INTERVIEW: Dr CHRISTIAN SCHWARZ SCHILLING,

international mediator for Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina

AIM Sarajevo, April 19, 1996

* The stance that relations within the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina are the key of success of the Dayton Accords is quite common. On the other hand, it is more than evident that problems in establishment and consolidation of the Federation are enormous, and relations between federal partners often highly uncoordinated, contradictory and strained. What are, according to your judgement, the main reasons for these problems in the Federation?

• I had the opportunity to see for myself that there are "local kings" in the region of the Federation who are opposed to implementation of the Dayton Accords, because the present situation in which they maintain power and make a profit suits them just fine. This should be prevented as soon as possible, or else the Federation will not be able to survive. The Federation must create and strenghten the joint police. The police must ensure fundamental order and remove illegal check-points in many places which, for example, charge hundreds and thousands of German marks for transportation of goods from Croatia to cities of B&H. I must say that I especially expect help and engagement of the Crpoat party in it, in order to enable implementation of highly comprehensive regulations of the Dayton Accords.

* Does this mean that you primarily blame the Croat party for these problems?

• I must say that both parties are to blame, just as I wish to say that heads of both parties are trying to prevent these things. However, it is a fact that the Croat party is in a different position, that it is financially highly dependent on current operation of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, and the Muslim is not. That is why I believe that good will is sometimes lacking on the Croat side.

* Refugees who cannot return are still one of the greatest problems in the Federation. What is being done concerning this?

• Except for Travnik where a hundred odd Croat families returned, it is difficult to find another positive example so far. The Croats have problems returning to Bugojno, the Muslims even greater problems to return to Stolac and Capljina. This is justified by the fact that many houses are occupied by one's "own" refugees, that it is impossible to guarantee safety to returnees, that peace must be fortified, etc., etc. Of course, these explanations are not acceptable. As an example, an official in Bugojno, Dzevad Mlaco, claims that the Croats do not even wish to return, but the fact is that that in fact they are threatened. We are trying to break such approaches. For that, establishment of municipal, cantonal and federal authorities and their operation is very important, and it is being obstructed.

* What does this position of the local power-wielders actually mean? Have you discusssed that with the leaders of both parties? Are the "local kings" more powerful than for instance Zubak or Granic, or do they enjoy their direct or indirect protection?

• No, I don't think that they enjoy their portection. I think that power of the the federal leaders is still greater and I think that these leaders are doing their best to break down such resistance. But, like I said, I would not neglect the influence of structures which even in present circumstances, by using para-state mechanisms of Herzeg-Bosnia, protect their own interests.

* Can peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina be maintained and consolidated with policy and politicians who played an active role in war conflicts and are still playing significant political roles?

• No! I must say that I have never seen such fanatism as in Herzeg-Bosnia. And with such fanaticism, it is difficult to implement the Dayton Agreement. Without its implementation, peace is not possible. Responsibility of the leading persons in Herzeg-Bosnia is enormous. They decide about the peace and the war. I think that the international community cannot sit and wait to see what will happen. The elections must be prepared. That is why it is necessary to ensure freedom of movement, because the elections are not possible without it. Therefore, if that does not succeed, nor will the Dayton Agreement, because the mandate of IFOR will not last long.

* You are speaking about Herzeg-Bosnian fanaticism. How do you assess the situation concerning it on the Muslim side?

• I do not deny that the same forces operate among their ranks. Indeed, I think that different fanaticisms help each other and advocate the same programs. It is just not quite clear to me whether the Croat party is always aware what danger this implies. Strengthening of Muslim fanaticism will lead to creation of a Muslim state. This state, of course, will not be able to operate as a normal state, but due to circumstances it will be better armed than it is now and it will become a real terrorist threat to Europe. However, the Croat party itself is the first endangered by such development. Zagreb often speaks about this danger, but I must say that it seems to me that they do not always pursue policy which will prevent this danger.

* The opinion that Zagreb is responsible for the behavior of the Croat party in the Fefderation B&H is quite widespread. What is your opinion about it?

• I think that Zagreb wishes promotion of the Federation, but I also think that it is not always in the position to control the situation at any moment. I think that it is not right to accuse Zagreb all the time for the situation in Herzeg-Bosnia, but Zagreb must be aware how things stand. I wonder to what extent they have true information. Namely, all their information derive from the HDZ alone which, I presume, keeps assuring them that only the Muslims create problems. I will talk openly with Zagreb about it.

* Do you think that there are structures in Zagreb which for the sake of their political and profit-making interests support the current situation in Herzeg-Bosnia, and in this way obstruct the Federation?

• Zagreb can and must radically cut short all speculations and imputations. Croat policy can clearly and loudly say that it does not stand behind outmanoeuvring federal agreements by certain forces in Herzeg-Bosnia and that these certain people in Herzeg-Bosnia bear complete responsibility for such actions. However, while Zagreb is mostly silent about it, general opinion is that Tudjman and his surroundings support it. I personally do not believe it. I really don't. I think that Croat politics is not that short-sighted and stupid that it does not know that it would return to it like a boomerang in a long run, that on the other hand it leads to creation of an Islamic state which will primarily be a burden around its neck. But that is why it is necessary to clearly disassociate oneself from these forces. It is in the interest of Croat politics.

* When speaking of Croat-Muslim relations, it can be heard from Zagreb that Croatia plays a significant role in Europeanizing and civilizing the Muslims in B&H. How do you look upon it?

• Is that really said? You know what I will tell you. Croatia would do a lot if it civizlized first some of the forces in its own backyard.

* You were a member of the German Government and submitted your resignation because you disagreed with the policy in B&H. What do you resent in German policy?

• I was minister of post and telecommunications and I resigned because of Bosnia & Herzegovina, because I believed that German Government was not active and responsible enough when war in B&H started in 1992 and when it should have done something. We were very satisfied with the developments concerning Croatia, but we should have done something to check the catastrophe in B&H, because it would have been easier to do that then than later on. Now I am a member of the Parliament, an activist concerning the issue of human rights, and as such I was accepted by the Croat and the Bosniac party as a mediator, political mediator in the Federation of B&H. I am in charge of political mediation, and Mr Robert Owen is in charge of final arbitration concerning controversial issues. We have an excellent cooperation. My main reason for resignation was that Europe cannot allow a new genocide. After World War Two, we have all promised that a new genocide would never again be allowed to happen in the whole world, especially not in Europe where we have major influence. I think that none of the European countries should have remained neutral when it became clear that a new genocide was taking place, that we have concentration camps, massacres, ethnic cleansing all over again, everything that we believed that we had done away with for good. German Government should have been involved from the beginning, and even militarily participated with the NATO and other states, to prevent this tragedy. I think that long discussions about whether the German Constitution allows it or not were a wrong approach and that it was in fact a specific alibi to avoid its own responsibility at that moment. Had the German Government reacted in time concerning Bosnia & Herzegovina, I think that the United States of America would also have joined in resolution of the crisis earlier. France would have also been in a different position, had Germany been a full and constructive partner from the beginning. Howver, due to the fact that Germany hesitated to join in resolution of the crisis in B&H from the beginning and fully, we did not have sufficient influence, some other states in Europe took over leadership and this was a big mistake.

STOJAN OBRADOVIC