REALITY OF KOSOVO SERBS

AIM Pristina, March 20, 1996

The formula according to which the Dayton Agreement resolved the Bosnian issue (take it or leave it and be punished for it) will most probably be applied to Kosovo as well. Europe has, it seems learnt the lesson that disputes in this space cannot or can hardly be resolved by accord between local power-wielders who sign agreements just in order to violate them the very next day, which was described so well in the testimony left by a man who watched this hypocrisy for a long time - Lord David Owen.

The main issue, and therefore the greatest difficulty of recent negotiations, not talks any more, will involve the question how to bring closer and if possible reconcile maximalist demands of the Albanians (Kosovo - Republic) and minimalist concessions of Serbia (limited, i.e. controlled autonomy). The Serb party is entering these talks or negotiations - as you will, within a very restrained manoeuvring space, because the Albanian party has already internationalized its demands and, with its Gandhiist behavior, won sympathies of the world which is fed up with violence and obstinacy.

The Albanian party will, therefore, have certain advantage in these talks, and it can justify (and succeed in it) its failures or results below expectations with conditions which were not easy for it, because it worked more or less, underground - with consequences which accompany every policy in such circumstances. The Serb party will have a much more difficult time, because its underachievement is more obvious: the promised "state of law" has not been established in this space (from Horgos to Dragas), the economy is generally at the level of a "positive zero" (another of our inventions), emigration of the Serbs was not interrupted, but their vociferously announced colonization of Kosovo has not begun either - announced most frequently and most uproariously by those who are neither from here nor living over here, but live and work in Belgrade, due to which they are usually known as weekend politicians, like for example, Kosovo district prefect who is also a minister in the Government of Serbia with permanent residence in Belgrade, of course.

Kosovo is a narrow space for its inhabitants, and therefore possibilities of employment here are also quite limited. Participation of the Albanians in the total population is nowadays about 90 per cent with an almost certain tendency to increase, because demographic trends are very slow in changing, so that in just another ten or more years, this percentage will certainly be bigger, and that of the Serbs even smaller - about 5 per cent probably, which means that they will be an ethnic group which will be of almost noone's concern. The need for employment which is higher in Kosovo than anywhere else in Europe, will demand a radical reorganization of the present-day structure of the employed, both those who are on "paid leave or just waiting and looking for a job". Even in such unfavourabe conditions, the Albanians seem to have got accustomed more readily due to which their transformation from peasants to merchants almost overnight is a phenomenon which willcertainly be subject of sociological and even psychological investigations in the future. Contrary to them, the employed Serbs are trying to live off their wages which makes them all, with the exception of a small number of peasants who live off the land, vitally linked to the state which provides that much.

The most peculiar consequence of this situation in Kosovo is in the sphere of its culture: it is strictly divided into the Albanian and the Serb culture, each primitively closed within its own boundaries, instead of mixing and forming a civilized multi-cultural environment, so that one can even speak of para-culture in this space, useful for noone and harmful for everyone, but obstinate in its resistance, due to which both cultures know quite a lot about nations around the world, but know little, almost nothing, about each other, although they live in the same space which, whether they like it or not, they are forced to share.

Although at the moment they might not be the most significant, but surely the most dramatic future psychological consequences of the Kosovo solution, definitely for the Serbs, but probably for the Albanians as well because there will be plenty of bitterness left, will be - for the first that they will lose a lot, and for the latter that they will get less than they wished for. That is the origin of the still not obvious but quite surely existing anxiety among the Serb population and its ambivalent constraint: whether to stay or leave? This fear is accompanied by a natural uneasiness due to uncertainty of what tomorrow might bring - if they leave, will they meet with an even worse destiny than their compatriots from Croatia or Bosnia & Herzegovina, since they were witnesses of how they were received in Serbia and quickly rushed to go back where they had come from, especially by official institutions.

Changes will be most prominent in the political picture of Kosovo: instead of apparent autonomy (since decisions are made centrally), it will be much more tangible. The Albanians will naturally have an impact on developments (assembly, government), and it will be impossible to dissolve the autonomy by introduction of coercive measures any more, except if not ready to wage war again against the whole world. The worst thing that might befall the Serb people in Kosovo is that they alone will pay the bill for the wrong policy which, by the way, neither consulted them much nor bothered to inform them about its moves.

The policy of provincial behavior is quite obviously manifested on the example of slow and unwilling resolution of the issue of Kosovo. That is why this policy, instead of common-sense facing the reality, persistently continues to use the already used up mechanisms, rationalization ("it is someone else's fault") or projection ("they hate us"), but mostly autism which is interested only in itself and its own and which therefore persists on rigid answers which can somewhat postpone the solution, but certainly cannot remove it. That is why it is quite possible that the resolution of the problem of Kosovo may be resolved in a move similar to that of Alexander the Great who cut the Gordian knot with a single stroke of his sword: the example of Sarajevo. This means that Berlin Congress (1898) will be repeated, or the Yalta agreement (1945). This is or will be the reality of Kosovo, and therefrom of the Serbs in it.

Milenko KARAN AIM Pristina