THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

Sarajevo Nov 4, 1995

written at : 04.11.1995 13:19:55 W+1

Around noon, to be more precise, at 1.30 pm of July 10, the Bosnian Serb army began its final assault on Bosnian positions in the town of Srebrenica, a UN declared safety zone.

At that moment some 30,000 people took refuge in the Dutch peacekeepers' headquarters in Potocari, a village north of Srebrenica. A UN peacekeeping officer sent a plea to their commanders: "Urgent urgent urgent. Bosnian Serb Army is entering Srebrenica. Will someone stop this immediately and save these people. Thousands of them are gathering around the hospital. Please help."

The enclave was overrun, and what followed in the area around Srebrenica is described by international officials, aid workers and human rights organization as the worst war crime in Europe since World War II: the summary killing of several thousand people.

The story of the Dutch batallion, supposedly there to protect the Muslims, is part of the tragedy. What really happened?

In May, Col. Ton Karemans, the Dutch peacekeepers' commander, warned his senior UN officers of signs that the Serbs were preparing to take over the enclave. Nothing was done in response to this message, UN officials said.

According to the local UN military sources, soldiers of the Dutch 13th Air Mobile Infantry Battalion were hopelessly outgunned by Serb forces. More significantly, their morale was hitting the bottom. Some sources stressed that the Dutch were subject to continual harassment by the Serbs, who constantly blocked their fuel and equipment convoys.

The TOW anti-tank guided missiles ejich should have been their most efficient backup were out of order due to a lack of spares. Their main firepower was reduced to Browning .50 cal heavy machine guns, and personal ordnance. Fuel shortage meant they were often forced to patrol on foot, and that their APC's and other venicles were useless for the most part of their mandate.

Their numbers were melting. The Serbs would let troops out on leave but denied entry to their replacements. The battalion was sliced to the size of 300. Worst of all, many of the men seemed to have lost sympathy for the people they were protecting. In presence of local people quite a few of them frankly spoke of their dislike of the Muslims.

When the first group of Muslim refugees, after being released by the Serb forces, finally reached the town of Tuzla, Dutch soldiers were deluged with an avalanche of complaints and accusations of having misused their mandate and cooperated with the victorious Serbs.

First of all, the Srebrenica survivors said that the Dutch troops barely fired a shot. They claim that the peacekeepers' commander, Col. Ton Karremans, made no public protest of the Serbs' ill conduct, and was seen drinking, toasting and laughing with general Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb commander.

However, some unconfirmed reports about theft, raping, harassments, and even murders committed by the Dutch, were recently strongly denied both by some Bosnian Serb officers directly involved in the Srebrenica operation, and by humanitarian workers in the field.

THE PICTURE OF A DISASTER

The final push began early on July 6, at 3.15 a.m.. The Bosnian Serbs fired rockets into the UN compound, and shelled a village to the south, sending 4,000 more people fleeing into the enclave.

As the Serbian assault continued on July 7, the Dutch peacekeepers asked their UN superiors to call in NATO warplanes. The aircrafts strafed some Serb artillery positions, tanks and APC's, but with doubtful success. In the next few days, the Serbs took the Dutch observation posts one by one, taking 55 troops hostage. General Mladic later threatened to kill them, if NATO air strikes continued. However, they were given good treatment and were released unharmed.

By July 9, the safe area was still under attack, with shells falling every minute. The Dutch set up a blockade on the road entering Srebrenica from the south, in an attempt to stop the assailants' advance.

In their Srebrenica and Potocari camp, the Dutch were surrounded by panicky defenders, determined, if necessary even by violence, to force the UN peacekeepers to help them.

The Muslims said they would kill Dutch troops if they abandoned the remaining posts. On several occasions Bosnian Government troops opened infantry and sniper fire on retreating UN soldiers. One soldier was shot dead as he pulled back from a position.

On July 10, the Serbs drove toward the center of Srebrenica. Late that afternoon, a single tank and 100 Serbian soldiers approached the Dutch blockade and retreated under a .50-caliber machine gun fire. Witnesses say that later that day the UN troops finally began to pull back to their base at Potocari. About 15,000 Bosnian troops took to the hills while some 30,000 followed the Dutch hoping for protection.

By the night of July 11, some 6,000 people were inside the Potocari camp and 24,000 outside. During the night, the Serbs began taking away fighting men as well as civilians. The Serbs secured the town and disarmed the Dutch. They placed the Potocari camp and the refugees gathered there in the target of their tanks, artillery and rocket launchers.

UN headquarters in Sarajevo faxed new orders to the Dutch battalion. The mission had changed. The Dutch commander, Karremans, and his sector commander, Col. Charlie Brantz, read that the battalion was ordered to "take all reasonable measures to protect the refugees and the civilians". At nightfall, Mladic met with Karremans. He set his terms "in the most threatening way," as the colonel later described it: no more air strikes, or the refugees huddled at Potocari would be shelled and shot. Karremans complied.

The local Serb inside sources said that the next day Dutch soldiers could clearly see a number of bodies outside the compound. On July 12, evacuation began. The Dutch soldiers looked on as men were separated from women and taken away. When the Serbs demanded handing over of the people inside the compound, including 250 fighting men, the Dutch complied.

Afterwards the Dutch troops were withdrawn to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and later to Zagreb. Jasushi Akashi, the UN Special Envoy described their work as "fantastic". Debriefings concluded that the Dutch simply lacked means to protect themselves. As for the Muslims, the troops were not out there to save them but to keep a non-existent peace. Wim Kok, Dutch Prime Minister, said there was "no question of reprehensible negligence" and that the troops were operating in "barbarian circumstances".

Aleksandar Vasovic