WHAT HAPPENED TO THE DECLARATION ON A SINGLE BOSNIA

A SLIP ON A BANANA PEEL or HOW DID THE ELECTION GAMES START

AIM, SARAJEVO, April 24,1996

About a month after it came into being as the joint brain child of Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic, the Declaration on the indivisible Bosnia and Herzegovina, could be considered a failure. Or even worse - an aborted idea. According to available data, this document was signed by approximately 30 political parties (apart from Izetbegovic's and Silajdzic's, mostly minor ones), organizations and associations of citizens, but...Four out of five leading parties in the Republican Parliament did not sign, nor did independent associations such as the Forum of the Citizens of Tuzla and the Circle 99.

To put it briefly, the Declaration is a document which once again unambiguously promotes several objectives crucial for the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina and peace on its territory. First of all, for it B&H as a single state composed of two entities is the only option, and in it the demand is repeated for all refugees and exiled persons to return to their homes and for war criminals to be persecuted, caught and tried. From the standpoint of those who have Bosnia and Herzegovina at heart, the objectives of the Declaration are absolutely "in", and to analyse why it failure we should go back in the past, or more precisely to the time of its inception.

One need not be too knowledgeable nor paranoid to understand that after the peace took hold on the Bosnian soil, the international community lost interest in B&H and its multi-multi idea. Papers around the world all but routinely write on variations of the theme on the definite division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two or three parts with pictures sent from B&H itself contributing to such calculations. Namely, pictures of Serbs leaving en masse from parts of Sarajevo which they had under their control until recently after having ethnically cleansed them, or the "case of Mostar" and pictures of attacks on Hans Kosnik, to which no one reacted and which showed the full impotence of Europe.

Such information does not raise any hopes in the average consumer in the possibility of life together in Bosnia and in any prospects whatsoever. On the other hand, neither do the distribution of donations for the reconstruction of this state according to which, for example, the TV of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian TV should get absolutely the same amounts of funds, and the tacit acceptance of the definite division of communal infrastructure into two parts, give any reason for optimism. Thus, only a signal coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina could change such gloomy impressions, so that, observed from that viewpoint, the Declaration has come in the nick of time.

It is still not clear who was the first to come up with the idea. Most people think that the signal for the Declaration came from the Americans, but opinions are divided as concerns the motives for sending out that signal. According to some, given the dominant and destructive Western-European influence on developments in and around B&H, the Americans felt that they have not scored enough points, which does not suit Clinton at all before the coming elections in the fall. These same American politicians are the chief sponsors of the Federation, but also of the Washington, Vienna, Dayton, Paris, Rome and God knows which agreement, and losing influence on the Balkans or anywhere else for that matter does not suit at all their vision of themselves as cocks of the walk. That is why a signal was sent out to B&H that Europe should be shaken out of it with a clear stance by impressing upon it unequivocally that things should be brought back to normal; the world should also be reminded that there are forces in B&H which do not think that the Bosnian multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure can be easily wiped out so easily. Izetbegovic (and Silajdzic?) were therefore asked to urgently come out with their multi-multi idea.

Others think that the American signal was a result of the assessment that the Bosnian - Iranian friendship showed inappropriate tenacity despite demands that ties be severed or reduced to a minimum. Moreover, according to that same reasoning, processes were unfolding which would result in a state to the liking of the Persian world planners, i.e. a state of virtually no multi-structure, so that the Americans asked the Bosnian leaders to openly deny the expansion of such interests.

Others again, who also believe themselves well versed, think of the Declaration as a result of the domestic Bosnian "wisdom and inventiveness". They find this fairly obvious because of the extremely short time that elapsed between the moment this political document was finished and the moment of its signing. Namely, at ten in the morning the state news agency carried the news that Izetbegovic and Silajdzic had launched an initiative to regale the domestic and world public with a Declaration on a Single Bosnia and Herzegovina. No details were given, but the public was informed that the document would be signed on that same date at 5:00 p.m. Strangely enough there was no information on anybody else negotiating the text of the Declaration apart from the two leaders.

It is interesting, for example, that it was impossible to get information on the full contents of the Declaration in Haris Silajdzic's party headquarters, more precisely in its organizational committee since the Party for B&H had not yet been officially presented to the public at the time. Namely, first assistants to the former Prime Minister of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Government were not familiar with the text of the Declaration.

Some time later, after much search, journalists somehow managed to find the original document, fax-information on how the Declaration came into being and its full contents. All this was printed on a memo of the ruling SDA (Party of Democratic Action), while next to the party seal Alija Izetbegovic had put his signature as the SDA President, not as the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is hard to say whether by this move the ruling party intended to take all the credit for the general pro-Bosnian stands, which prominently feature in the programme of practically all federal political factors, or whether it was, which is less probable, a gross oversight. Presented on SDA party paper, the Declaration on an indivisible B&H was automatically doomed.

