BOSNIAN GAME OF CHESS

AIM, Zagreb, September 24, 1995 "Our beautiful Bosnia" (echoing the Croat national anthem - "Our beautiful homeland") - with this title on the front page and the picture of the renowned waterfull in Jajce, the latest volume of "Hrvatski obzor" (Croat Horizon) appeared. It is a weekly with a small circulation which is hopelessly trying to keep up the tradition of the closed down "Danas", but which has never reached even the level of a humble substitute of the journal which was for some time published thanks to abundant assistance of the authorities. It seems that "Obzor" has relied even more on the state budget and enjoys an even more immediate support of Tudjman himself, so that the cited title should more accurately be read as congratulations to the "benefactor" in an attempt to satisfy his most intimate wishes.

To what extent Tudjman's emotions are turned in the direction of Bosnia could best be seen in Knin when he visited this city for the first time after the fall of "Krajina". Not even at that moment, standing under a twenty-meter long flag on the Knin fortress, did he forget Bosnia. With a broad gesture he pointed towards the Dinara mountain and quite seriously said that liberation of Knin was glamorous only in the light of the fact that Croatia is acquiring a more natural form in its neighbourhood. At that moment noone could know that he had in mind a closely elaborated plan of military and political action in B&H, although a call for military assistance addressed at Zagreb by Sarajevo had preceeded these developments for quite some time. But now it is clear that declarations of elite guardsmen from brigades of the Croat Army made in the streets of Knin should have been taken seriously when they said that they were on their way to Banja Luka "to look up general Mladic".

Penetration of the Croat Army through Western B&H was simple and easy like the preceeding one through "Krajina". Expressions of satisfaction unknown for years arrived from Sarajevo, and the Croat Army became some kind of a military hit despite the fear caused by Tudjman's London napkin and the doubt that the fall of "Krajina" resembled more a headquarters game of chess than a real war. The only one who was sceptical at the very beginning when actions in the direction of Glamoc and Grahovo were initiated, was Haris Silajdzic who declared that he was afraid Croatia was waging a war of its own and that Federation B&H was still insignificant for it. Silajdzic said so while speculations about the Croat Army proceeding towards Bihac were still topical, but then it decided to leave lifting of the blockade of this town to general Dudakovic's 5th Corps of the Army of B&H and the Croat units which were coming from the West, from Croatia, and turned East towards Jajce conquering places with large Serb and relative Muslim majority. All these places were immediately annexed to "Herzeg-Bosnia" with festive military ceremonies and hoisting of Croat flag alone, and not the official flag of B&H.

That is how Silajdzic's doubts not only came true but were greatly exceeded, so that in the end even Izetbegovic and the group around him became nervous, appealing to the joint American sponsor to smooth what has started to jut out in Croat-Boshniak relations. That is why last week Tudjman, Izetbegovic and Zubak met in Zagreb, where the two presidents in the presence of the American mediator Holbrook put their hands on the Bible of the Washington Agreement again and got separate assignments. The Boshniak party took upon itself to accelerate integration of functions of the Republic and the Federation B&H (practically giving permission to the "Republic of Srpska" to secede, but then Zagreb has never been against it in the first place). Croatia was warned not to take all the militarily taken territories in Western and and Northern B&H for granted, because the status of these regions remains to be discussed.

At this same meeting it was also decided to give up the military campaign against Banja Luka, and the Croat foreign minister Mate Granic immediately made a statement about it and thus cut short the still red hot forecasts of other Croat officials (Bosiljko Misetic, Zlatko Canjuga, Gojko Susak) that such an attack was to be expected. His assistant, Hido Biscevic even sharply rebuked the mentioned officials, without naming them though, stating that bragging about Banja Luka could jeopardize the whole architecture of the peace process, primarily reintegratioin of Eastern Slavonia and Baranja into Croatia. Granic admitted later on that this Croat withdrawal was the result of direct American intervention, since "essential strategic objectives were attained which improved negotiating positions". Everything that in the world press indicated the possibility of major misunderstandings was carefully avoided, and the public was denied any details about tensions with the Boshniak party, although rumours about the Croat Army and the Army of B&H racing to be the first to reach the gate of Banja Luka leaked abundantly from diplomatic bags.

Fears which have already become quite evident on the Boshniak side have finally started to coincide with indiscreet rumours about secret bargains. It is, namely, quite probable that Croat charge at Banja Luka could lead to a situation resembling the London napkin. After possible Croat conquering of the city, the only thing left to do would have been for Tuzla to fall into the hands of the Serbs in an equally successful blitzkrieg. And "Tudjman's line" would have been drawn. It is true, though, that certain other additions have begun to show on the chess board. Croatia has practically never shown any interest in Banja Luka so far, which was evident by the way Croats expelled from there were welcomed, who were told not to even think about going back, because "Croatia is your homeland just as it is mine" (Jure Radic). This means that Banja Luka would have been taken just to be exchanged for something else, for instance for Eastern Slavonia and Baranja (which is still possible, if one bothered to read carefully what Biscevic had to say, as compensation for "sparing" this city).

It seems that Sarajevo was so scared of the territory market which started appearing in front of its eyes that it preferred to see Banja Luka remaining, at least for the time being - Serb. It was offered to have it demilitarized and linked in a sort of a "special relationship" with Sarajevo, i.e. to annex it to the Federation B&H but leave it the status of an autonomous Serb region. An angry answer with a refusal arrived from the seat of Bosnian Krajina, probably because it was interpreted as a poorly concealed invitation to surrender. But, maybe this should not be taken too lightly. At the moment, the Boshniaks do not have sufficient military power to take Banja Luka on their own, and judging by the assessment of general Divjak of the Army of B&H (based on comparison of the number of tank barrels), it would not be an easy task even for joint Croat-Boshniak army. The greatest weakness of Banja Luka is something else, that it is surrounded, in the Knin syndrome of a "pocket" which need not even be cut off to fall, but might be pierced on its own, and then first civilians and then the army start leaking out of it.

But the pocket position of Banja Luka could have a different meaning for the Boshniaks - by preserving this enclave, several other enclaves in which flags with the lily are waving could perhaps be preserved too (Bihac, Gorazde, and Tuzla to a certain extent). In this sense Sarajevo could be sincerely interested in Banja Luka remaining in Serb hands, primarily for short-term strategic reasons, and in the foreseeable future perhaps, because the enclaves could become embryos of renewal of B&H (on a recent occasion, Federation B&H was said to be an "embryo", but it failed exaggerated expectations of Sarajevo). When nightmarish figures on the Bosnian chess board are arranged like this, it seems that Sarajevo is trying to play a simultaneous game of chess on two boards - with the competitor from across the river Drina on one, and with the one across the river Una on the other.

But, it also seems that this was immediately seen through. For the first time after a long time, the opponents are not coming to it one by one, but in a pair. Therefore, at the same time, relations are becoming strained with Zagreb, maintained only thanks to the 24-hour control of the USA, and the first threats have arrived from Belgrade (Milan Milutinovic) that the FR of Yugoslavia could get militarily involved in B&H.

MARINKO CULIC