INTERVIEW: MUHAMED SACIRBEJ, AMBASSADOR OF THE RB&H IN

Sarajevo May 31, 1995

THE UN

UNPROFOR EXISTS FOR ITS OWN SAKE

AIM, SARAJEVO, May 20, 1995

* Mr Sacirbej, let us begin with the burning issue. According to your opinion, why does UNPROFOR refuse to engage NATO forces in the Sarajevo exclusion zone?

  • Their official explanation is fear of consequences of engaging NATO, that is, fear of reprisal against their soldiers in the field. I think they are wrong, because the less ready they appear to respond to attacks of Karadzic's rebels against their soldiers and the civilians in B&H, the more they seem powerless and will become an easier and more frequent target of attacks themselves.

* United Nations Secretary General, Bhoutros B. Ghali stated four possible options for the future of UN forces in Bosnia - retaining the existing situation, more resolute military response, withdrawal and redeployment, that is, reduction of forces in the field. Which of these four options is most acceptable for the Bosnian Government?

  • First, I must say that these are not the only four options. Mr Ghali conceived the listed alternatives from an aspect which is not the most convenient one for B&H. For instance, the French Ambassador in New York said that his country did not believe that these four options were the only possible ones. They believe that the UNPROFOR should be given more power so as to be able to respond to Serb provocations. The fourth option you mentioned may on the one hand mean a transitional phase towards complete withdrawal or, on the other, baulking at a mandate of the UNPROFOR which would have even less authorizations than the former. This means persisting on the mandate of "peace keeping". The problem is that we were given promises that the mandate of UN forces would be given more power in exchange for the demand that the arms embargo be lifted, something like a compensation. In case the UNPROFOR loses significance, we will be forced to warn about the possible consequences. The most important thing is what other possibilities for protection of civilians in B&H exist. Besides, much more earnestness is necessary in implementartion of what was already decided by the resolutions. It is simply not very serious to say one day that the UNPROFOR will protect safe zones and the people in them, and then just state that they are not ready to defend them the next, without hesitating to take away the arms from the defenders of the citizens of a certain city.

* If quoted correctly, Mr Ghali said that the problem was that there was no clear definition of safe zones.

  • They are insisting on the concept of demilitarization of 'safe' zones. The UN administration believes that the right of the Bosnian Army to arms in these zones is somehow 'unclarified'. There is nothing unclarified about it for us. When the Resolution on safe zones was adopted, the French Ambassador at the session of the Security Council declared that the resolution was being adopted in order to help the Bosnian Government to preserve the civilians and its territory. On the other hand, we must not proceed with the concept of full demilitarization of these zones if the UNPROFOR keeps saying (and that is exactly what is happening) that the most important thing are their soldiers, and only then our civilians and territories. If the intention to demilitarize a zone exists, then its citizens and territory must have priority and their soldiers should come only after that. The prevailing opinion in the UNPROFOR is that they are most important for themselves, and as for the others (who they exist for in the first place) only if they manage to do anything.

* What do you think would happen in B&H if the UNPROFOR started to withdraw?

  • It is very difficult to assess. The question is under what conditions the UNPROFOR would withdraw, and to what extent we would be permitted to get ready for such a situation. The civilians would certainly be in great danger. But, such a decision could mean that the Bosnian Government would get the right both to arms and defence which it was denied to do of so far.

* What do you think, how would Karadzic's forces act in case of withdrawal of UN forces?

  • It depends on the threats which would be addressed to them in case they attacked. If nothing serious is done in that sense, both the UNPROFOR personnel and safe zones would be un danger.

* It seems that there are differences in the opinions between UN officers in the filed and those from the administration.

  • Mr Ghali thinks that the mandate of UN forces should not be intensified, and he is most radical in that stance in the UN. Even in the countries who have troops in the field readiness for intensifying the mandate is much greater, which is logical, because it would make them more powerful in response to attacks. But, in deciding for this or that option, key reasons are of a political nature. In some of the European capitals there is some kind of permanent inability to actively respond to aggression. Mr Ghali sees B&H as a permanent political and economic worry of the UN. Economic because the UNPROFOR is very expensive and the end of its job is nowhere in sight. Our Government was not the one to choose the road for the UNPROFOR and we have constantly repeated that it is not an efficient response to aggression and genocide. But, although the decision was theirs, they keep saying that the UNPROFOR is too expensive an inefficient?! If that is true, they should seek other means which are more efficient and more appropriate. The fact that Mr Ghali will try to win another Secretary General's mandate will also play a certain role in it. Many believe that the longer the UNPROFOR remain in Bosnia, the less efficient it will prove to be, which is highly inconvenient for Mr Ghali at the time he is searching for votes for his new mandate. That is why it is in his personal interest to withdraw the UNPROFOR from B&H. Bosnia & Herzegovina is in fact the greatest defeat of the UN in the past fifty years.

* The assessments are that the withdrawal of UN forces would also cost several billion dollars, and that about 40 thousand soldiers would have to be engaged in it. As noone is ready to allocate the necessary funds, aren't UN troops in &H in an unenviable situation? It seems almost impossible to get them out of B&H without great military and financial investments!

  • Yes, the situation is certainly very complicated for economic, political and other reasons. The question of UNPROFOR is not just a question of efficiency in bringing peace to B&H any more, but it has become much broader. In case of withdrawal of UN forces, many administrations would have too explain to their public the reasons for such a radical turn in their policy, in other words, they would be forced to admit that their entire policy concerning B&H was a mistake. That is why it is not easy to answer to this question.

* How did the UN react to the success experienced by the Bosnian Army in the field?

  • Some wished to present this success as something that has disturbed the situation, slowed the peace process down. My mission was successful so far in the attempt to explain that this was a legal military action of a legal administration, as well as the fact that we have a right to defend not only our civilians but territorial integrity of the entire state. Everybody is also afraid that intensified fighting might cause major insecurity of UNPROFOR and perhaps greater insecurity in the entire region. But I believe that they all understand that noone can expect the administration of Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Army of B&H to wait for London, Moscow, Paris or Washington to succeed in exerting greater pressure on Pale to accept peace. After all, they have not shown readiness to exert efficient pressure on Pale so far
  • why should we believe that they will be ready to do it tomorrow?

* How do you see the present activities of the Contact Group?

  • Obviously their present activity is centred on the effort to establish contacts between Sarajevo and Belgrade, to bring about Milosevic's recognition in order to isolate Karadzic more efficiently. But, Milosevic still does not show serious intention to do anything in that respect. Therefore, we support objectives of the Contact Group, but with good reason, we also have doubts about its efficiency.

* Did anything change in the American policy towards B&H?

  • Not in the last six months. We have the support of the USA, but it is doubtful whether that support is more important than the controversies the USA would have in implementation of its intentions with France, England and Russia.

ZEHRUDIN ISAKOVIC