KOSOVO - A NEW LIFEBOAT IN THE BALKANS?
AIM Pristina, February 8, 1996
After Dayton Agrement, one could say that the situation in the Balkans is more or less pending. Interruption of the war and presence of troops which guarantee that peace will be kept and compromising solutions implemented, do not mean that a lasting stability in the region has been secured. Both in principle and practically, solutions from Dayton are rather palliative, and not longterm and definite in character. This could be anticipated before, during the very negotiating process, and now it is verified daily, in the so-called process of implementation of peace. That Dayton Agreement actually is palliative became obvious after a recent statement of its head architect, Richard Holbrooke, in which he did not exclude the possibility of Serbia and Croatia annexing Republic of Srpska and Western Herzegovina, respectively, after withdraal of NATO forces.
This palliative and pending situation reflects on other critical points in the region. As Bosnia & Herzegovina is a fragile and unstable creation, the situation in Macedonia and Kosovo is just as fragile and unstable. Powers involved in resolution of the crisis in the Balkans still do not have a clear and consistent picture how the crisis will be overcome and lasting safety and stability in the region achieved.
Just as it was difficult to reach a concensus concerning the war in Bosnia and Croatia and resolving the Serb issue in the Balkans, the international factor still has no formula for resolving the Albanian issue either, which is similar, but also different from the Serb issue. As could be seen at the last session of the Ministerial Council of the EU, there are two approaches to the problem of Kosovo: the first, which gives priority to resolving of the Serb issue and almost completely neglects Kosovo, and the other which insists on an essential levelling of the Serb and the Albanian issue in the Balkans. Supporters of the first approach, who were in the majority in the EU, did not accept the initiative to make resolution of the problem of Kosovo a condition for full diplomatic recognition of Belgrade. Great Britain, France and some of the other member states of the EU were ready to recognize sovereignty of Serbia (i.e. FR of Yugoslavia) unconditionally, without linking it to Kosovo, and later seek a solution for Kosovo in recognition of human rights and possible revival of a form of autonomy for the Albanians. The second opinion advocated by Germany was in favour of a more permanent balancing of the Serb against the Albanian issue by conditioning the return of Serbia/Yugoslavia into the international community by resolving the issue of Kosovo.
The haste of some members of the EU, such as France, for instance, which insisted on unconditional recognition of Belgrade and which even wished to send its ambassador to Belgrade without waiting for the concensus within the EU, was checked by the United States of America which actively got involved in resolution of the Bosnian issue and which have a similar opinion on the issue of Kosovo as Germany.
All things considered, the USA believe that balance in the Balkans, even if it may be palliative, cannot be re-established without principled balancing of the Serb against the Albanian issue. If comparatively high concessions were made for the Serbs in Bosnia, where statehood of their entity was recognized, FR Yugoslavia/Serbia must be forced to make the same concessions in Kosovo, that is, to offer the Albanians at least internal self-determination.
The stance of Italy is highly indicative, since it is traditionally believed to be more inclined towards the Albanians than to the Serbs. At the Brussels ministerial gathering, however, Italy, in the capacity of the Chairman for the next six months, supported the proposal to recognize FR of Yugoslavia. Malicious people in Kosovo interpreted this shift as a wish of Italy to protect its economic interests in Serbia, primarily links of the "FIAT" with "Zastava" from Kragujevac. After all, foreign minister of Italy, Mrs. Agnelli, is a member of the family which owns "FIAT". However, perhaps the other assumption is closer to the truth, according to which the present situation and the indefinite status of Kosovo is quite convenient for Italy, because it implies maintenance of the weakened position both of the Albanians and the Serbs in the Balkans. Without Kosovo, Albania will be a much easier ground for quiet economic and political penetration of Italy, while Yugoslavia/Serbia with Kosovo around its neck will be convicted to stagnation and deprived of all its remaining ambitions to return to the coast of the Adriatic as a significant factor.
