FAREWELL TO ARMS OR SEE YOU IN THE NEXT WAR

Sarajevo Oct 15, 1995

Subject: CEASEFIRE IN BOSNIA

AIM, Sarajevo, October 15, 1995

Here we are, in the end, faced with another paradox: despite an increasing conviction that the story about the bloody war in this space has finally started to concoct its end, the wish of the Bosnians and Herzegovinians, regardless of nationality or territory they live on, to run away from the country in which peace is finally in sight - is not dying down!? To try to describe why the citizens of Bosnia & Herzegovina, worn out by the war, instead to prepare champagne to celebrate peace, keep in their drawers filled out application forms for emigration to Australia, Canada, the USA or a Western European country, would in fact mean to try to explain the difference between interruption of the conflict on one and establishment of peace on the other hand.

After the recently established ceasefire which is more or less observed except in North-Western Bosnia, it seems that the direct dictation of the international community aimed at interruption of the conflicts in B&H bore fruit. Regardless of how drab reasons for the suddenly coordinated military and political action of the international community in ending the conflict in Bosnia may be (Clinton's election campaign, national televisions saturated with Bosnian blood and suffering, or just strengthening of nationalistic and rightist options in their own ranks), compulsion with which the West set out to pacify B&H certainly did prevent killing of hundreds of new civilians. But, the fact that the interruption of conflicts in B&H is imposed by dictation from without, and is not the result of will of the ruling oligarchies within the country, especially Karadzic's, results in a permanent threat of a repeated war. In other words, the answer to the question how long arms in Bosnia & Herzegovina will remain silent directly depends on the height of the international pressure exerted on local centres of decision making, that is, on regimes in Belgrade, Zagreb, but Sarajevo too.

The Western sponsors of the ceasefire in Bosnia, are still left with heaps of unresolved issues which dangerously threaten even a short-term pacification of this part of the Balkans. The Washington Agreement between the Boshniaks and the Croats has already shown that continued presence of ruling structures responsible for the conflicts provides nothing but another forcibly imposed interruption of armed conflicts with constant risk of their renewed escalation. Therefore, abandoning of the war as a means in resolving conflicts is incompatible with the regimes which are responsible for the war and which are still waging it. Natural logic of war criminals such as Karadzic and Mladic, of war profiteers and those who share the responsibility for conflicts with them in Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Tudjman's Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) in B&H is in fact continuation of the war agony. With it, the former will try to ensure the armchair for their leader instead of the bench for the defendants in the Hague, and the latter wish only to ensure power and numerous privileges which go along with it.

Abandoning of the political idea of disintegration and ethnic division of B&H is also incompatible with the political option of the ruling oligarchies. Although methods applied in the attempts to reach this objective - according to the applied methods and responsibility for the war and the crimes - differ among the centres of power in Pale, Grude and Sarajevo, the idea about ethnic statelets makes the coalition SDS-SDA-HDZ still indestructible. For instance, the latest Tudjman's victorious euphoria when he claimed that he had "stuffed the Croat croissant" (with Bosnian territories) is just another proof that his dream on division of B&H and annexation of its territories to Croatia has by no means been forgotten.

On the other hand, expectations that abandoning of the political totalitarianism practiced by all the three regimes within B&H would come about spontaneously and all at once, are more than naive. It is quite needless to mention manifestations of these regimes on the territories controlled by Pale, or "HerzegªBosnia", where being of a different nationality is a "sin" which can cost you your life, where absolutely no independent medium ever appeared, and where circles close to the regimes are at the same time centres of crime. The latest developments on the territories controlled by the Government in Sarajevo (removal of all those who are not members of the ruling SDA from all leading posts, frequent physical assaults on journalists of independent media, threats to non-Muslim population) are clear evidence that intolerance of different views is increasing in Izetbegovic's SDA, but coercion to total loyalty to the party as well. As a reminder, Bosnia & Herzegovina can nowadays be classified only among rare totalitarian states which prescribe by their constitutional amendments (an idea of SDA deputies) not only what nationality its president must belong to, but what party he should be a member of!

