans there were those who joined Europeans in such behavior. That this was not a simple result of affective indisposal towards Western countries is obvious from the fact that according to Tudjman they were from the very beginning - he included even Germany among them - against creation of the Croatian state, accusing them even, instead of Milosevic, of dissolution of Yugoslavia. And, when despite everything, Croatia was created, they expected and wished for its defeat and disappearance. It was all, according to the Croatian President, a part of long historic continuity

• Croatia has always been loyal to Europe, and Europe repayed it with imperial conquering and excommunication. It remained the same to this day: the only "assistance" Croatia had got from the world was plan Z-4.

Does this angry snapping of Tudjman's mean his historic "no" to western countries after disappointment with the Council of Europe, or is he simply looking for a sufficiently sound explanation and pretext for this fiasco of Croatian diplomacy and his own? Probably not even numerous speakers know the answer to this question, who dilligently elaborated Tudjman's introductory speech at the two-day non-stop conference (lunch was served for them in the Presidential palace), having absolutely agreed that Europe was fully responsible for Croatia's not having been received in the Copuncil of Europe. Tudjman has perhaps launched the rumour on purpose - despite the sharp criticism of the Council of Europe, he did not announce a shift in Croatian policy towards it - in order to conceal that his attention was in fact turned elsewhere. The gravest complaint against the West was its "meddling" in internal affairs of Croatia, and it was possible to hear that in the past few days especially the Americans distingushed themselves in this. They have agreed to resolve the crisis in Zagreb, where for more than six months the ruling HDZ has been refusing to turn over power to the opposition, not by a regular transfer of power, but by scheduling early elections.

But, they have given an ultimatum to Tudjman that he had to take on the obligation in advance that he would not obstruct results of the elections and cause another crisis in transfer of power. For the Croatian President who likes to boast that he will quite certainly win the next elections - this is utterly unacceptable. Not only because of his widely known personal vanity, which is probably the main reason for the great spring harangue of the "disobedient" independent media. Much more serious things are at stake, because secret polls which are often ordered both by Tudjman's party and the opposition - and which noone publishes - speak of constant and rapid decline of popularity of the ruling party. Allegedly, the latest investigation showed that only 20.5 per cent of the pollees are still in favour of the ruling HDZ, and in Zagreb which was until recently the "stronghold of HDZ", hardly 17 (16.7) per cent. If the percentages are even approximately correct, Tudjman's manoeuvring space is more limited than ever. The only thing left for him to do is either to conclude some kind of a non-aggression pact with the opposition which had never succeeded before, or to shift the attention of the public from red-hot internal political issues to external policy.

In this context, Tudman's unexpectedly sharp assault on the Council of Europe may seem at least temporarily as a good choice. Although this institution is an entrance court to all significant European and transatlantic associations the membership of which Croatia hopes for, Tudjman can still afford even a considerable estrangement of relations with it. Besides, he might have in mind that which could be heard even in competent European circles just before Croatia was rejected again. And that was that at the moment, implementation of the Dayton accords in B&H and even elections in Mostar were more important (reintegration of eastern parts of Croatia could be added to this). By shifting to this track, Tudjman is buying time for resolving accumulated problems at home, with the possibility to have success achieved on the Croatian outskirts be capitalized in the metropolis.

However, there is still high risk which threatens him from the changed relation of forces on the Croatian party scene. The main force of Tudjman's so far was in his high political rating at home which enabled him to get involved in highly risky, sometimes even breakneck adventures on the world diplomatic scene. Perhaps one should be reminded that just before signing of the Washington Agreement he had literally hung over an abyss, that the Americans had insisted at the time that he should be "removed", but with a strong support at home, he easily overcame the danger. Nowadays, however, there is no such support any more, moreover Tudjman is forced into a risky sale of shares in external policy in order to preserve the capital in internal affairs.

He will soon find out for himself whether in this new game with hazardously increased number of combinations, he will know how to make the right moves, or a dangerous mistake awaits him on the way.

MARINKO CULIC