The question at stake is, however, whether this Latin cunning and sophistication will tip the balance in favour of the Albanian issue remaining unsolved. Hesitation of the Europeans to undertake more resolute steps concerning the issue of Kosovo was soon afterwards corrected by the Americans. After French President Churac's visit to Washington D.C. and Warren Christopher's Balkan tour, this strategic difference of opinions on evaluation of the situation in the Balkans was somewhat alleviated. It is clear, though, that it has not been essentially resolved and that a period of difficult and uncertin diplomatic struggles lies ahead, but further complications of relations between the Balkan statelets as well.
As it seems at the moment, there are a few ideas how to re-establish strategic balance in the Blkans. The French and the British still seem to believe in the old formula of stability in the Balkans based on a powerful regional position of Belgrade and a kind of a political and military hegemony of the Serbs. Although Belgrade lost a lot of its influence after dissolution of former Yugoslavia, in Paris and London it is still believed that Belgrade could maintain its predominant position in the region - in the space of former Yugoslavia. Due to that, they constantly manifested an ambivalent stance concerning Serb aggression in Bosnia, and now they are generously leaving Kosovo to Serbia, worried that concessions demanded from Belgrade were too big anyway.
According to another viewpoint, Belgrade cannot keep its old predominant role in the political and military sense in the space of former Yugoslavia, but a new architecture of balance will have to be found and constructed, the axis of which could spread to other Balkan countries. Belgrade can no more be the point which gathers, by hook or by crook, the scattered states and ethnic entities with expressive, distinct centrifugal inclinations. Therefore, a new candidate for hegemony is sought. There was a time when Zbignev Bzezinsky proposed that, apart from Belgrade, Athens or Ankara could take over the hegemony, but they would need support for it from the world powers. However, historic memory about the role of Turkey and comparatively inferior geo-political position of Greece made such projects unfeasible. In fact, all ideas based on establishing stability on a hierarchy or hegemony, cannot be effectuated.
The third possibility is establishment of a complex configuration of balance in the Balkans, with a few more or less equally important centres. Centres of such balance would be Belgrade, Zagreb, Sofia, Athens and Thirane, while Sarajevo and Skopje would be points of interesection but also resultants of interests. For this possibility, strengthening of the Albanian factor would be necessary, that is, its careful turning in the right direction, in order to prevent its becoming a detonator of a new war and further complications.
Euro-American strategy for the Balkans is now at a new pragmatic turning point, when after comparative rewarding of the Serb aggression and recognition of results of ethnic cleansing, Albanian cooperativeness and determination for non-violent policy in Kosovo must be awarded in a way, because on the contrary, even the current project for implementation of peace in Bosnia could suffer complete failure. This is not just a moral issue, but also one of pragmatic imperatives. Without resolution of the issue of Kosovo, it is impossible to expect that peace and safety could be established in the Balkans. Cynical stance of certain European powers which consider the Albanian non-violence in Kosovo to be just a sign of weakness and psychological subordination of the Albanians may quickly return as a boomerang to them, because discontent of the Albanians with their forcible fragmentation into a few comparatively unprotected entities would explode similarly as the Serb issue exploded when former Yugoslavia disintegrated.
In any case, Mr Warren Christopher's firm position in Belgrade, forcing out the consent for opening the American Information Centre in Pristina, returning of Kosovo among the conditions for recognition of Yugoslavia/Serbia, as well as institing on opening of a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, points out that not all chances have been lost yet for introduction of another rescue raft in the pending balance in the Balkans. With the possible demilitarization of Kosovo this traditional powder keg of the Balkans may actually become a floating lifeboat which will join all other lifeboats in former Yugoslavia. When current powerful ethnic tempests in the Balkans calm down, instead of the current palliative diplomacy and pending solutions, maybe modes for establishing more lasting forms of safety will be found, and even some kind of a way to connect different lifeboats into some kind of a formation.
Skellzen Malici
AIM Pristina