"BLUE HELMETS" AWAITING SEPTEMBER?

The dilemma of the UNPROFOR - to remain in Bosnia or leave, will soon be resolved

AIM, Belgrade, July 12, 1995

Almost without a single shot fired, the UNPROFOR seems to be approaching the outcome feared by the international community the most and the one which was cause for rejection of military intervention in B&H: a humiliating withdrawal in midwinter. Just a couple of weeks ago, a political advisor of the NATO, who wished to remain anonimous, said that the decision about the withdrawal would probably be publicized in September. After the Serbs conquered Srebrenica, continued stay of the "blue helmets" in Bosnia is even less probable, although neither the NATO (except symbolically), nor the Dutch peace-keepers offered any resistance, nor did they attempt to stop the advancing troops of general Mladic.

The fall of Srebrenica thus became an important weight on the balance pan of those who have a long time ago started to believe that engagement of UN forces in Bosnia has lost all purpose. An official of the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo said last month that "safety zones are the most dangerous places in B&H", and that "presence of the peace forces in these regions is not a means of prevention any more".

Such pessimistic views of UN representatives in the field have come in the past few months as a continuation of repeated warnings coming from high officials of countries whose troops are deployed in the war stricken state, that withdrawal of their soldiers is becoming a more realistic option every day.

"If in the next two or three weeks, no significant progress is made in the peace process, the question of withdrawal will be opened again", on July 5, Head of the General Staff of French Army, admiral Jacques Lanckstadt, explicitly stated. Western allies had warned about the possibility of withdrawal for months before that, and towards the end of April this year, for the first time Russia joined them. Alexander Zotov, President Yeltsin's special envoy for former Yugoslavia, warned at the time that if the ceasefire was not prolonged (still valid at the time) and the combats continued, his country would "consider the possibility of withdrawing its soldiers from the peace forces in Bosnia".

At the time, a very lively debate was going on about proposals of UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, for the future of the UNPROFOR. All options, however, tumbled down one after the other as the crisis escalated. A series of developments which seriously jeopardized the existence of the peace mission started with its failure in mediating for prolongation of four-month ceasefire which expired in the beginning of May. Flaring up of combats in a series of frontlines, including the one around Sarajevo followed. Recently, bombing of downtown Sarajevo started again and marked annullment of the latest significant success of the international community - establishment and maintenance of the heavy armament ban zone in a diameter of 20 kilometres around the Bosnian capital. The NATO responded to it by symbolic air strikes, after which the Bosnian Serbs took hundreds of hostages from the ranks of the "blue helmets". This was a new blow against the UN and a new reason for it to withdraw.

This episode had another serious result: first disagreements within the UNPROFOR command came out in the open. British General Rupert Smith, commander of the "blue helmets" in B&H, demanded air support of the NATO, but this demand was stopped by his superior, French general, Bernard Jeanvier, commander of forces for the former SFRY, and UN Secretary General envoy, Yasushi Akashi.

According to some reports, Mr Akashi hesitated too long to give the approval for the intervention in Srebrenica, and when he did, the operation of Bosnian Serbs was practically finished. With such policy, the UNPROFOR significantly endangered its position in the eyes of the Government of B&H, and did not manage to win the favour of Bosnian Serbs in doing it either. Much before the fall of Srebrenica, on June 12, a Minister in the Sarajevo Government, Hasan Muratovic, declared: "The UNPROFOR is doing nothing in Bosnia & Herzegovina since the taking of hostages, so that these 20 thousand men (soldiers of the UNPROFOR) are practically idle waiting to see what will happen. In this sense, their failure to carry out their mandate is intensified and their crisis is in fact total, in the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia they are doing nothing. Therefore, over there the Serbs do not allow them to bring supplies, they have also taken away a part of their equipment, they bomb them every day, the UNPROFOR soldiers have started to eat the humanitarian aid which is there at the disposal of the population."

Additional lack of trust of both warring parties in the "blue helmets" resulted in formation and sending in forces for rapid reactions (RRF). The Bosnian Serbs look upon these mainly British and French units with suspicion, because they are afraid that these better armed soldiers could initiate much more specific and serious actions against them than those the poorly armed members of the formerly deployed units were prepared to take. Suspicion of Karadzic's team was especially roused by hints of general Smith that the first task of the RRF could be opening - if necessary by force even - of a corridor for connecting Sarajevo with Kiseljak.

On the other hand, the Muslims tend to believe that the newly arrived "special units" are just the advance party of larger units which will ensure pulling out of the UNPROFOR, meaning that they will only fight against those who will try to prevent pulling out of the UN soldiers and their equipment. Since there are practically no UNPROFOR troops in territories controlled by Bosnian Serbs, it would mean that the RRF are more likely to be engaged in clashes with Government forces than with those under command of general Mladic. Admiral Lanckstadt directly accused the Government of B&H for obstructing deployment of rapid reaction forces.

At the same time, he rejected both the Serb and the Muslim speculations about the role of the new troops, stressing that their priority task was to protect life and security of the "blue helmets", and not to punish anyone or protect humanitarian convoys and enclaves. If the role of the RRF will actually be reduced to protection of their other colleagues, it will additionally jeopardize financing of the whole operation. American congressmen have already questioned participation of the USA in providing funds for this expensive operation. Their argument was that it is absurd to pay dearly for the mission which will neither save anyone nor help anyone in order to - inefficient as it is - hardly manage to protect itself. Clinton's adiministration has for a long time opposed the House of Representatives, but the fall of Srebrenica forced the Minister of Defence, William Perry, to announce withdrawal of the UNPROFOR, too.

Plans for departure of UN forces already exist. Towards the end of June, they were adopted by the NATO Assembly. The plan for the "Resolute Effort" as the opeartion will be called, is registered in the seat of the Western military alliance as number 40104.

The only ones who are resolutely advocating survival of the UNPROFOR, are Boutros Ghali and his envoy Yasushi Akashi. It is, however, hard to expect that they will have the last say - especially when everything they can show their opponents is a mission which is rapidly bursting at the seams.

Dragan Cicic