WHAT IS IFOR DOING IN MOSTAR?

AIM Zagreb, January 9, 1996

Immediately after Dayton, one of the severest critics of the "project of establishing integral Bosnia & Herzegovina, Henry Kissinger forecast that in six months at the latest, Croat-Boshniak conflicts would be resumed. Regardless of premisses and prejudices which corroborated his allegations that "it was crazy to create such a state in the first place, that it had no future, so it should be divided", some of the latest developments appear to show that he was right.

Six armoured vehicles and 50 members of the Spanish IFOR brigade on Saturday evening were deployed along the Boulevard in Mostar and thus placed themselves between the western and the eastern part of the city. This was done by direct order of the European administrator Hans Koschnik, but also after a series of armed incidents which resulted in the dead and wounded on both sides. Quite unexpectedly, therefore, IFOR broadened its mandate, but just in relation to programmers of peace, and instead of taking position at the "border" between the Croat-Boshniak Federation and the "Republic of Srpska", that is between the two B&H entities, now its job is to pacify and separate allies. Mostar has become, as it has always been, the key testing ground of the possibility of foundation but also survival of the Federation. Pursuant the Dayton Agreement, it should be divided into six municipalities (three Croat and three Boshniak), but at the same time, it should be an integral city, and as Koschnik says, "if Mostar is not going to be a united city, there will be no Federation either".

If such a "division" was agreed in Dayton, if it means readiness to coexistence, and if it is true that Alija Izetbegovic has agreed to make Mostar the political and cultural centre of the Croats in B&H, what is debatable? Is this just a matter of incidents directed by extremists on both sides, or something much more profound? There is no doubt that extremists, in this case "jihad" warriors and "Ustashe", as they like to call each other, have reasons to create tensions, but nevertheless, the problem must in fact be in different interpretation of Dayton documents.

This thesis is verified by a series of statements and actual moves made by both parties concerned, not only in Mostar, but primarily in Zagreb and Sarajevo. Much has come out in the open during Tudjman's visit to Sarajevo, where he chaired the Council for Cooperation of the Federation and the Republic B&H with the Republic of Croatia, while Izetbegovic is just the Vice-Chairman of this body. The Croat President did not conceal his satisfaction with the foundation of the Council, but he interpreted it not only as a link with the Croats in B&H, but at the same time as a patron of the Federation, as a supplement for the Confederation in which everyone knows who is the boss. Tudjman declared after the meeting that problems had emerged concerning the division of cantons in the Federation which, according to his opinion, should be solely ethnic, but that that which used to be Serb and then conquered by the Croat Army should also be Croat.

On the other hand, Alija Izetbegovic concluded that talks about the Federation were at a standstill, and that the Croat party was avoiding to sign a series of most important inter-state agreements. The Boshniak party also accuses the Croats for delaying abolishment of Herzeg-Bosnia, and its leaders, prompted from Zagreb, persistently repeat allegations that it is still necessary for the sake of preserving political, military and economic interests of the Croats. What is more, after Sarajevo, noone publicly mentions the presence of the Croat Army in B&H any more, which should have withdrawn by the middle of January, pursuant the Dayton Agreement.

Tudjman's post-Dayton statements about the Muslims as an invented nation and his attempt to save men accused of war crimes just completes the idea about division of Bosnia into three, not two, entities, or more precisely nations, when the Muslims cannot be forced to become Croat hangers-on.

A few days ago, Bosbian-Herzegovinian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, to a journalist's question on latest territorial disputes in Mostar, answered with a counter-question: "Why divisions in the first place? Mostar must remain a united city of all its citizens. If not, we will be awarding what was happening in the war. Those who have destroyed the Old Bridge wished to divide Mostar for good. Therefore, when we speak of divisions into municipalities we act in favour of these people. Mostar can be divided only administratively, but not ethnically, because that would be an enormous step backwards for the civilization. We are forced to live together, whether we wish it or not, whether we like each other or not. We will never overcome controversies if we continue dividing municipalities into Croat and Muslim ones. In this way we will support those who have fired at the Old Bridge, and by firing at it they have fired at civilization. I sincerely admit that I had not expected anything of the kind from the Croat rightists".

So as not to cause more confusion, Silajdzic explained that he was not opposed to the Federation as often imputed to him, but that it had to be a "federation of cantons, and not a federation of ethnic territories. I have problems with people who do not understand that. We have not agreed about a federation of ethnic territories in Washington, because that would have meant a division of Bosnia, but a federation of cantons, a true democratic creation".

Can there be a more obvious example which shows the difference in conceptions and views of the future of Bosnia that these Silajdzic's statements? Although they are highly diplomatically measured and aimed against extremist, rightist forces, in fact they are an evident criticism of the official Croat policy. On the other hand, concerning developments in Mostar, representatives of the Croat people in the Federation of B&H also made a public statement (Kresimir Zubak, Jadranko Prlic, Mate Tadic, Martin Raguz, Neven Tomic, Vladislav Pogarcic and Bozo Ljubic) denying that "again, the Croats were mostly and exclusively guilty for all the problems of this city".

Extremism, radicalism and fascistoid behavior are political phrases - the statement reads - which have taken root in the vocabulary of local media. A typical Pale pattern of informing the public is applied and thus a negative public opinion about the Croats is created. After denying Muslim versions of Mostar developments and accusing Sarajevo media for not telling the complete truth, they wonder in the statement "why special statements on the occasion of these developments are made only by the officials from the ranks of the Muslim Boshniak people? What about us Croats? What about TV B&H which incessantly claims that it is objective, but most of all multi- multi-... Is it possible to hear a multi- opinion on these developments from TV B&H? Do only the Muslim-Boshniaks have a monopoly on the truth and the right to make a statement, and in Mostar particularly Mister Orucevic (mayor of the eastern part of Mostar)?"

There is no doubt that the media have been used for the purposes of politics again and that there are numerous examples in Sarajevo that they solely represent the opinion of the Boshniaks and policy of the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA), but it is in no way different in Zagreb. "Vjesnik", for example, writes "that local structures in eastern Mostar (supported partly by Sarajevo) jeopardize implementation of the agreed by their acts. As an example, there are the maximalist demands of the Boshniak party concerning the borders of Mostar municipalities, insisting that Koschnik reaches a decree on the statute and the elections...".

Dayton is therefore, experiencing its first big trial and first defeat in Mostar, which just corroborates the thesis that this is just a ceasefire, and not peace, especially if it is still believed that the NATO could complete its job in B&H in a single year. While the Serb party has become appeased and is filling "its" territory with "its" people, making its idea about homogeneous ethnic territories come true, the Croat party would also like to make it true, and the Boshniak is trying to prevent it by all possible means.

In this context, regardless of the fact that integral Bosnia & Herzegovina would certainly be possible but with some new leaders, Kissinger's question sounds quite logical: "What are peace forces expected to protect? If they are to protect demarcation lines, then divided Bosnia is in fact the American goal, and if they are to protect the borders of the integral Bosnia, then the Americans must get ready for a brutal conflict with no end in sight".

We know where IFOR stands and who it should separate, but what its arrival in Mostar means, still remains to be seen?

GOJKO MARINKOVIC