CROAT OPPOSITION AND THE "SARAJEVO STATEMENT"

INITIATIVE FOR B&H IN RESOLVING THE CROAT ISSUE

AIM, Sarajevo, June 6, 1995 In the capital of B&H, representatives of a large majority of those who form the political will in Croatia and all presidents or representatives of parliamentary parties in Bosnia & Herzegovina agreed and then formulated and signed what they had agreed in the form of a document titled "Sarajevo Statement" on the necessity for Bosnia & Herzegovina to be preserved as an integral state with modified internal organization.

The initiative for the "statement" originated in Croatia. It was started by the Croat Social Liberal Party and supported by all the opposition parties active in the Croat Assembly. As expected, there were no dilemmas concerning the contents of the document, so it was accepted by all the parties and wholeheartedly supported by the political public. But, what arrests the attention of the public in Bosnia & Herzegovina is the curiosity of the political moment this initiative arrived at, as well as the fact that it appeared in Croatia. Since few things ever happen accidentally or spontaneously in politics, it is worthwhile to look at the motives which stimulated the Croat opposition politicians to react in this way.

The "Sarajevo Statement", in fact, resolves the Croat issue. It concerns the destiny of Croatia which is, according to the authors of the initiative from that country, inseparable from integrity of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Possible division of B&H, which is silently supported by the ruling Croat DemocraticCommunity (HDZ) and Croat President Tudjman himself, is a trap - according to the opinion of the opposition there - would result in recurrent division of Croatia. This is the first argument for a more offensive political activity of such an option, while the other imposed itself when an initiative arrived recently from the UN for convening of a new conference on ex-Yugoslavia, that is, a hint that the political mechanism which would be aimed at reconstruction of a new Yugoslav community could be activated again. This political option is not less dangerous either, especially for Croatia where an absolute consensus exists not to accept any such offers. Between these two possible solutions stands the third - Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia in internationally recognized borders.

The fact that this third solution at this moment seems the least feasible due to the nature of aggression against these two countries, has not prevented protagonists of political life to renew once again - this time in the form of a political document - the demand for integrity of Bosnia & Herzegovina as a necessary precondition of stability in this space. Also aware of the fact that a political document, how ever important it may be, cannot win the war against the aggressor, the signatories gathered in Sarajevo (which is, by the way, perhaps going through its most difficult war days) considered a system of practical moves which could lead to this desired solution. It is assessed that the international community is executing the political will in Bosnia & Herzegovina through its institutions, acting mostly opportunistically, which means that it accepts the so-called "reality on site". That is why, it was so far largely inclined towards some kind of division of B&H. Today, however, there are indications that the developments on site could lead the international community to a different road - a road to protection of the integrity of Bosnia & Herzegovina. The possible shift in the policy of the international community could be induced uder pressure of the new reality, which is called the Army of B&H, the factor that must be considered. This army, which still has difficulties with the lack of armament, especially with heavy armament, has not lost a single significant battle since the Washington Agreement, and has won a few victories having significantly expanded the territories it controls. It is now much better organized and logistically supplied with highly-motivated human factor and clearly defined war objectives, contrary to Karadzic's army, so that its existence and operation opens possibilities for new diplomatic initiatives of the Bosnian Government directed primarily to effectuation of integrity of B&H. In such a situation, political pressure in the form of the "Sarajevo Statement" can be an important factor which should not be lightly disregarded by world political power-wielders.

The other significant fact connected with signing of the "Sarajevo Statement" is the stance of the local Croat Democratic Community. It is clear that the Croat opposition, by insisting on the "Statement", wished to force the ruling Croat party to come out in the open concerning the political issue of Bosnia & Herzegovina. They partially succeeded in this, because the HDZ managed to open a line of retreat for itself by creating additional space for manipulations - namely, the HDZ of B&H signed the Statement. Since it is clear that this party does nothing without full consent of the headquarters in Zagreb, based on this act it should be concluded that the HDZ itself also supports integral Bosnia & Herzegovina. On the other hand, absence of representatives of the central HDZ from Zagreb and formal absence of signatures of representatives of this party on the document leaves maneuvering space for those forces of the HDZ of Croatia which are opposed to integral Bosnia & Herzegovina. Such political calculation which leaves space for combinations within speculative policy, could succeed in a period such as the prewar period in B&H, but since this is a brutal war reality, Croat opposition now has all the right to accuse the HDZ that it acts against the interests of Croatia. Politicians such as Budisa, Mesic, Racan, Degen, Cacic and Kovac, who have signed the "Sarajevo Statement" in the name of their parties, will certainly not miss the opportunity to deliver this accusation to the HDZ.

As concerning Bosnia & Herzegovina, entire political activity here is directed towards the priority aim called the battle for Sarajevo. Its positive outcome would turn a lot in favour of Bosnian interests, and the "Sarajevo Statement" can be a significant support to this struggle, accepted with pleasure.

STRAJO KRSMANOVIC