CRISIS IN THE SOUTH OF THE BALKANS
/Attempt on Gligorov's Life and the Situation in Kosovo/
Prishtina, October 4, 1995
In the past few weeks, American shuttle-diplomacy has made a decisive breakthrough in resolving the Balkan crisis. It seems that resolution for Bosnia & Herzegovina and achievement of peace there is just a matter of days. At the same time, in the background of accelerated diplomatic activities between Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, parallel activities have been going on to prevent spilling of the crisis over the borders to other parts of the Balkans which have not been war-stricken so far. American mediation enabled accomplishment of strategic turning points, first in relations between Athens and Thirane, and then between Athens and Skopje. Finally, having reached a compromise with Athens, Macedonian President Gligorov hurried to Belgrade where he almost succeeded in reaching an agreement on mutual recognition of Skopje and Belgrade.
But, just a day after he had returned from Belgrade, a bombing attempt on the life of Kiro Gligorov was made, and he was badly injured. This attempt has come as a warning to optimists that the process of full stabilization of the situation in the Balkans will be neither easy nor quick. Although the perpetrators of the attempt on Mr Gligorov's life have not been found yet, there is no doubt that their direct objective was interruption of the current peace process and prevention of reaching compromising solutions for Macedonia.
The attempt on Gligorov's life in Skopje is just another indication of an exceptionally delicate position Macedonia as a state is in. Although it has seceded from former Yugoslavia without major disturbances, Macedonia managed neither to achieve a historical agreement and a full internal consensus of ethnic and other constituents of the state, nor to find a formula which would neutralize pressures and aspirations of neighbouring states. For its survival and relative stability Macedonia should primarily thank to strategically and tactically quite skillful policy of Kiro Gligorov who has taken the role of the main cohesive force in the period of transition. As a close associate of the leader of second Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, Gligorov seems to have learnt well the formula of keeping the balance of forces in a state shaken by internal controversies, which is at the same time an intersection of conflicting interests of its neighbours, but also of regional and world powers.
However, the weak point of such policy of walking the tightrope lies in the fact that it does not tend to reach permanent solutions, but relies on ad hoc situations and continuation of the existing fundamental relation of forces. As the final outcome, such policy of Kiro Gligorov might have the same consequences as Tito's policy: after him, cohesive force of the system will disappear and it could crumble in all its contradictions.
While physicians are struggling to save the life of Kiro Gligorov, the key issue of his successor has come to the surface and that of the destiny of Macedonia. The issue of the successor has in fact been raised before, when about a month ago Vasil Tupurkovski returned to the political scene of Macedonia advocating the thesis on necessity of reaching an internal historical compromise (primarily with the Albanians) about the future of Macedonia. Instead of Gligorov's "communist" techniques of preserving power by maintenance of the conflict and postponement of resolution, Tupurkovski proposed a possibility which could guarantee internal stability in a joint state of the Macedonians and the Albanians. According to Tupurkovski, stability of Macedonia does not depend so much on a concensus among ethnic Macedonians as on a concensus between a part of Macedonian parties and the Albanians. Pragmatism of this policy is founded on the fact that it will be easier to enter a marriage of convenience with the Albanians in Macedonia than to resolve the internal conflict among the Macedonians themselves, and as even less realistic, to accomplish Greater Macedonia as wished for by Macedonian extremists who were most probably the ones who have organized the attempt on Kiro Gligorov's life.
In any case, the latest developments in Macedonia announce profound and far-reaching shifts which may result in lasting instability and turbulences. That is why behavior of neighbours will be highly significant, that is continuation and completion of the process of rapprochement of Skopje with Athens and Belgrade, together with the already existing close cooperation with Sofia and Thirane. Another important moment will be regulation of relations with the Albanians as a precondition of internal stability of Macedonia.
Developments in Macedonia are just new evidence in favour of claims that the relative peace and stability in southern sector of the Balkan crisis is just an illusion. The closer and the more probable compromising solution, the more impatient extremists seem to be. It is presumed that the successfully completed negotiations with Athens, and then those with Belgrade have induced Macedonian extremists to make up their minds to liquidate "traitor" Gligorov.
