POSTELECTION ARRANGEMENTS

AIM, Zagreb, November 5, 1995

Before Franjo Tudjman, who has returned from Dayton just for a short while, made a shift at the helm of the Government and nominated Zlatko Matesa for the new Prime Minister, various forecasts appeared in Zagreb press. Some had the correct premonition and anticipated that Matesa would be assigend to this post, and the others speculated with the possibility of Valentic's remaining in office, claiming that majority of the ministers from the old cabinet would also remain, meaning that Tudjman could have made up his mind to have a "Government of continuity" after the elections.

But, Nikica Valentic himself cut these speculations short by publicizing that he would "return the mandate" for "principled private" reasons, which revealed to the public just enough to clarify nothing. Newspapers hardly managed to get slightly more in the open, announcing that Valentic would probably "return" his mandate of an assembly deputy as well, that is, that he would withdraw from politics altogether, because he was planning to found a private enterprise to trade with oil and offer financial services. The reason for the withdrawal, it was claimed, was "also Prime Minister's health" which is known not to be too good. But, apart from that "also", what could have urged Valentic to leave the Prime Minister's post after two and a half years, and despite the fact that, according to Tudjman, he was so good at it that "history" would make a note of it - noone knows.

So far, Valentic was removed from his office by political lobbies at least a dozen times, and even he himself occasionally announced his withdrawal, most frequently in order to force the Assembly to adopt the budget or other Government measures which were unpopular in the parliament. Disinclination towards Valentic existed among the opposition during most of his mandate, although in the very beginning he had won confidence and affinity by introducing fundamental economic and financial discipline and by curbing inflation. But, true opponents to the Government were in fact among deputies of the ruling HDZ who believed that Valentic's team was not HDZ enough, and that it was too "professional", and that instead of its policy of "zero inflation", the Government should pursue a policy of "zero Chetniks"!

For a long time, Tudjman pursued a policy of equidistance from the two conflicting parties, meaning that he offered support to the Government, but at the same left its critics safe in their ambush to wait for an opportunity to attack again. Only recently, at the elections, an exception was made when some of the severe rightist critics of the Government (Dzodan, Turic) disappeared from the lists of candidates, meaning practically from politics, but also some less severe leftist critics as well (Segota, Klaric). But, the very first time Tudjman struck a blow and removed those who had plotted against Valentic, Valentic himself left, or was forced to leave, which might mean that Tudjman remained faithful to his policy of equidistance now when he began making a list of those he would not be needed any more.

This "sending off to the bench" some of the leading players from the team of the rightists, but of those who had been "provoking" them as well, is quite in tune with the pre-election premonitions that Tudjman would strive to make both the Assembly and the Government an even more obedient and conflictless transmitters of the state leader. There were even speculations which predicted that, had the HDZ won a two-thirds majority, he would have initiated Constitutional amendments which would have dissolved the Assembly Chamber of Districts, and thus transferred the right to veto enjoyed by this "senate" in the parliament to himself. As the two-thirds majority has not been attained after all, these combination have, at least for the time being, become impossible, but there is nothing to prevent Tudjman to "seize" prerogatives of the executive power, although most of it had belonged to him anyway. This means that the Government which was until now "political", that is the one in which actual decision-making centres were elsewhere, would become even weaker headed by Maseta, actually some kind of an extended Office of the President of the Repoublic, just as it had already been at the time Hrvoje Sarinic was the Prime Minister.

In the meantime, the elections have just intensified Tudjman's decision to complete centralisation of the supreme power in Croatia. The HDZ lost in Zagreb, and the opposition won such predominance in the capital (about two thirds of the seats in the Assembly) that for the first time it was given the opportunity to elect the mayor of the "capital of all Croats". In the extremely centralized Croatia, Zagreb means much more than just an ordinary capital, especially as here the HDZ had employed hundreds and thousands of its men in various civil-service posts which are often just another name for generous privileges, possibility to get flats owned by the city and similar. It was no surprise that the loss of this city caused quite a commotion in the HDZ, that repeated inter-party elections were immediately announced, although they were held just a couple of months ago, obviously to punish losers of state elections, but perhaps also to enable the party to get rid of some, such as Mercep and Vukojevic, who had been removed from the ruling party leadership, but who maintained prominent positions in Zagreb, and were even promoted.

The HDZ has no intention to let go of the mayor of Zagreb, so at a press conference on the occasion of inauguration of the new Prime Minister, Tudjman declared that "the HDZ has the right to remain at the head of the City and the District Assembly, according to a democratic principle that the most powerful prty in the state Assembly has this right (the HDZ still has relative majority, remark of the author), in agreement with the other parties in the Assembly, of course". In order to stress that he considered this to be top-priority state interest, Tudjman used the well-known platitude about state of emergency and uttered a sentence which, had it not been so characteristic of him, would deserve a place in anthologies: "It is essential that our public realizes that we cannot accept to have Zagreb, where a quarter of Croat citizens lives, in conditions when the state is still at war and when difficult tasks lay ahead of us, become some kind of an opposition stronghold, opposed to Croat state authorities, because that would be harmful for the stability of Croatia itself".

The opposition refuses to give up the post of the mayor too, and there are speculations that it could be given to Zdravko Tomac who was at the head of the list of the SDP which won the greatest number of votes in the city elections after the HDZ. However, various other combinations appeared immeditely - that the HDZ would offer a coalition to the SDP or Budisa's HSLS in order to maintain power in the capital, and in exchange, allegedly, Tudjman was ready to offer certain concessions to the opposition in the central state agencies. The opposition is still refusing all such combinations, and it demands from the HDZ to recognize its power in Zagreb, just as it has recognized the results of the elections on the level of the state. Negotiations are conducted, however, and it is difficult to anticipate their outcome, because Tudjman also leaves the impression of being inflexible. Having received heads of all major opposition parties in the new Assembly, he declared that he hoped that the new parliament would constructively participate in pursuing state policy, and not become a scene of harmful "politicizing".

A possibility of a compromise potentially lies in the new composition of the Government and the heads of the Assembly. Should Tudjman make up his mind to offer the opposition a prominent post in the Assembly or some posts in the Government (which is hard to believe, because he has only once nominated a multi-party Government when he had had problems with discipline within his own party, but dissolved it as soon as he had resolved that, explaining that a multi-party Government was not necessary any more, because the "war is over"(!)) - it would undoubtlessly be a significant sign of retreat from rigid centralism which is being prepared in a hurry.

It would, nevertheless, be just a meagre compensation for the opposition, because it should harden itself primarily in Zagreb for new much greater election challenges which lay ahead of it. And not spend the first major election accomplishment in some minor business deals for minor offices and thus risk to squander the confidence of the voters earned with great difficulty, as the HSLS had already done in Osijek.

MARINKO CULIC