MILOSEVIC DECIDES ON HIS OWN

"Belgrade Agreement" breaks Karadzic

AIM, Belgrade, September 3, 1995

One of the basic rules of "Balkan calculus" which says that in this space two plus two usually do not amount to four, or do only when the right opportunity occurs, was proved once again last week in Belgrade. This time, however, three plus three amounted to seven, but so did one, depending on who did the calculation and depending on the way it was done. But, these were the sums obtained when all five items of the "Belgrade Agreement" were read, as signed by heads of leaderships from Pale and the FR of Yugoslavia on August 29 in the presence of the Bishop of the Serb Orthodox Church. Namely, this Agreement the contents of which was presented to the public after a whole day (on August 30) provides that the three-member delegation of the Bosnian Serbs (Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Ratko Mladic) will form part of a single six-member delegation which will in the future, headed by President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, negotiate about the peace process in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

"Annexation" or "capitulation" in front of Milosevic

Pursuant to the "Belgrade Agreement", Slobodan Milosevic will be two men's worth in the team. In case the delegation gets stuck concerning some important issue and remains divided three against three, the President of Serbia will have the right to reach the final decision. He also has the inviolable right to decide about changes of members of the delegation. Some have already denoted formation of this negotiating team as the "alliance of a single person", making an allusion to the broad authorization given to the President of Serbia by this agreement. Now it is clear that this team will have to follow closely each little move Milosevic makes with his forefinger. As someone has already noted in Belgrade, only two out of the five items of the agreement need be kept in mind: first, that Milosevic is always right, and second, that in the case he is not right, the first clause becomes valid.

As soon as this piece of news was made public, state media in Serbia started overwhelming the entire media space with messages that Pale has finally come to its senses and accepted peace orientation of Belgrade. Along with the allegations that "it is never too late" to make a sensible decision and reject the unyielding militant position, unavoidable questions arose: why did not Karadzic and the leadership from Pale agree to all that a year ago; why were they engrossed at the time with "unfounded bragging of being invincible" which turned out to be too expensive; who will be responsible one day for all the futile victims and loss of the "fourth Serb state" represented by Knin krajina until the August Croat offensive called the "Storm".

Some opposition leaders from Belgrade tend to interpret this, only apparently "unexpected" agreement, by readiness of Pale to renounce a part of their (internationally unrecognized) sovereignty and turn it into the hands of Belgrade for the sake of the peace process. There were those who emphasized, like the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica, that the mandate of Karadzic's delegation in the negotiating team was formally more powerful than that of Milosevic, since the Bosnian Serbs had been given their mandate by their assembly, while Milosevic was not. Such a complaint is mere "splitting hairs", knowing that the President of Serbia has so far never reached any decision crucial for the state he is at the head of by consulting the parliament or the "will of the people" he so readily tended to quote while he was still struggling for power.

One of the questions which springs to mind immediately on the occasion of last-week's "Belgrade Agreement" is the following: does it in fact imply "capitulation" or "annexation" of Pale? Judging by the tone of the media close to the authorities in Belgrade, the accent is on capitulation of a wrong policy and its definite agreement to accept Milosevic as the "helmsman" in pursuing the policy of peace. At the same time it seems as if this acceptance implies anticipation of at least a certain aspect of a confederate connection of that part of Bosnia with the FR of Yugoslavia. Well-informed circles claim that the methods of "persuasion" applied on Karadzic to accept something of the kind, resembles more an "annexation" than "anticipation" of a confederation.

Certain issues have remained unclarified from the international legal point of view. For instance - how will Pale, which were so far considered to be one of the three parties in conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina and formally had nothing to do with the FRY as a different state, all at once be included in the negotiating team of another state? The other unclarified issue concerning the negotiating status of Radovan Karadzic and general Ratko Mladic who are on the list of the accused by the Hague court, was partially removed by the State Department officials who claimed that, should these two appear at a meeting in the company of Slobodan Milosevic, the American negotiator, Richard Halbrook "will not leave the room".

Regardless of what has in fact happened - "capitulation" or "annexation" - it was done under evident pressure exerted by the USA and the approval of Alija Izetbegovic himself. "Taming" Pale in one way or the other in order to prevent international negotiators from stumbling on the differences between Milosevic and Karadzic was something that the Americans demanded a long time ago. Allegedly, something of the kind was promised by the President of Serbia to the late American diplomat, Robert Frasure, which was at the same time one of the first requirements for lifting the sanctions against Belgrade.