If the ultimate range of the dictation of the international community will be interruption of conflicts with unchanged ruling nomenclature and their political options, the imposed ceasefire will turn into just another time-out during which national oligarchies will gain new strength and then start a new round of war-waging with by far more radical demands. There is no doubt that the present neuralgic points of pacification of B&H - combats around Banja Luka, the Northern corridor which is of vital interest of regions belonging to "different parties" (Banja Luka, Tuzla, the Sava river valley...), unresolved status of Sarajevo, corridors leading to Gorazde will be insurmountable again and appear as permanently burning issues in the current political constellation of power. In fact, advancement of the Army of B&H and troops of the Croat Defence Council near Banja Luka could become a specific litmus paper of developments: the struggle for Banja Luka is still primarily a political issue which inside the "Republic of Srpska" adds strength to Karadzic's and Mladic's opposition headed by the President of independent deputies, Milorad Dodik, supported by the disappointed, forsaken, and probably terrified members of the SDS. But, should we become witnesses of a military battle for Banja Luka (which is, after all, less probable), it would mean that a military solution would be sought in other focuses of the crisis in B&H, too.

Although interruption of conflicts still does not mean the end of the war, there is no doubt that silence of arms imposed by the international community is not the result of political decisions of the ruling circles in B&H. But, the question of a stable peace and democratization of this space can be achieved solely through political processes and changes within Bosnia & Herzegovina itself. Any assistance from without, however precious it may be, cannot exceed the limits of a manifestation of support. In other words, possible establishment of a lasting peace is a direct response to the question how this ceasefire that came as a gift from abroad will be used inside Bosnia & Herzegovina? Favourable chances for establishment of peace have already emerged: interruption of conflicts directly weakens the regimes which derive all their power from war alone; antiwar feelings are becoming exceptionally strong not only among the citizens, but even among the combatants whose motivation is quickly decreasing; the peace process, regardless of constant bargaining over documents and maps, always stresses anew that in Bosnia noone is seeking for a winner, but for a compromise; the court in the Hague is gaining in significance and its instructions are finally accepted even by the leadership of the so called Yugoslavia; the idea of "Greater Serbia" was finally defeated while Milosevic was drinking coffee with Holbrook at the time of the severest NATO air strikes at military objectives of the Bosnian Serbs; and finally, the fact that will have to become predominant among all other listed facts representatives of the opposition to the regimes from Pale, Sarajevo and Grude (Milorad Dodik, Sejfudin Tokic, Ivo Komsic and others) promoted the Forum of Democratic Alternative of B&H and its joint objectives.

In fact, to use the opportunity for establishment of a lasting peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina primarily means to reconcile, i.e. reestablish confidence among the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims. This is doubtlessly a much harder and more tedious process than the attempt of the national leaders to assure them that coexistence and peace are impossible. Such a process, though, has no chance to succeed if those responsible and engaged in the war in Bosnia & Herzegovina remain in power. Because, how ever ghastly it may be to even imagine that war criminals such as Karadzic and Mladic could bring peace to the homes of the Muslims and the Croats whose families they have killed, imprisoned or evicted, it is probably just as unthinkable for the Bosnian Serbs to seek safety in Izetbegovic's embrace after living under Pale dictatorship and almost four years of conflicts?! Lack of trust between the left and the right bank of the river in Mostar is the best illustration how distant true peace actually still is with the protagonists of the war still inpower.

Of course, neither is the responsibility for the war the same, nor will replacements within the regimes in Bosnia & Herzegovina take place simultaneously. Nevertheless, the demand to have Karadzic and Mladic removed from their posts made at the latest session of the parliament of the "Republic of Srpska" in Banja Luka is perhaps a serious beginning of the end, if a similar process should start in the other two national oligarchies. Alternative to nationalism and war in the whole space of B&H must use the opportunity given to it by international dictation to end the conflicts. On the contrary, those who have survived may seek salvation only in fleeing from here. As far as possible...

DRAZENA PERANIC