RADIOACTIVE SCANDALS IN SARAJEVO

Is IFOR to Blame?

AIM Sarajevo, April 4, 1996

The months which lay ahead of us will certainly give an answer to the question whether, after four years of unprecedented suffering, Bosnia has finally got firm hold of peace. For the time being, nobody dares make any serious forecasts, and the reason for such restraint can eaily be found in the experience of numerous foretellers whose ego, when speaking of Bosnia, was literally shattered to pieces. Nevertheless, if peacetime topics and scandals can be considered to be a harbinger of true peace, then there is hope that the Bosnians have really left the time of war and killing behind them.

Towards the end of the war, hit-story in the space of Bosnia & Herzegovina became an information that Sarajevo is gradually turning into a Chernobyl of the Balkans. The first spark was lighted by the minister of agriculture, forestry and water management in the Government of the Federation of B&H, Ahmed Smajic, with his declaration that, accompanied by his associates, he had visited mount Igman, and as he said, "after everything they had seen and had been prevented to see", he expressed his doubts that among the heap of garbage left on this beauty of a mountain mostly by UNPROFOR, and partly by IFOR, there was - radioactive waste!

Whether this statement is a result of the fact that in his criuising around Igman, the minister and his team were quite roughly prevented to move freely and inspect the countryside in the vicinity of positions and bases of IFOR which their mandate permits them to do, it is hard to tell. That his statement is charged with emotions and hurt vanity became quite clear the moment the minister angrily complained because of car checks and identification controls he and the other passengers had been subjected to. Anyway, too strong a word was uttered, and as usual, the first to stick on it were the journalists eager to grab a story which can raise circulation. They immediately thought about numerous floating ships loaded with nuclear waste, linked the fact that majority of soldiers of IFOR were from countries which owned these ships, garnished this with a couple of assumptions and confidential unofficial information and - a scandal was born. In order to remain in the same extraordinary role of an even more extraordinary film, the day after the mentioned warning, minister Smajic uttered a couple, to say the least, interesting sentences directly into recorders of the journalists. He declared: "When one knows the attitude of IFOR towards children and pedestrians, one can just imagine what its attitude to nature may be. Therefore, suspicions that the deposited material is radioactive is not without foundation." And to a question whether the pollution in Sarajevo was alarming, after his observations, the minister answered that the Sarajevans should judge it by themselves "on the basis of journalists' texts". These words really do not need any comments.

In addition to the radioactive cloud, heads of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management did their best to cover mount Igman with a specific oil stain as well. Namely, Faruk Mekic, assistant minister of forestry, presented assessments that about two litres of oil or motor oil are spilled on mount Igman a day, and calculations according to which a drop of this matter spoils about ten cubic metres of drinkable water. Mount Igman is formed by very rare sediments of rock which act as filters for Sarajevo water sources in Bacevo, and it is assessed that rain which falls on Igman reaches the wells which the city waterworks get their water from within 36 hours. In such circumstances, it is quite logical that several hundred thousand citizens of Sarajevo became concerned, because after all the war problems with drinkable water, all they need is a new ecological one. Nevertheless, they were reconciled after some other experts, and fortunately Bosnia still has some, explained that the amount of spilled oil was close to the normal peacetime quantities, and that all analyses of Sarajevo drinkable water showed that its quality had remained unchanged. Still, one should be reminded that IFOR was blamed for the spilled oil, although everyone knows that during most of the time during the war, the narrow macadam road over Igman was literally the only connection of Sarajevo with the rest of the world by land.

How did the case of Igman end, or at least how it was pushed aside, until someone else, perhaps another minister, decided to recall it again? Stories about a nuclear catastrophe, and that is how far the forecasts went, diminished after major Simon Haselock, spokesman of IFOR in Sarajevo, said without even trying to be diplomatic about it: "Suggestions that nuclear waste was buried on mount Igman are ridiculous". At the same time, a new denial arrived from Brussels, according to which neither military nor political leaders of the NATO had any information that the IFOR units were leaving behind nuclear waste in the mountains around Sarajevo, especially in Igman and Bjelasnica. Fortunately, minister Smajic did not issue any more statements.

