ALL OPTIONS ARE STILL IN THE GAME

INTERVIEW: KARL GORINSEK, retired general of the Croat Army mirovini

AIM, ZAGREB, July 16, 1995

AIM: After a series of Calvaries six protected zones in B&H have gone through, the first has now fallen into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. How did you experience the fall of Srebrenica?

Gorinsek: It is a true indicator of the attitude of the international community towards the Boshniak people as the greatest victim of Serb aggression. It proclaimed "protected zones" just to take them off its conscience and fool the world public that it was doing something about it. From the very beginning there was no serious intention to defend them from Serb assaults and they could have, militarily speaking, fallen a long time ago, because they are much inferior to Serb attackers, especially in the Drina river vlley. For a long time now, Karadzic and his generals have had a plan to take those Boshniak enclaves near the Drina river, in order to cut the links between the Muslims in B&H and those in Sandzak and Montenegro, which the Serbs called the "green transversal" leading towards Turkey. Why these enclaves are falling just now, perhaps the Boshniaks themselves know it best, although they are accusing the international community that they were sacrificed in exchange for liberation of UN hostages. I am personally inclined to believe such claims.

AIM: Why did, in that case, NATO planes shoot at Serb tanks?

Gorinsek: It was a part of that same pretended concern. Allegedly, everything possible was done, and in fact the intervention was so poor and so delayed that they could have almost issued the Serbs an additional certificate that they were permitted to enter Srebrenica. The Serbs have probably feared the forces for rapid reactions which are still a mystery for everyone, and therefore for them, too. That is why they have decided to take the Podrinje enclave before these forces prevented them. I believe that this fear is unfounded, because obviously, these forces have no intention to return Srebrenica its status of a protected zone, nor defend Zepa and Gorazde from similar attacks. But, this fear could prove founded concerning a much more serious matter, that these forces are the advance guard of a much more powerful contingent which could impose a political and territorial ultimatum in order to disengage all three parties militarily, and perhaps even demilitarize the entire space of B&H, and probably international administration would be introduced by model of Mostar. I forecast that this could happen in the beginning of autumn, perhaps even earlier, and the ultimate goal would be preservation of integral Bosnia as Contact Group has defined it, while for Croatia, implementation of Z-4 plan would be imperatively demanded. It is very important to say that in doing it, care would be taken to eliminate influences from the FR of Yugoslavia and Croatia, because these influences and their intermingling appear as the greatest threat to stability of B&H. But, Boshniaks will also have to give up their dreams, if they have any, that they will establish their own national state, because apart from Belgrade and Zagreb, that will not be permitted by the international community either.

AIM: Why are the Serbs breaking into "protected zones", if they might be taken away from them after an intervention of forces for rapid reactions?

Gorinsek: They might, but noone can guarantee that they will though. So far, what was militarily conquered was always the basis for subsequent political negotiations, and besides, the Serbs might have got information from their foreign mentors that the territotial ratio of 51:49 per cent from the Contact Group plan would be changed. I am afraid that the death of Irfan Ljubijankic and the traffic accident of Ejup Ganic could have been just a part of that scheme and pressures in general exerted on the Boshniak Muslim people to give in and be "cooperative". I don't believe that these two accidents were mere "coincidences", it is more probable for me that they were planned.

AIM: By whom?

Gorinsek: It's difficult to say exactly, and besides,it is not advisable to go into details about such issues.

AIM: What will happen to Zepa and Gorazde?

Gorinsek: Boutros Ghali has practically already announced that the status of protected zone for Srebrenica wouldbe abandoned, meaning that the fall of Zepa, which is also demilitarized and on top of that much smaller, has already been accepted. This means that ethnic cleansing of Podrinje has for the time being also been accepted, because we see that the refugees from Srebrenica are withdrawing towards Potocari and Bratunac, and from there towards Kladanj, Olovo and Tuzla, meaning towards the regions with Boshniak-Muslim majority. As concerning Gorazde, it is a bigger mouthful for the Serbs, because it is comparatively large, not disarmed, and even has a minor armament industry. But, it too, has been foredoomed to disappear, since Mladic has engaged powerful forces which will be free after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa. I am afraid that the UN will not react here either, but rather let ethnic rounding off of Podrinje be completed.

