A LAYER OF BOMBS, A LAYER OF NEGOTIATIONS
AIM, BEOGRAD, September 11, 1995
The Bosnian Serbs Under NATO Strikes
During 12 days of continuous attacks the NATO aviation has severed all communications within the territory of the Bosnian Serbs and interrupted the broadcasting of TV and radio programmes. The Army of the Bosnian Serbs is still powerful, and Mladic refuses to withdraw heavy weaponry from the area of Sarajevo believing that the Bosnian Army would push him back towards the Drina river in that case.
All factories of ammunition, weapons and materiel were damaged or destroyed in the NATO airstrikes on the Bosnian Serbs, which have been going on, with shorter interruptions, since August 30. All the telecommunication centers used by the Bosnian Serb Army, as well as the systems for civil telephone traffic and radio and TV broadcasting, have been hit. Phone lines between Banja Luka and other areas in western Bosnia, which are under the control of the Serbs, and the eastern parts of Bosnia and Yugoslavia have been severed. As have the internal lines between individual towns and cities, and those with Belgrade.
No reliable data on the victims has been made public, except for the claim of the Military Command at Pale, according to which at least 100 civilians lost their lives in the first seven days of the attack. The media of the Bosnian Serbs reported that in the area of Doboj, nine dead civilians had been discovered under the rubble, and that ten people had been killed when the rapid reaction forces (RRF) attacked the hospital in Blazuj. No independent source has yet confirmed these statements. It is, however, certain that there had to be casualties when bridges, post-office buildings and similar facilities were shelled.
The first wave of airstrikes, carried out on August 30, was officially explained as retaliation for the carnage in the center of Sarajevo of which the Serbs were accused. The explanation was soon changed. Already the following day it was stated that the bombardment would continue until the Serbs pulled out their heavy weaponry from the Protected Zone of 20 kms. around Sarajevo and until they stopped endangering the other Protected Zones.
The Serbian side tried to avoid or at least mitigate the airstrikes, but not for a moment did it exhibit genuine readiness to withdraw its heavy weapons. Although on September 1 at 10,00 p.m., an hour before the NATO ultimatum threatening to renew the attacks expired, the President of the Parliament of the Bosnian Serbs, Momcilo Krajisnik, stated that the Serbian side was ready to accept the demands of the international community as it had, from the UN Commander for the former Yugoslavia, General Bernard Yanvier, allegedly gotten guarantees that the Moslems would not take advantage of the withdrawal of the heavy artillery to attack Serbian emplacements, the Military Commander General Ratko Mladic addressed a harsh letter to Yanvier that same day in which he accused the UN and the international community of siding with the Moslems. In that letter Mladic, practically, refused to pull back the heavy weaponry.
A veritable inferno broke loose the very next day, and NATO forces extended their attacks to areas outside Sarajevo, shelling telecommunication centers, factories, bridges, roads and other infrastructure facilities, mainly in the eastern parts of Bosnia.
Mladic Will not Accept Withdrawal
It is quite evident that the western alliance adjusted the tactics of airstrikes to the situation on the ground from hour to hour. Starting with "pedagogic" motives (punishment for the death of some 40 civilians in Sarajevo, of which the Serbs were accused), through the demand to pull back the heavy artillery because it was endangering Sarajevo, the operation turned into the largest air action in the history of NATO. The operation covered the entire area of Bosnia under Serb control and quite evidently aims at weakening their military and economic power.
The Army of the Bosnian Serbs was undoubtedly considerably weakened by these attacks but it would be a mistake to think that its power was crushed. It seems that relatively few shells hit the artillery batteries, which were partly hidden and partly moved to areas with higher concentrations of civilians or to civilian facilities. Nothing has changed on the ground and the Army holding the front lines neither moved from those lines nor was seriously endangered.
The Bosnian Serbs persistently refuse to pull back their weapons from the area of Sarajevo believing that the far more numerous and already well-equipped Bosnian Army would attack them immediately afterwards. Mladic knows that he does not have sufficient men successfully to oppose that Army without cannon and mortars and thus suffers the airstrikes. According to the Bosnian Serb media, partly confirmed by independent sources, the civilians numbering a somewhat over 100,000 in that part of Sarajevo under Serb control, also do not agree to the withdrawal of the artillery and mortars.
These are people who have already spent several years amid a brutal war and who have very little confidence in the authorities in Sarajevo. They truly believe that they will all be killed if the Government's forces attack the Serbian positions on Grbavica, Ilidza and other parts of the city and if they break through. That is why, if the Government's forces advance, a new mass exodus should be expected of tens of thousands of terror-stricken people or street fights with a large number of casualties.
The Serb Military Command also seriously reckons with an attack of the Government's forces and incessantly repeats that no one has offered any tangible guarantees that such an attack would actually not take place after the pulling back of the heavy artillery. Mladic knows very well that all the rules have been broken in this war and that no one can truly guarantee security to anyone. He demands direct negotiations with the opposing side and firm guarantees from the international community.
In strategic terms, this certainly does not concern only the area of Sarajevo. A possible attack and the success of the Government's forces in that section of the war theatre would result in major changes in the balance of forces. The Government's units would probably unite with the troops in Gorazde. In that way the Serbs would lose full control over the Drina river and the link between eastern Herzegovina and the north-eastern parts of Bosnia would be completely cut off.
Might and the Negotiations
Momcilo Krajisnik and the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, who exhibited some signs of readiness to agree to the withdrawal of the heavy artillery, probably intimately share Mladeic's views. Being politicians however, they are more pragmatic and are aware of the fact that they have already practically agreed to all the demands of the international community. They have realized that the international community has finally broken their main sponsor, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and that in Serbia there is no longer any force which could support their war efforts. They also know that the NATO airstrikes have not been launched only to protect Sarajevo, but so that the only power in the world could demonstrate its might and so as to break down the resistance of the Serbs.
Karadzic and Krajisnik are actually adhering to the political agreement with the authorities in Belgrade, according to which they shall jointly act in the peace negotiations. It seems that the airstrikes practically had no influence on their decision to negotiate. Karadzic voiced the first shy threat to withdraw from the negotiations only on the 13th day of the attacks, September 11, after NATO had used cruising missiles. That threat was made in a letter sent to the UN, Russia, the USA and Great Britain. Karadzic however, made no ultimatum, but only announced the possibility of the withdrawal of the Serbian side from the Geneva negotiations.
It seems that the military and political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, having definitely decided not to pull back the heavy artillery from the area of Sarajevo, can only endure bombardment and wait for the possible results of Russian pressure on NATO and the United Nations. Pale are also waiting for the final denouement in the Security Council which is again to decide on the sanctions againt FR Yugoslavia on September 15. It is possible that the Bosnian Serbs are counting with Belgrade changing its attitude towards them and extending greater support to the efforts to strengthen the Serbian state in Bosnia if the sanctions are lifted.
Dragan Janjic