Similar strain of relations can be expected in Kosovo, as a response to more and more frequent mentioning of the possibility of a compromise. So far, in Kosovo there have been no new serious signs of aggravation, but nervousness of extremists is manifested indirectly. Serb extremists are organizing symbolic manifestations: apart from colonization of refugees from Krajina who are presented as just the first wave of a future mass colonization of Kosovo, they are organizing symbolic but provocative actions of encouraging local Serb population, for instance by erecting and unveiling a monument to Tsar Dusan (in Prizren), Vuka Karadzic (in Prishtina) etc. These symbolic manifestations of the Serbs "taking root" in Kosovo are in fact expected to drive away fear of an unfavourable outcome of the Kosovo crisis for the Serbs. After the great Serb defeats in Krajina and in Bosnia, which are presented as treason by the extremists, Serb population fear that Kosovo might be betrayed as well.
On the other hand, leaders of the Albanian movement in Kosovo appear to be using some kind of exaggerated symbolic optimism in order to drive away fear of failure. In the course of the past few weeks, Ibrahim Rugova has several times repeated that "there are reasons for one to be an optimist", but without giving any of these reasons. Although international factors keep repeating that Kosovo can rely only on getting an autonomy within Serbia, in his public appearances, Rugova creates an impression that there is certain speculative "excess of the offer", that he is in some secret collusion with the Americans and other forces which will participate in decision-making on the resolution of the crisis.
Contrary to the optimistic Rugova, his internal opponents in Kosovo, like for example Adem Demaqi, consider his optimism as an act of demagogy aimed at maintaining the present leadership of Kosovo Albanians in power, which Demaqi believes to be mostly incompetent and inept. Demaqi warns Rugova against dangerous spreading optimism and illusions at a time which is merciless, when there is no real readiness of international factors to offer Kosovo and the Albanians more than what they can force the other party to accept. Therefore, spreading illusions could return as a boomerang and lead to resignation and throwing oneself upon the mercy of destiny.
The thing that is most disturbing for the Kosovo Albanians is the fact that Kosovo is not an issue on the agenda of current diplomatic negotiations. They would have more confidence in the international community, if lifting of the sanctions against Serbia were conditioned by previous resolution of the Kosovo issue. But, all things considered, there will probably be no such conditioning, since another formula is being offered: the fifteen members of the European Union seem to have reached a concensus to condition provision of financial and other assistance to Serbia after the war by giving back the Albanians in Kosovo their human and political rights. The possibility of conditioning the return of Serbia (and FR Yugoslavia) into international institutions is also mentioned in diplomatic circles by resolution of the issue of Kosovo, as well as establishment of human rights in Vojvodina and Sandzak.
In any case, soon the crisis will move from Bosnia and Croatia into Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The issue here is what instruments will be used to control these crises. The international community has made a lot of errors in its former treatment of the Yugoslav crisis, but one should not be too great an optimist. The new world order, as an uncompleted project, has no developed instruments for preventive operation.
Kosovo will certainly be the gravest problem, since there are no signs of easing of tensions and readiness for a compromise. None of the parties involved can be satisfied with the autonomy which is being proposed, and some even consider it to be just an introduction into further radicalization of the problem. There are three distinctly differentiated factions among the Albanians: the first which rejects the idea of the autonomy but believes that independence of Kosovo can be achieved peacefully and through negotiations; the second which believes that a certain type of autonomy of Kosovo could be accepted as a necessary starting point for subsequent progressing of the status of Kosovo towards independence; and finally, the third faction which considers the previous two options unrealistic and illusions of collaborators, and which calls the nation to prepare for a certain form of a liberation war, because it is impossible to accomplish freedom without putting up a fight for it.
Among these factions, the first, headed by Ibrahim Rugova, is still the most influential one. Some people predict that in the end Rugova's movement will reach the position advocated nowadays by the more moderate and realistic Albanian politicians. The third, militaristic faction is still in the initial phase of development and has so far had no prominent public promotion, nor public support. But, the real relation of power remains a mystery.
Shkelzen Maliqi AIM Pristina