CONFUSION ABOUT KOSOVO

AIM Pristina, May 21, 1996

Hesitation of international factors to deal more resolutely with the issue of Kosovo is quite disappointing for Kosovo Albanians. It seems to them that promises that the issue of Kosovo would be put on the list of priorities of preventive diplomacy have always been and still are mere empty rhetoric. Even if they could understand why Kosovo was neglected in Dayton, where attention was focused on interruption of the war in Bosnia and Croatia, the Albanians cannot understand why this issue is still ignored and why further concessions are made to Serbia and Milosevic's regime.

The so-called external wall of the sanctions which was allegedly supposed to be the instrument for resolving the remaining problems, primarily that of Kosovo, is quickly crumbling and reduced to mere formality. European states have recognized the FR of Yugoslavia disregarding the unresolved status of Kosovo as a potential centre of a new crisis and war. Europe has even abandoned the demand of a minimum guarantees that Belgrade would be cooperative concerning the issue of Kosovo. Indeed, Europeans have practically left at the discretion of Belgrade to condition resolution of the issue of Kosovo, contrary to the Americans who still insist on imposing conditions on Belgrade in seeking a solution for Kosovo.

The two-sided policy of the West in relation to Belgrade is not promising anything good, except of continuation of the deja vu great confusion concerning Bosnia. Although there is a principled consensus about condemnation of Serbian repressive policy in Kosovo and a high level of agreement concerning necessity of resolving the status of the Albanians as a precondition for establishing stability in the region (a broad autonomy for Kosovo is most frequently mentioned as a solution), the Western powers cannot reach an accord about instruments and dynamics of resolving this issue. They kept persuading Kosovo Albanians to remain peaceful and be patient, and now they are using their inferior position in negortiations with Milosevic. Kosovo can wait.

Illusions of the Albanians have dispersed especially after the visit of Klaus Kinkel to Belgrade, which had aroused great expectations. Since it seemed that Germany had not willingly accepted the variant of practically unconditioned recognition of FR Yugoslavia (the only European condition was recognition of Macedonia), it was expected that it would take the leading role in exerting political and economic pressures against Belgrade in order to force it, at least consequently, to make concessions and compromises concerning Kosovo and other issues significant for stability of the region. However, it turned out that Kinkel's priorities were determined more by current recession in Germany and large expenditures for the Albanian and Balkan asylum seekers than any longterm strategic interests of Germany in the region. Among some fifteen demands on Kinkel's list, the question of urgent return of 120 thousand Yugoslav citizens, mostly Kosovo Albanians who were not granted asylum in Germany ranked the first. Since Kinkel easily succeeded in obtaining Milosevic's agreement concerning this issue, pressure concerning other issues subsided. Germany, how ever rich it may be, or perhaps that is exactly the reason why, obviously first takes care of its own interests, and money-bag, and then of "high principles" and "international justice".

Nevertheless, there are opinions which regard Kinkel's bargain from a different aspect. It is not that unfavourable for the Albanians, because it indirectly proves that Belgrade has practically been thrown on its knees concerning Kosovo and the Albanians. Agreement to have 100 thousand Albanians returned from Germany (similar demands are expected from Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries for extradition of additional 50 to 100 thousand Albanians, which as a matter of principle, cannot be refused any more) is the beginning of the end of Milosevic's policy in Kosovo, the main objective of which was its "Serbization", i.e. "improvement of the blood count of Kosovo". Milosevic's agreement to have the Albanians return to Kosovo is in a way acceptance of ethnic domination of the Albanians in Kosovo, and this again means that it is just a matter of time when political domination of the Albanians will also be accepted.

However, the principled agreement on return of asylum seekers does not mean that all modalities of this great operation have been determined, and that certain political and economic guarantees as a matter of procedures will not follow. In fact, the initial reactions of the German press and influential organizations which advocate full guarantees for the asylum seekers, show that German Government cannot just simply deliver Kosovo Albanians and leave them to the tender mercies of perfidious Milosevic. They will have to do something quickly about resolving the status of Kosovo, or at least find a temporary solution satisfactory for both parties in order to enable the tide of those who have fled return to Kosovo. First, there are firm guarantees which the asylum seekers themselves will seek, but Pristina as well. Should it be just a bilateral agremeent between Bonn and Belgrade, the operation could be just adding fuel to the fire, and not one of the phases which could add to resolution of a long-lasting crisis. It should be kept in mind that the flee to Europe, after about 150 thousand Albanians had been sacked by Milosevic's regime in 1990-91, was the decisive social, and even political safety valve which prevented an explosion in Kosovo. If now more than 100 thousand of the Albanians would return to Kosovo without any control, they and their relatives would all be socially vilnerable, and the present peaceful Albanian resistance would collapse and probably become more radical, if not even lead to a general uphival. That is why further development of negotiations concerning this issue between Bonn and Belgrade should be followed closely in order to see whether he Albanians will be involved. In any case, return of asylum seekers ought to be linked to the process of resolving the status of Kosovo.