The thing that gives an additional note to the case of Igman is the fact that the public reacted spontaneously to the news about the deposited radioactive waste, without much, one could even say any, thought. For instance, only one journal, and along with the others there are three dailies in Sarajevo, wondered: if nuclear waste was really deposited on mount Igman, what was the motive of about 300 soldiers of IFOR who were stationed on this mountain to stay and sleep there, and what was even more, to conceal this fact from minister Smajic and the Sarajevans? Did these members of IFOR find radiation and an excess of Becquerels agreeable contrary to the sensitive Sarajevans?

Stories about nuclear waste on the mountain - which was before the war in Bosnia, so why would not it be now, used as a zero parametre for measuring pollution in large European centres - had not died down yet when Sarajevo was shaken by a new one. Titled "Mini Chernobyl in Stup", a story appeared in the daily press about radiation which threatens the Sarajevans from a facility of devastated "Energoinvest" factory "TAT" in the new part of the city close to Ilidza. First the public was informed that the Serbs, withdrawing during reintegration of Sarajevo, took three barrels of radioactive material from the factory, then that cobalt balls used in checking welding were scattered in some of the premises, and that any contact with this material was dangerous for life. Of course, there were also assessments of the journalists that radioactive cobalt from "TAT" could contaminate a space of one kilometre in diameter.

The republican Headquarters of Civilian Protection came out in public with its proposal, stressing that its expert teams would remove the unpleasant balls in a short time, that they had to be collected to the last one, because they would continue to emit gamma-rays in the next 50 years. Explanation that the device for checking quality of welding which used the infamous cobalt balls was in a special room with thick walls which was completely undamaged given by the deputy director general of "Energoinvest" was not of much help. Rumours continued to spread.

Only a couple of days later, dust began to settle down after the explanation that "no balls were scattered around premises, and even if they were, they could not be harmful, except if a long time was spent living in their vicinity". And again, a similar logical question was asked: why were soldiers of IFOR incautiously exposing themselves to dangerous radiation living literally next to "TAT" in Stup and in it, what was their interest in it? Did their life of soldiers make them so disappointed that they deliberately exposed themselves to radiation wishing to become sterile and incapable of participation in giving life to children who would some day also become soldiers? It may sound stupid, but such thought brought peace to the citizens, when nobody from the Bosnian authorities saw it fit to address the public concerning this matter.

Whether both radioactive stories appeared by pure chance and whether it was a mere accident that they appeared within just a few days, it is difficult to know. The fact is, however, that they were not presented and supported by independent media, but by those close to the authorities and the ruling (SDA) party. It is quite possible that this was part of an effort to divert the attention of the public from unpleasant topics such as wages of the combatants, status of the disabled veterans, families of the killed defenders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state, return of demobilized combatants to their jobs and fctories which do not exist any more... If this was the intention of presenting radioactive stories, one must admit that the range of the whole operation was very limited and full of other drawbacks.

Finally, it would not be amiss to consider another aspect of these but other stories as well which are appearing or might appear in the days to come. It is becoming quite clear that IFOR was given enormous authorizations by the Dayton Agreement and that the authorities might find it convenient to publish information which "sting" the international forces and create an impression that they are after all "touchable" although actually they are not. IFOR is polluting Igman, IFOR is enabling the Serbs (according to the first naive version) to take barrels with radioactive cobalt with them probably somewhere to Pale, IFOR checked identity of a minister and controlled his vehicle... Perhaps demonstration that IFOR is "touchable" could present its dislocation from Igman, under pressure of the public, which is a wish which (for the sake of the mountain and its purity) should not be debatable. Nevertheless, if that was the intention, the method used to accomplish it was - a complete failure.

ZLATKO VUKMIROVIC