TERRORISM IN KOSOVO - SPECTRE OF SPECULATIONS

AIM Pristina, April 29, 1996

The status-quo which lasted for years in Kosovo, maintained on acute tensions and police repression, was overwhelmed with a rising spiral of violence in the past few days. One can do nothing but wonder whether there would have been any black series of terrorism, if it had not been for the murder of the 20-year old student Armend Daci in the night between Saturday and Sunday, April 21, who was shot in cold blood by Zlatko Jovanovic from his balcony. It is a fact that the Albanian parallel authorities in Kosovo, in previous similar cases, demanded and managed to ensure maximum of restraint, but it is also a fact that the cup of Albanian restraint this time spilled over. For the first time after many years, in Pristina, in front of the building which was the scene of the crime, mass demonstrations were held. About ten thousand women gathered, who did not seek permission of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo to express their protest against Serb violence. The midnight crime at Pristina's Sunny Hill was not assessed by the Albanians according to personal motives of the murderer, but addressed it at the Serb regime which had armed the Kosovo Serbs to the teeth and proclaimed that practically all forms of repression against the Albanians were legitimate. The weapon which Armend Daci was shot by was the weapon of chauvinism with aspirations to Greater Serbia, which was distributed by order of Slobodan Milosevic.

But, contrary to this spontaneous and controlled reaction of mothers and concerned citizens, developments which started forty eight hours later, on Monday evening, must have in fact been activation of a prepared scenario aimed to destabilize Kosovo. At comparatively synchronized time intervals, in several places in Kosovo (Decani, Pec, K. Mitrovica, Stimlje) five Serbs were killed and the same number of them were wounded. In one of the killings, the target of the attack and victims were civilians (a cafe in Decani), but victims of the other attacks were policemen. Therefore, the terrorists had planned it all to appear as retaliation for the murdered student. Based on the few publicized data (Serb authorities are acting strangely, as if they wish to hide relevant data or, which might even be closer to the truth, as if trying to conceal their own impotence and confusion), speculations that behind these terrorist attacks, and perhaps even behind bombing of Serb refugee camps which occurred a few weeks ago, might be a well trained and equipped organization with at least twenty odd or even more members.

Terrorism in Kosovo belongs to the clandestine type. Contrary to majority of terrorist organizations in the world which stick to the principle of maximum conspiracy concerning their internal organization and planning of operations, but also maximum publicity when speaking of promotion of causes they fight for and reactions to operations they perform, terrorism in Kosovo does not wish to publicize its identity: nobody accepted responsibility for the attacks. Such terrorism which is clearly addressed, but has no sender causes suspicion. It enables much speculation and mutual accusations. When in the end of the week the black series continued with explosions in Prizren suburb Dusanovac (without victims) and on the road between Vucitrn and K. Mitrovica (an Albanian boy killed, three wounded), the circle of speculations was closed. Such a spiral of vengeful violence can have but one aim: to cause Serb-Albanian war and prevent all forms of peaceful solution of the Kosovo issue.

It is indicative that anonymous terrorism in Kosovo, but in the entire Albanian space in the Balkans as well, appeared in the post-Dayton period. It started with the attempt on the life of Kiro Gligorov, continued with explosions of car-bombs in Tirane and Drach, and now it is focused in Kosovo, as the most neuralgic point in the south sector of the still unresolved Balkan crisis. As if someone is in a hurry, before the war in Bosnia completely and definitely ends, to open a new centre of the crisis. One may even speculate, although with no proof, about a thesis on external sponsors of prolonging the Balkan crisis in order to buy time and secure the shaken strategic positions. But, one cannot disregard the possibility, which might even be more logical, of this being a nervous reaction of internal extremists who, frightened that in the post-Dayton phase when quite a few influential sources have already announced that accelerated resolution of the Kosovo issue is already on various agendas, are trying to prevent "unacceptable" compromising solutions. What irritates the Albanian extremists are announcements that Kosovo will remain within Serbia/Yugoslavia, which seems unacceptable for them regardless of all possible international guarantees and protective mechanisms of a high degree of self-administration and political, legislative, cultural and economic autonomy. On the other hand, Serb extremists are afraid of the internationally guaranteed mechanisms of protection of the autonomy (sometimes it is explicitly said that they would be similar to those from the so much disliked 1974 Constitution of the SFRY) which to them seem like an introduction to total loss of Kosovo.

Mutual effects of these destabilizing internal and external factors, even despite certain possible minor breakthroughs in resolving the Kosovo issue (beginning of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina; convening of a international conference on Kosovo announced by the latest ministerial conference of the European Union), might make terrorism an everyday occurrence in Kosovo. Especially because both the official Belgrade and the Albanian authorities in Pristina seem to be somewhat caught by surprise by the latest developments. Belgrade should especially take it hard because it had invested so much in the police control of Kosovo, and now it proved that it was not capable of resolving any of the crimes, not even when victims were policemen. Most immediate effect of the black week is that now the Serbs in Kosovo are frightened of the situation the most. Can the police protect them if it is not capable of protecting itself? Fear that "Serb Kosovo" will face the destiny of Krajina is growing and people are already thinking of "great exodus" before Sloba (Milosevic) surrenders Kosovo to Ibrahim Rugova.

But, there is also the assumption that the regime in Belgrade is concealing evidence on purpose because armed Serb extremists might be involved at least in some of the latest crimes, those with whose aid they wish to provoke a Serb-Albanian war. The problem is that Belgrade was the one who let the demon out of the lamp, so it is now easily suspected of anything that happens. On the other hand, if an Albanian organization is after all responsible for the series of crimes, the question of profitability of the police investment of the regime could be posed again and of the delusion that Kosovo could be maintained by force.

Shkeljzen Maliqi AIM Pristina