In the meantime, Milosevic has tried with the option which would have been more convenient for him - complete elimination of Karadzic with the help of general Mladic. Since tht project did not go well and rapidly enough, the President of Serbia had to accept (those well informed claim with a lot of disgust) the headstrong Karadzic into the negotiating team. Naturally, only if he could control him.

"Pale Casino" about to be closed

Karadzic himself was probably not aware that the arrow aimed at him was fired way back when he was in his prime and was the most probable candidate for the new "greatest son of the nation". Unfortunately for him, at the time he even became subject of poetry which approximately read as follows: "Radovan, you man made of iron/ The first leader after Karadjordje/ Preserve our freedom and faith/ On the banks of the cold Geneva lake." Even if he ever takes him to Geneva again, Milosevic will certainly not allow him to act as a "man made of iron" there.

The demand that the authorities from Pale turn in their negotiating credentials were persistently repeated in the past few months by Alija Izetbegovic himself, despite all possible overtones and "anticipations" conveyed by such a move. For the authorities in Sarajevo, bringing Karadzic under the command of Belgrade, primarily means final recognition of the fact that just "ordinary rebels" reside in Pale, and not legitimate authorities who can autonomously sit at a negotiating table and make decisions in their own name.

Althought it may sound as a paradox at first, what Alija Izetbegovic advocated so wholeheartedly might in a way be good for Radovan Karadzic himself. After everything that has happened in the past months, it is incomparably smarter for the leader of the Serbs from Pale to put himself under protection of Milosevic and let him make the most delicate decisions. Or, as many have said in the past few days, to save whatever can still be saved of the once joint project. American President Clinton himself spoke in that sense in Hawaii the other day, claiming that the war has enetered the phase "in which the Serbs can get nothing more, but they can lose everything."

All at once, a lot tumbled on Karadzic's head. The situation began seriously changing in the battlefield, thanks to the improving equipment and armament of the Sarajevo authorities' troops, but engagement of the regular army of Croatia too. According to certain military assessments, nowadays, against a single Serb soldier there are four soldiers of the enemy troops. The one-year international embargo, but especially the sanction of Belgrade on the Drina also had severe consequences.

The domestic conflict between the military and the political leadership, the fall of Krajina and the fact that tens thousand of his subjects have already packed their bundles and intend to start on their way towards Belgrade have also contributed to softening of Karadzic. Especially the possibility of a new refugee wave which would definitely drown FRY which is already exhausted by the sanctions, was the reason for Milosevic to increase pressure in the past few weeks and "convince" Karadzic and Krajisnik to start spelling out his favourite refrain that "peace has no alternative". All that has finally brought Karadzic to Dobanovci, the former residence of Tito, where all he and the leaders from Pale could do was sign what was later called the "Belgrade Agreement".

According to some rumours, apart from the leaders of the FRY, representatives of the Army and the Church, Dobrica Cosic was among those invited to Dobanovci. Before the agreement was signed, Milosevic seems to have signed a previously unpublicized document (Biljana Plavsic mentioned it) promising that he would not go below certain limits in negotiations. And this means that after the end of the war, Belgrade and Pale must be enabled to unite in a confederation, that the Bosnian Serbs must be provided with a compact territory, that they must have a wider and safer corridor.

Having returned to Pale, leaders of the Bosnian Serbs did not hurry to celebrate the "Belgrade Agreement". Their TV published the news about it only a day later and in the 25th minute of the central news program. The fact that at that very time NATO airplnes were mercilessly bombing positions of Bosnian Serbs could perhaps be used as a pretext.

Despite numerous doubts that the leaders from Pale might some day try to evade the agreement and continue acting as before, it seems that nothing of the kind is possible at the moment. Close reading of the "Belgrade Agreement" shows that the document simply does not have a "double bottom" and that there is simply no space for dodging the issue. The solution mentioned before according to which each decision in the negotiating process had first to be verified by the "parliament of the Republic of Srpska" (where Momcilo Krajisnik is sovereign, of course) was left out of the final version, and it is written instead that the "delegation is authorized to sign the peace plan in the name of the Republic of Srpska". The "Pale Casino" where until just recently, Radovan Karadzic could not but win, will soon be closed, it seems. In its editorial on Friday, September 1, which should be carefully read, Belgrade "Politika" states that everything that has been lost in the past year might perhaps be compensated some day, only one thing may not: "The dead are dead. Pale must bear its part of responsibility for it".

Nenad Lj. Stefanovic