REACTIONS OF SARAJEVO TO DAYTON

Sarajevo Nov 29, 1995

THE BITTER TASTE OF PEACE

AIM, Sarajevo, November 23, 1995

Mixed feelings of joy and concern with a large dose of incredulity and doubt about peace at last - these are in short reactions of the Sarajevans to the agreement reached in Dayton. After four years of blockade and life on the verge between life and death, it is more than understandable why the Sarajevans do not give vent to their feelings and joy because of the promised peace. Nevertheless, hope that this martyr city will finally be free as the Dayton papers dictate, seems increasingly real and conceivable.

Similarly to the distrustful Sarajevans, reactions of the local political parties to the news from Ohio ranged from whole-hearted approval of the agreement to fierce criticism and condemnation because of division of the country. Namely, B&H delegation headed by the President of the Presidency and at the same time President of the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA) went to the negotiations in Dayton with stances of this party, and not those of the republican parliament, so this unprecedented occurrence is now defended by this party's cheering to the agreement. According to the assessment of the SDA "Dayton agreement is our stake for peace in B&H. But, this does not mean the end of our persistent and difficult struggle both for our state Bosnia & Herzegovina and for the Boshniak people who have given the greatest contribution to defence and preservation of our homeland. The end of the war on the basis of this agreement is a fundmental assumption of peace" - the statement of this party reads. Further on, the ruling party stresses that at this moment the most important thing is "the existence of B&H as a sovereign independent state, preservation of Sarajevo and Mostar as undivided cities, guaranteed right to return for the refugees and prevention of the fascist option to remain in power which will practically be accomplished through the process of prosecution and conviction of war criminals". In the manner of former communists, the current ruling structure claims that "the SDA will additionally mobilize and organize" all its potentials primarily for the sake of reconstruction of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan society, since this party "is the leading force in the liberation struggle"!

On the other hand, former communists are most critical about the agreement, that is the present Social Democratic Party (SDP) which also participates in state authorities. They see the signed agreement as a practical division of B&H into two. This party explicitly claims that "Dayton is just one of the branch offices of Karadjordjevo", in other words that Tudjman and Milosevic divided Bosnia by the recipe they used in Karadjordjevo, but now under the auspices of the USA. Former communists assess that significant pressure was exerted in Dayton, primarily on the B&H delegation, which resulted in enormous disadvantages of the final project. Members of the SDP are also interested mostly in demarcation between territories, so the loss of the Sava river valley and Brcko is unacceptable for them, and because of the injustice done to Srebrenica and Zepa which will not be included in the federation, they wonder "if that is a reward to the aggressor for the greatest crime ever committed in this space?"

However, their "sister" party by its political orientation, the Union of B&H Social Democrats (UBSD-former Reformists of Ante Markovic) have shown once again that the greatest similarity between these two Social Democratic parties in B&H is, in fact - in their names. According to the opinion of the opposition UBSD, the agreement signed in Dayton is exceptionally important for the citizens of B&H, and this party characterizes it also as "the maximum regarding the political structures present in B&H in the past five years". The UBSD claims also that the signed agreement and participation of the USA in it verify once again the thesis this party has advocated all the time - that the way out of the Bosnian crisis and Golgotha of the war must be founded on some sort of a limited protectorate of B&H - and according to the opinion of the UBSD, the agreement from Dayton anticipated exactly something of the kind.

And yet, most of the commentaries and critical reactions to the agreement are based on a geographic analysis and division of B&H which are the cause of all negative attitudes towards the peace plan. In their severe criticism of the Dayton agreement, the Muslim Boshniak Organization (MBO) and the Liberal Boshniak Organization (LBO) anticipate not only that the agreement will not stop the war but on the contrary that it will deepen the reasons for its continuation!?

The Liberal Party (former League of Socialist Youth) claims that the war will now be transferred from the military to the diplomatic and political sphere. "It is understandable that one had to make concessions in the negotiations and that the offered solution may not be the best, but in respect to circumstances it seems to be the only possible one", as the Liberals claim. Considering the adopted constitutional solutions which are founded on internationally recognized state of Bosnia & Herzegovina, according to the Liberals, one might expect that conditions will be established in which the political struggle for reconstruction of B&H on democratic foundations could continue.

Reaction of the deputy of Reis-l-Ulema, Hadzi Hafiz Ismet ef. Spahic is also interesting, since he observed "a very large stain on peace which refers to the positions of thousands of refugees". He believes that the international community in that respect rewarded the aggressors and "allowed them to keep centuries-old cities which belonged to the Boshniaks, ethnically cleansed and with all religious buildings levelled to the ground in them".

Reactions of all other B&H politicians can most commonly be brought down to the thought formulated by a member of the Presidency of B&H, Dr Ivo Komsic: "Even unjust peace is better than war!"

However, majority of local analysts (whether by mere accident?) disregards the fact that the agreement prescribes, among other, absolute freedom of movement for all and return of the refugees, which, along with the constitutional provisions, is expected to annul the geographic division and reduce it to the level of internal regionalization which is not a limiting factor for operation of the state as a whole. After the beastly killing and waging of the war it is clear that noone seriously believes in implementation of these agreements, at least not in the foreseeable future, so demarcation lines have such great significance. This thesis is verified by the fact that the most difficult part of the negotiations was in fact the one which referred to geographical demarcation, although the constitutional principles which practically invalidated this division had already been accepted. The essence of the problem is therefore reduced to the question whether after Dayton further disintegrating processes will continue, or integrative ones will begin in B&H.

At this moment, it is difficult to make a precise assessment, although in this respect the view of Alija Izetbegovic himself is interesting when he claims that disintegration was already attempted and did not succeed, and that now one should expect a reverse process. If this is just a wish or the reality will soon become clear. But, until that time, another fact should be accepted: Bosnia & Herzegovina is a state divided into two, but this division was not caused by Dayton in '95, but Serb cannons in '92. Dayton has just formally and legally opened the process of peaceful reconstruction of integral B&H, and whether it will actually take place does not depend only on any moves the local authorities may make, but on support of America and its vision of the postwar B&H.

For the time being, Dayton has every opportunity to be a repetition of the Washington Agreement: it will be difficult to implement it, but it will stop bloodshed and enable softening of positions for creation of new political relations which will be aimed at a synthesis instead of destruction. This process will be slow and tedious, but being positive, it has its opportunity to succeed.

STRAJO KRSMANOVIC