TIME-OUT FOR BARGAINING

AIM Zagreb, December 17, 1995

I think that not only we are satisfied, but so is the whole world - this was the first sentence uttered by Franjo Tudjman when he had landed at Zagreb airport after signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris. Such stressing of positive vibrations sent by Zagreb into the world usually reflects his opssessive conviction that he, with his statesman's moves and estimates makes not only his own country his debtor, but the greater part of the world as well.

This time, however, there was an additional reason for that, because on the eve of Tudjman's departure to Paris, an attempt of the ruling HDZ and the opposition to reach a joint assessment of the Dayton Agreement failed, just as it happened concerning dismissal of UNPROFOR's mandate. Now the HDZ had no patience to discuss nuances of meaning of certain formulations

• the opposition offered only a principled support to the agreement, but refusing to consent to giving up Prevlaka and Bosnian Posavina to the Serbs - so, when he returned, Tudjman obviously wished to stress that the world respected him and his "real politik", and not the whimsical ideas of national "Romanticists" among the opposition.

Nevertheless, the opposition got its way concerning one thing without any of its doing. The day after his arrival, Tudjman declared at a special press conference that signing of the agreement on normalization of relations and mutual recognition with the FR of Yugoslavia had been postponed because Belgrade insisted on getting Prevlaka. During his short return home from Dayton he had also mentioned aspirations towards Prevlaka, but not in a tone of apodictic refusal, but rather as an information about what he had been asked to give up, which was intended to feel the pulse of the public. It therefore became clear that something has changed in the meantime, but the mentioned refusal of the opposition in the parliament eliminated the possibility that it was done for its sake.

It is much more probable that in the Paris finish, the agreement got stuck concerning certain details, which might have been agreed previously, but not firmly enough to bring to an agreement now. All things considered, primarily the so-called timing is disputable, i.e. the choice of the time for exchange of territories. Approximately three years ago, when he mentioned for the first time the possibility to exchange Prevlaka, Tudjman said that it would be done after the two states were recognized within internationally verified borders. This obviously means that he wished to have guarantees concerning reintegration of some much more valuable and essential parts of state territories - Krajina, Eastern Slavonia - and then sit down to discuss Prevlaka.

It is true that after Dayton, he intensified the issue of Prevlaka insisting - which sounded more like a threat outwards than a promise inwards - that the Assembly must decide about its possible exchange and finally the citizens themselves at a referendum. But, rejection of the demand of the opposition which especially stressed the issue of Prevlaka, shows that he will probably not make haste to consult the parliament. And as for the referendum, it can even more prove to be a mere verbal promise. The Croat Constitution does not mention a referendum concerning a change of borders, but, with its Article 8 of the Basic Provisions, excplicitly authorizes the Assembly to take care of it.

All in all, it might prove that actually nothing has been settled concerning Prevlaka, and that after all, "old Tudjman" should be believed when he mentioned its exchange, rather than the "new Tudjman" who is probably just trying to increase the price with this concession. The optimistic statement of Momir Bulatovic also points in this direction when, he said that Zagreb was probably just seeking "the way and the means" to accomplish it, but even more the course of Dayton negotiations which reminded many of a recapitualtion of all secret and less secret agreements (Karadzic with Boban in Graz) between the until recently warring parties. Indeed, some things have changed in the meantime, and Ivo Komsic says in the daily "Novi list" that when the Croats and the Boshniaks stood firmly united concerning Sarajevo in Dayton, the Serbs lost it. But, again according to Komsic, when Tudjman and Milosevic reached an agreement concerning Bosnian Posavina (or just verified a previous agreement, as the latter explained), The Boshniak party not only could do nothing about it, but it was threatened that the failed negotiations would be at their expense.

The agreement on Posavina seems to hold all the keys, maybe even the bulk of what has been agreed in Dayton and signed in Paris. In the interval between these two super spectacles for the media, Tudjman angrily retorted to his critics at home who had accused him of "betrayal" of Posavina Croats, that by insisting on Posavina he risked making the international community demand from him to have the Serbs from Krajina, who were now in FR Yugoslavia, Eastern Croatia and Posavina itself return to their homes. And that, of course, he said, was out of the question. That this can really hardly be possible was clear after Paris when Tudjman was asked whether recognition of Zagreb by Belgrade was conditioned by mass return of the Serbs to Ktajina. He answered that Croatia would not accept such a condition, and that it had not even been asked to do it. Judging by this, neither is Belgrade imposing conditions concerning Krajina, nor is Zagreb imposing any concerning Posavina, and if we agree that there is a link between the two, this forms a basis of a reasonable understanding between the two parties. However, there are opinions that there is not enough parity for a firm agreement in this understanding either, and that for that reason, Croatia is expected to make further cocessions.

Attention is directed towards several possible compensations, among which succession of the name and property of the SFRY is gaining significance, especially since Croatia showed understanding for Belgrade concerning inheritance of the "pedigree" and membership in international organizations. A while ago, a high official of the HDZ and since recently the "holder of state seal" Ivan Milas stated stances of Zagreb as clearly as in a children'c picture-book. He said that the departure of the majority of the Serbs from Croatia was such a relief for it that in comparison with it, giving some inheritance rights to Belgrade was a mere "trifle". This quite unambiguously speaks of a true obsession of the Croat leadership by permanent banishment of the Serbs and a readiness to pay an appropriate price in order to prevent their return. But, it is obviously difficult to control this price, and once one enters into this kind of bargaining it is difficult to predict how much it may cost in the end.

Majority of the Serbs, apart from Serbia, have gone to Posavina, which Zagreb has alreday written off, but also to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem, where they can stay and continue to settle down, pursuant the Zagreb-Erdut agreement. This means that hindrance of their return to Knin, Glina or Grahovo and Drvar are quite firmly securing their remaining in Eastern Croatia, and even if Belgrade fails to make any significant steps in this sense, insisting of Zagreb on accelerated reintegration of Eastern Croatia is quite dubious. Hesitation of both the United Nations and the United States to organize a mandate for that reintegration seems to be taken as a serious warning by Zagreb that ethnic "draining" of the Serbs from Croatia must be paid for not only with Prevlaka and concessions concerning succession, but perhps also by amputation of some vital parts of state territories.

The current interruption in "normalization" is probably used in Zagreb for calculations what to do next. But, there is not much room for lingering, because there are certain indications that international mediators have not completely given up the idea of a mass return of the Serbs to Croatia. This would especially become topical if repatriation of refugees from B&H succeeds, because in that case it would be very hard to evade the question of return of the Serbs west of the Una river, especially since they had lived there in rounded off and their own territorial entireties. That is why the current interruption of connections between Belgrade and Zagreb resembles anything more than a relaxed time-out, and it is more probable that the heated negotiations will soon continue than be put on ice.

MARINKO CULIC