The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) the federal partner of the Party of Democratic Action immediately announced that it would not attend the signing ceremony, finding excuses for this move in a short time it was given to assess the character and purpose of the Declaration. Later, they became more explicit - in their view the Declaration was totally unnecessary as its options were the same as HDZ's programme tasks, and as regards the Croatian people, which the HDZ assumes to have patronage over, it clearly opted, already in 1992, for a single and indivisible Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that this party considered the relaunching of the same idea in public superfluous. Few were surprised at this HDZ stand.

Five opposition parties comprising the-so-called Coordination Forum (SDP, USD, MBO, HSS B&H and the Republican Party), announced in relatively harsh tones that they would refrain from the signing of that document reminding that the theses it advanced, were a sublimation of their party programmes, but also emphasizing that that whole affair left the impression that the blame for the Bosnian catastrophe should be expanded from the ruling to other parties also. The Coordination Forum also pointed out that the initiators of this idea were the same people who had previously signed all the plans, agreements and accords which led to the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without having asked other parties for their opinion beforehand. Thus what is basically sound and, at this moment badly needed idea, continued to be eroded.

The meeting scheduled for 5:00 p.m. apart from Alija Izetbegovic as the SDA representative, was also attended by Haris Silajdzic as the leader of the then yet not formed Party for B&H, Rasim Kadzic (Liberal Party), Ibro Spahic (Civil Democratic Party), as well as representatives of the Liberal Bosniac Organization, Serbian Civil Council and fifteen smaller civil associations. Although the signing was postponed for the next day, nobody changed their mind. The response was weaker than expected.

A few days later, while the deputies of the Republican and Federal Parliaments of Bosnia and Herzegovina were assembling, posters in four languages (Bosnian, Croat, Serbian-Cyrillic and English) were being posted on the assembly hall walls with space envisaged for signatures of new sympathizers and supporters of the ideas of the Declaration. However, nobody touched them. True enough, there were some signatures on smaller posters with the same contents which were distributed in the deputies' benches, but those were only autographs of members of parties which have earlier said "Yes" to the Declaration. Scarce or none is information of what was later done in the field (in the Balkans, the field has always been a strange and abstract phenomenon used to mask all sorts of things). Still, had anything important been done, information would not be lacking, but the news would have been announced with a flourish of trumpets.

Against the Bosnian backdrop the Declaration also had another meaning - it represented an unofficial start of the election campaign. Namely, it can serve as a good indicator of a number of things and possible relations between political rivals, with the only true dilemma being the new ideological hitching up of Izetbegovic and Silajdzic. Moreover, some have interpreted their cooperation as two recently divorced spouses patching up a broken marriage, while others thought Silajdzic was manipulated and got the dirty end of the stick with the failure of the Declaration. Representatives of the opposition parties were most alarmed by Dr.Haris Silajdzic and his Party for B&H (which was subsequently introduced to the B&H public in an all-out presentation) as it is assumed that he could snatch away part of the electorate from SDP, UBSD and other parties. Appearing together with Izetbegovic he gave them grounds to give him a dressing down and invoke his own theory on SDA inter-party frictions and feigned break-ups.

Namely, according to many, early this year in a bid to preserve SDA's strength and primacy, there were only two things Alija Izetbegovic could do - either inaugurate Dr.Haris Silajdzic as his successor at the helm of SDA and at the same time undertake a major spring cleaning of the Party according to the wishes of the successor (removal of the "second and third" men of the party, some ideologues and people behind the scenes) or agree with Haris Silajdzic on the formation of a new party which would absorb the votes of "rogue" Bosniacs, now members of UBSD, SDP and other parties beyond SDA control.

Allegedly, that new party and SDA would subsequently unite thereby preserving Bosniac unity. It is certain that Alija Izetbegovic did not opt for the first step of inaugurating Silajdzic, and whether he has made the second move is hard to say. Still, it is nevertheless indicative that during the recent SDA gathering in Zenica, held only a day after the promotion of the Party for B&H under the interesting name "SDA for B&H", the SDA President blamed the new Party for B&H and its leader for breaking the Bosniac unity and "fighting for power within B&H and not for B&H".

The party leader Alija Izetbegovic has already shown that when it comes to SDA he can play rough and cut down to size those who do not toe the line. Naturally time will show what result he will score by playing against Silajdzic, but the varied forecasts obviously worry him. However, it should be borne in mind that in all these years the still undisputed Bosniac leader has proven that his is an unusual political but also purely human cunning which is not all that easily discernible under the layer of simple sentences, seemingly innocuous and even clumsy public appearances. That is precisely why we should wait before characterizing his Zenica speech as reflecting what he really thinks about the Party for B&H and Dr.Haris Silajdzic.

ZLATKO VUKMIROVIC