Even without this threat, there is a sufficient amount of gloomy clouds in the Albanian political skies to announce a storm. Recent developments have dispelled the Albanian illusions that the resolution for Kosovo would arrive from abroad and now a formula is sought for adapting to the newly established reality, but without allowing on the one hand resignation and on the other, with the more radical people, wrath and wish for revenge to prevail. The ruling Democratic Alliance of Kosovo and so far the inviolable leader Dr Ibrahim Rugova are still counting on support of the Americans, but with an optimism which has become very frail. The announced opening of an American information centre in Pristina is perhaps the last chance to juxtapose an undoubted act of internationalization of the issue of Kosovo to negative trends. However, sceptics warn that American presence does not mean support to independent Kosovo. On the contrary, in well-informed circles one can hear that the Americans were the ones who demanded from Rugova to be the first to make a concession and accept the solution for Kosovo within the FR of Yugoslavia, because that would enable a more efficient foreign pressure to be exerted on Belgrade and at the same time meet the main precondition (abandoning of the project of independence) for the beginning of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina with foreign mediation. That such rumours are trustworthy is illustrated by the stance of the official Albania and its President Sali Berisha who has several times declared himself in favour of the idea that a resolution for Kosovo should be sought within Yugoslavia.

It seems that Rugova himself has finally realized that it was impossible to seek solution outside that framework, but he still has not the courage to face the Albanian public with it. Instead, Adem Demaqi came forward with the new realistic platform and formulated demands of Kosovo Albanians presenting the formula for their remaining in a community with Belgrade - only in the form of a confederate alliance of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. This implies previous recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. Rugova and a portion of his associates and ideologists vehemently attacked Demaqi for the project of confederation called "Balkania". "Any link with Serbia and Belgrade is completely out of the question", they say, disregarding Demaqi's cunning and the real meaning of the term "confederation" as a loose alliance of sovereign states. In the theoretical model of the confederation "Balkania", domination of Belgrade which is feared by advocates of full equality of Kosovo could not survive.

In fact, differences between Demaqi and Rugova are essentially not big at all. Both seek solution for Kosovo in creation of a republic, but Demaqi a priori permits establishment of political, economic and military relations defined by contract with Serbia and Montenegro, while Rugova advocates a somewhat more vague formula of "independent Kosovo equally open to Serbia and Albania". How would it be possible to be "open" to Serbia without special political, economic and military arrangements with Belgrade - that is what the contents of the so-called confederate relations should be.

In any case, Demaqi's crossing of the Rubicon could make it easier for Rugova to soften and seek a formula for the beginning of negotiations with Belgrade. If one should believe a statement made by Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov who met with Rugova a short time ago, the leader from Kosovo is aware that for the time being the option of independent Kosovo is not supported by the world, not even by the Americans, and that a compromise should be sought for coexistence with the Serbs, no matter how impossible it may seem from the present standpoint. However, conviction of leaders, even of the leading political elite, will not be sufficient for reaching a solution. Processes in the Balkans, especially concerning unresolved Serb and Albanian issue are still far from stabilization and quick and permanent solutions. There are still a lot of unknown factors on both sides, but also those which affect the situation from abroad and which cannot be simply predicted. A series of unresolved explosions and assassinations continues. It is still not quite clear how radical the radical actors really are and how powerful they are. So far, Rugova has been able to control the situation, but for how long will he be able to do it? On the other hand, the other key for resolution of the issue of Kosovo is in Belgrade and depends on development of relations within Serbia. Serbia is at the beginning of a new cycle of fierce struggle for power and change of the system. Who can foretell how Milosevic will behave not only in Kosovo but in Serbia in general? He is fighting bitterly and neurotically for another mandate which might save him from the Hague Tribunal. He might be willing to bargain with Kosovo, but then again he might not. In any case, the choice of possibilities is narrowing down both for him and for Rugova.

Shkelzen Maliqi AIM Pristina