BEARING THE FIRST FRUIT IN RELATIONS

BETWEEN ZAGREB AND BELGRADE

AIM Zagreb, January 23, 1996

Although after the head of Croat diplomacy, Mate Granic, had visited Belgrade both parties did their best not to appear too optimistic, even less enthusiastic, "normalization" has nevertheless begun to bear its first fruit. Opening of the first border crossing was announced, and negotiations between oil companies, Zagreb INA and Belgrade Jugopetrol continued verifying that economic, especilly trading interests, even after several years of total neglect still serve as a good "buffer" of nationalistic exclusiveness and passions.

Representatives of the two national oil companies met in Zagreb, and in order to remove all doubt which previous contacts stirred in public, they tried to make an impression on journalists of experts who did not wish to prejudice diplomatic solutions, but that they were just using advantages these solutions might bring. It was said that in the end of last year an agreement was signed on selling INA's products (gasoline, mazout, diesel fuel), and that subsequently selling of other products was also considered (artificial fertilizers, polyethylene, p.v.c., plastic packing materials), but that all this would become operational after mutual recognition of the two states. As if the people in oil business from the two banks of the Danube wished to say that they did not want to stand out in any way: they were here to reestablish a business relationship which in any normal circumstances brought nice profits to everybody, but only when told to do so.

Yet, it seems that this time their role has gained much in significance and that the economists are now well acquainted with all the fine points of diplomacy just as much as politicians. That something has changed in political calculations and that closing of the first deals among the people engaged in oil business was an announcement of this change was clearly shown by the interview of Mate Granic published in the latest volume of Zagreb weekly "Nacional". Contrary to what he was saying so far for months and years even, Granic now says that recognition of Croatia by FR of Yugoslavia is not "the first goal", but that reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem is. If opening of communications, border crossings etc. come along with it, they will be "elements of recognition", because everything can be regulated by inter-state agreements between Zagreb and Belgrade.

Granic's statement could probably be understood as an attempt to protect the Ministry of external Affairs which has lately become subject to criticism of the opposition and the public in general, because the stance not to accept unconditional normalization of relations with Belgrade was abandoned. Such statements were actually made from the highest posts in the state, and even Granic himself had several times declared that his visit to Belgrade was out of the question before FR Yugoslavia recognized Croatia and before the highway which passed through Serb-controlled territories was opened.

After he had returned from Belgrade, Granic was asked by one of the leaders from the opposition, Zlatko Tomcic (Croat Peasants' Party) during a debate at the Assembly, why Croatia agreed, again contrary to previous declarations, to lifting of the sanctions against Belgrade, before reintegration of Eastern Slavonia and before it recognized Croatia. Granic replied that the issue of the sanctions was not considered in Zagreb at all but in Dayton, and that they were not unconditionally lifted, and as for reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, he said that after operations "Storm" and "Flash" it became a much less serious problem, especially since the Americans agreed to nominate a military and civilian commander of the region.

Although Security Council Resolution 1037 quite vaguely speaks of reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem - it is not precisely said when the one-year mandate of UNTAES actually begins, demobilization of this region begins after deployment of the peace forces, noone knows how long it will last, nor is there any interest of member states to send in troops - it was welcomed by state leadership with marked optimism, like no document from the East River. The reason for this was disclosed by Mate Granic himself who stressed the role of the USA which is believed to have been decisive for further developments, and about which there were allegedly certain details which the public should not know anything about yet.

Namely, Granic has recently declared that the Americans had given internal guarantees to Croatia concerning reintegration of Eastern Slavonia. Since internal guarantees are not usually given in order to be talked about publicly, this statement appears to be quite clumsy, and indeed can be checked how true it is, which was probably why it was made in the first place. It is also claimed by the Croat party that it is no mere chance that Resolution 1037 states that UNTAES will withdraw its forces before schedule if it turns out that the agreement was not implemented or if obstructed in any way. The top people in Croatia insist that it was introduced due to possible resistance of the Serb party which would not be tolerated this time, so Zagreb would be given permission to apply means from operations "Storm" and "Flash", after every possibility of peaceful reintegration fails.

Although Croat leadership gets creeps from the very thought of Americans as secret sponsors and supporters of Croat military victories in Krajina and Western Biosnia & Herzegovina, now, in a subsequent explanation of the context, it is awkwardly admitted that there is some truth in it. It is highly questionable, however, whether the Americans can remain sponsors of a new limited war in Eastern Slavonia, in which involvement of military forces of Yugoslavia would be much more probable than last summer. Besides, circumstances have completely changed in the meantime, and while last year passed in a search for any trail which would lead to a global peace solution, it was found in the meantime.

What is more, the three warring parties signed a joint paper in Dayton for the first time, which is believed to be able to bring lasting, even if cold, peace. This was the necessary condition for the Americans to become directly involved and agree to send in their troops. It sounds hardly probable that they would allow that to be jeopardized and have a new war started in the neighbourhood of a pacified Bosnia & Herzegovina, because this time they would not be able to just "overfly" it, but they would most certainly be forced to get directly involved. That is why it was no accident that the American administrator of Transition Administration for the region, Jacques Klein, emphasized that reintegration of Eastern Slavonia was not something that could be accomplished with no efforts made by Zagreb. "The Serb party is concerned whether everything will proceed peacefully", he said with understanding, and added that it asked for guarantees of "civic rights and protection of the Serb population which had lived here before".

Croatia has already received a very serious warning from the East River concerning protection of minority rights of the Serb population, and in less than a month, a new rapporteur of Boutros Ghali on the subject is expected to arrive. According to an assessment of Croat representatives in the UN (Vladimir Drobnjak) there are actual possibilities for the Security Council not to remain on the level of a Presidential Statement this time, but to adopt a special Resolution on Croatia (and, if it should have the power of implementation, to vote in favour of some form of punishment of Zagreb).

Due to all that, the highest Croat officials, especially Minister Granic, have lately underlined that peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia has great chances to succeed, and asserted that a high level of understanding was achieved with Belgrade on this matter. Motives of the other party for that are not discussed, although it is not clear why Belgrade would do anything in favour of Zagreb, if the latter would not be cooperative on other open issues (Prevlaka, return of a certain number of Serbs to Krajina). For the time being, these issues are shoved under the carpet, but it is clear that this cannot go on forever.

MARINKO CULIC