AIM: Renewal of combats in the Bihac pocket are also expected. Will this town also be sacrificed?

Gorinsek: Karadzic and Mladic have announced that they would fight for all Boshniak enclaves, meaning for this one, too. It has an exceptionally important communication meaning for the Serbs, and it is engaging too many troops that could be used elsewhere, so they wish to get rid of this pocket as soon as possible, especially due to the fact that they fear the ultimatum of the international community I have mentioned. In fact, combats for Bihac have already started twenty days ago, but not much is known about them, because the Serbs are fighting there indirectly, through Abdic's secessionist forces. They are gradually progressing, and there have been announcements from Serb sources that a "Republic of Western Bosnia" would soon be founded, so obviously this is a well prepared action which has both military and political objectives. Bihac is in the so-called strategic encirclement and this is the greatest difficulty for its defenders. But, possibilities for its defence are still considerable. The Fifth Corps of the Army of B&H has toughened in the war and morally it is firm, so it can withstand attacks provided they do not escalate. It is obvious that the attackers do not intend fo "stifle" the Bihac pocket but to conquer it directly. If that should change, the defence would yield, especially since it is not capable of breaking through and contacting the closest Gospic, while Livanjsko plain which is mentioned by some is quite inaccessible (about a hundred kilometres of difficult ground).

AIM: Does the fall of Boshniak enclaves refute the increasingly spread assessment that military power of Bosnian Serbs is weakening?

Gorinsek: These are rather exaggerations of Croat and Boshniak propaganda, although there is some truth in it. This primarily refers to the situation of military manpower which consists mostly of older people who are linked to certain space - most commonly to their own villages - therefore, unfitting for major offensive activities. But, this does not significantly reduce the combative power of the Serb army, especially since Milosevic has recently strenthened it with fresh soldiers and new officers, supplying it also with new weapons. Missile systems S-300 are especially significant, which is a Russian weapon we had the opportunity to see at the military parade in Jarun, but the Croat Army still does not have them in operation, and the Serbs have already mastered their use. They are missiles which are not worse than American "patriots", in some aspects they are even better, and they are an efficient protection against ground-to-ground missiles and airplanes, including NATO's, so that they have started to take off very cautiously, I should even say they are forced to announce their flights to the Serbs. The Serbs are very restrained with these missiles, they have them in operational equipment for two years already, but have not used them yet, obviously saving them for a possible escalation of war.

AIM: Would this advantage disappear if the military alliance of the Croats and the Boshniaks started to function?

Gorinsek: First, I am not an optimist that this alliance could become operational quickly, which is verified by the statement of the new commander of Allied General Staff of the Croat Defence Council and the Army of B&H that the Croats do not consider lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo of top priority. The interests are, obviously, still completely different. But, even if this were not the case, the Serbs still have considerable military advantage, if the army of the FRY is taken into account, and it must be taken into account, because we see that its assistance is present again, if it had ever disappeared. Besides, it is known that military forces which are attacking must be by far more powerful than those which are defending themselves, or in this case holding what they had conquered. This will also be a problem even for the forces for rapid reactions, if they do intervene, let alone the Boshniak and Croat forces.

AIM: Does this mean that the Serbs are invincible?

Gorinsek: No, it doesn't, but one could say that they cannot lose everything all at once. That is why ambitions to attack them frontally do not stand a chance, but constant pressures on their weak points, such as the corridor, do. It is true that they will defend it with all their might, without hesitating to engage the army of the FRY, and the international community would be against such an action, because it knows that it could cause general escalation of the war, and that is why the Contact Group left the corridor to the Serbs in the first place.

AIM: In case of such a war, what do warnings coming from Zagreb mean that the Croat Army is capable of shooting Belgrade now?

