THE CITY IN AGONIZING EXPECTATIONS

LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE OF SARAJEVO ?

AIM, SARAJEVO, May 5, 1995 That Sarajevo is the key strategic point of the war in Bosbia&Herzegovina was a fact known from the very beginning. Resolution of the issue of Sarajevo will also be the resolution of the Bosnian war. The only question is whether first the issue of Sarajevo will be resolved, or will it be the other round? This question implies the main dilemma: whether Sarajevo and the whole of B&H will definitely be resolved by arms or by political means? In the city itself, which is shelled everyday from the surroundings hills again, which is blocked and locked up like when the war was at its culmination, expectations what might happen and what the resolution for Sarajevo will be, are lifting tensions sky high.

The four-month ceasefire is not and will not be prolonged, at least not formally, despite the great pressure exerted by the international community. The ultimatum issued by the NATO is in force, although it is increasingly violated. Heavy armament which is controlled by the UNPROFOR is easily accessible to Karadzic's Serbs, and they are ready to use it should they assess that it is necessary for them. Of course, without any obstacles, new arms can also be brought in. The Army of B&H is better organized every day, has more men, and it is materially and morally better consolidated, but there is still no equilibrium concerning heavy armament. Will the embargo on arms imports for the Bosnian Government be lifted, it is still difficult to predict, but the pressure in that sense is in itself a significant factor which must be taken into consideration in any assessment. This Army was armed quite well by alternative ways, anyway. Threats about withdrawing of the UNPROFOR due to increasingly difficult conditions it operates in, can hardly be completely effectuated, but even the very threatening pressure they produce has certain effects. Finally, the city is under siege for more than three years and the recent statement of Alija Izetbegovic that "it is impossible to wait for next winter like this, so the issue of Sarajevo will be resolved this way or that (politically or militarily, remark of the author)", should be taken quite seriously.

The analysis of all these and some other facts suggests the conclusion that there are three options for Sarajevo: a political solution which would mean demilitarization of the city in the diameter of 20 kilometres and placing it under administrative and political control of international factors, most probably the UN; then there is the solution with arms, and finally, the combined, compromising resolution which would imply some kind of "trading". Not even any of the decision-makers in this space could claim with certainty which resolution will be implemented. The decision about this and the final outcome will depend on the relation of forces and the facts which will be established after further developments both on the military and the political level.

It seems that the first solution would suit best the Bosnian Government. The political solution with demilitarization and establishment of the international administration is in fact an integralistic solution and it would almost completely satisfy political aspirations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. It would satisfy the citizens too, because suffering of civilians would be reduced to a minimum, demolition of buildings too, and possible bridges for reestablishment of trust among its citizens who are now on opposed sides would be rebuilt. But, it is difficult to grasp whether there is any interest for this solution among Karadzic's Serbs. Judging by the radical stance he speaks in favour of for the time being - and radicalization of relations keeps him "alive" and he chooses it whenever he can regardless of the cost - such a solution does not suit Karadzic. But, public statements are one thing, and real political interests another, so it is not impossible to expect a change of attitude of this psychiatrist with schizophrenic political reactions, in the sense of his acceptance of such a resolution of the issue of Sarajevo.

The second possibility, that is, the purely armed solution, or the battle for Sarajevo as the key strategic battle of this war, from the aspect of achievement of the final goal, is an attractive option because the winner would acquire a clear position for continuation of disentanglement of the whole B&H crisis. It would eliminate all further compromises and it would be a strategic turning point which would open the road for the winner to a final victory. However, why does this option seem the least realistic? Primarily because the actors, especially the Bosnian party, are aware of the cost they would have to pay for anything of the kind. Since it would not be a struggle with a limited objective to lift the blockade, but a struggle for liberation of the whole city, and the region around it. Aware of such a possibility, generals of the Army of B&H are making certain preparations in order to win the best possible initial tactical positions, and in this sense, territorial conquests of the mount of Treskavica and the Nisicki plateau were undertaken, after which a kind of a double ring around the city was formed. Theoretically, the Army of B&H could engage in Sarajevo five of its corps and logistic support of the forces of the Croat Defence Council (HVO) (who else's). On the other hand, however, it is quite possible for Karadzic's soldiers to engage the greatest part of their military and technical potentials, including the long-range missiles. Sarajevo would, therefore, be a frontline, maybe one of the greatest and the severest ever formed in Europe. Since this is a large city with an exceptionally large number of civilians in a small space, consequences of opening this frontline would be incalculable. Therefore, one could expect that the threat of the NATO contained in the ultimatum which is still in force and refers to Karadzic's Serbs would not, should this happen, remain being just a threat.

The third option is the possibility of a "deal". Such an option was in the air all the time, and stories about it were renewed after the latest developments related to liberation of Western Slavonia by Croat forces, since due to the speed and ease with which this was accomplished the public which is usually engaged in this kind of speculations, claims that "the letter and the spirit of Karadjordjevo" is active again. In other words, if a lot of things have actually been "directed" in this war, why would not lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo be resolved in a similar manner. Whenever they can, Karadzic's propagandist media see to it that such a possibility does not remain just in the sphere of speculations and unverified assumptions. They have often offered this possibility, both publicly and secretly. Especially because such a solution of the Sarajevo problem would satisfy best Karadzic's political appetites, that is, his policy of formation of ethnic territories in the B&H space would in this case be effectuated. Exchange of Vogosca and Ilijas for instance, for Srebrenica, Zepa or Gorazde is something that would suit the leader from Pale just right, and any other similar combination such as a limited blockade of Sarajevo accompanied by a "simulation" of a battle would not be inacceptable for him. In such a case, he would still have the divided city of Sarajevo as one of the long ago proclaimed objectives of his policy. For such cominations, the legal B&H authorities did not show much interest. On the contrary, anything of the sort, at least publicly, was a priori rejected. It is difficult to presume that anything would change in this stance, although in politics, not only principles decide, but interests and realistic possibilities. But, since it is impossible to go below certain level, not even for the sake of pure interest (if there is any such thing in this option), is it probable that the B&H Government would agree to such a development.

What is, therefore, lying ahead? One thing is certain

• if an armed resolution does occur, it will be very soon. In any case, before anything else is resolved in the remainder of B&H territory. Solution of the problem of Sarajevo would in that case dictate the course of the entire Bosnian solution. The political option, if it will be chosen, can be expected only in the end, after everything else related to B&H is completed. While expecting the choice of one or the other, it is not improbable that a whole year and another winter will pass, despite the statements that something like that will not happen. In any case, a period of highly condensed political time lies ahead, which could bring fatal moves and decisions, and even a quick solution. All the options are still open, and that may be what worries the Sarajevans most of all.

STRAJO KRSMANOVIC