Gorinsek: In case of general escalation, all threats are in the game and should be taken quite seriously. It is claimed that the Croat Army has at its disposal long-range ground-to-ground missiles, but I am not sure that they are operational. I would rather think that their purpose is at the moment psychological and propagandist, meaning that their military meaning is limited. Unless they have tactical nuclear charge.

AIM: Do they have it?

Gorinsek: One can never tell. But, then one can never tell what the Serbs have either. As much as the Croats and the Boshniaks are in a hurry to get armed, the Serbs are trying to keep up the advantage.

AIM: But at the moment Croatia is investing much more into its army than the FRY.

Gorinsek: Exactly, but don't forget that the Serbs had a great advantage at the start and now they are buying just special high-quality and high-efficiency weapons. They do not need any more tanks or cannons, they have too much of those as it is. Now they are purchasing rocket-launching systems and ground-to-ground missiles with tactical range up to 500 kilometres.

AIM: Spegelj claims that Croatia missed its chance to defeat JNA in 1991. Are the possibilities of that greater or smaller now than the used to be?

Gorinsek: I think that Spegelj's thesis is correct, because the JNA was not by far the third or the fourth power in Europe, besides, it was drilled to fight an external not an internal enemy, and finally, it started dissolving along ethniuic seams right after the war started. But, the Serbs were best organized and grabbed the largest part of the dissolved army and arms, by my assessment 80 per cent of it, which we did not succeed in preventing, among other, due to rejection of Spegelj's plans. Concerning the present prospects for liberation of occupied territories, it is a complex issue and I am not certain that it would be successful, as the "Flash" in Western Slavonia. Especially because the Serbs are hurriedly reorganizing their troops both here and in B&H, and Milosevic shows that he has no intention to give up neither Knin nor any other territories won by war, and broadening of objectives to include the Adriatic coast and Slavonia, all the way to Djakovo and even Pozeska valley is quite possible.

AIM: Let us go back to the Croat-Boshniak alliance which you said you don't believe in. Why? Do you think that the policy of Croatia in B&H is concentrated on creation of Greater Croatia?

Gorinsek: There is no doubt about that. This idea was topical ever since 1990, as well as creation of the independent Croat state, and the idea reaches back for decades if not even centuries. It is true that there is another trump card - the Federation, but at the same time Herzeg-Bosnia is so firmly structured that in fact you already have Greater Croatia. Because the central authorities in Zagreb operate not just there, but in Croat enclaves as well, such as Zepce, Usora, Brcko and others.

AIM: When you say "Greater Croatia" aren't you forgetting "Krajina"? Perhaps the expression "Little Greater Croatia" would be more appropriate?

Gorinsek: Yes, perhaps you might say that. It is a question of different variations, as there is a variation of Greater Serbia which was once called "Little Greater Serbia" by Sarinic. But, in both cases, moves made by one and the other party are almost identical. Perhaps the only difference is that Serb moves are more open and public, and Croat are mysterious and cautious.

AIM: Do you believe there will be a war in Croatia soon? Some American journals think it might happen this summer already.

Gorinsek: That certainly cannot be disregarded. Fear of international dictation is felt on both sides, just like in B&H. In that case, new "flashes" of Croat Army would be extorted by this race with time, and not by a free choice of the right moment for action. That is the weakness of such actions. A breakthrough through the Livanjsko Plain would have much greater effects, that is, through the ethnically Serb space, which would offer a possibility of better "bargaining" in negotiations later on, but which would also force the other party to sit at the negotiating table and abandon the idea of secession. Besides, surrounding Knin from that side and at the same time from Mount Velebit and from the region of Lika, creates a good starting position for future "flashes". But, one should count on it that these "flashes" will not possibly be as quick and efficient as they were in Western Slavonia, and involvement of the army of the FRY is quite probable, as well as much sharper reaction of the international community, even with the possibility of engagement of forces for rapid reactions, which was already announced in Zagreb UN headquarters.

MARINKO CULIC