MASLENICA REPEATED

AIM, ZAGREB, May 3, 1995 On Tuesday, May 2, 1995, after three years, the war has called on Zagreb again. About 10.30, six missiles fired from high-calibre launching system called "Orkan", probably somewhere from the direction of Petrinja, hit the very centre of the city, and the airport "Pleso" was also fired at. A shell fell on the well-known Zagreb park Zrinjevac, close to the Ministry of the External Affairs, but Americal Embassy as well. Another missile hit Draskoviceva street in the vicinity of the National Bank, the third just missed the Ministry of Defence and exploded in the yard of a neighbouring high school, the fourth almost hit the Post Office in Jurisiceva street and caused a true massacre in the old Vlaska street which is just about a hundred meters from Ban Jelacic square, and the, at that moment, crowded marketplace Dolac.

The final balance sheet of this attack is, for the moment: five dead, about 140 wounded persons, 150 destroyed cars, a tram and serious damage done to buildings. But, although the targets were evidently chosen with great care, and missed just slightly, regarding the distance from where the shots were fired, because the system's range is about 50 kilometres, the real target of the attack were solely people. Namely, the rebellious Serbs used rockets with heads containing 288 small explosive devices ("bells") filled with tiny fragments which are used exclusively for killing people, and not for destroying buildings.

At the same time, missiles fell on other Croat cities too - Novska, Pakrac, Karlovac and Sisak, where there were also dead and wounded. The attack on Zagreb occurred at the moment when the Assembly was in session which, despite explosions in the vicinity, did not interrupt operation, but continued work according to the established agenda, nor was the general alarm sounded in the city. When we asked some of the state leaders why it was not, the answer was that it was unnecessary to disseminate and spread panic, and that, besides, the Croat Army had destroyed the launcher and therefore, there was no danger of a new attack.

But, the alarm was sounded at 15.40 hours, just after information from the Office of the President of the Republic was carried by television that the action of the Croat police and military forces aimed at cleansing the approaches to the highway and the railway in Western Slavonia of the Serb rebels, was completed. Deputies, together with the journalists, were closely following the reports from Okucani which the Croat Army together with the police entered a little before 13.00 hours, but the film of developments in Zagreb, as well. And after the siren did howl after all, with no signs of panic, descended to the Assembly cafe and restaurant where they waited for the end of the fifteen-minute alarm, which was not explained in any way. And while pictures from Okucani were telecast, there was no victorious euphoria, and it is indicative that almost everyone stopped watching the program at the moment the announcers started reading letters of support to President Tudjman, accompanying them with quite frequently malicious comment: that we have already seen.

When citizens of Croatia were informed on Monday, May 1, that at 5.30 that morning, action of Croat armed forces had begun, that too was seasoned with a letter of support. A citizen of Zagreb, a war disabled veteran wrote that he had gone to Slavonia in 1991 on foot, carrying only a pistol, and returned without both legs. He sent word to the President that he had lost faith in him and the Croat administration, and that he would be the first to sit in a tank and start to Western Slavonia in order to terminate the terrorist actions, which should be the beginning of liberation of whole of Croatia. This letter is the most picturesque explanation why Tudjman decided to take this war action of limited range. According to a generally accepted opinion he was forced to do it because, on the one hand, the people had begun to lose faith, and on the other he was strongly pressured by the rightist faction of his party, but almost all opposition parties of some importance also accused him that he had practically accomplished nothing with the new mandate of the UNCRO.

This whole affair which in the end resulted in establishment of Croat rule in the former Sector West which was anyway mostly controlled by Croat army, apart from some major outposts such as Okucani and Jasenovac, and certain villages, had chronologically begun back on April 28. On that day, near "Slaven" motel by the highway in the vicinity of Nova Gradiska, after a verbal conflict, a Croat citizen killed a person from village of Smrtic from the occupied region. Right after that, according to the official sources, the brother of the deceased with a group of Serbs started shooting at the cars which were travelling down the highway, and three persons were killed and at least ten wounded. Incidents of this type continued in the following two or three days, and spread along the road connecting Pakrac and Pozega. According to official explanations, that is when the final decision about the action was made.

But, judging by the manner in which it was carried out, judging by its force, high level of coordination, speed, and success, which was also determined by the military analyst Fran Visnar, the action was carefully and long prepared, and it waited only for a suitable moment and an immediate cause. It is clear that the attack on Zagreb and other Croat cities was actually an act of retaliation which Milan Martic and general Celeketic were directly accused of by the Croat party.

We have already given some of the reasons why Tudjman decided to take action at the moment he did. This action reduced the occuopied territories to 17 per cent and finally made the highway and the railway operational and supposedly safe for travelling, but it is quite clear that President Tudjman needs a great victory to reestablish faith people had lost in him. The open question remains, however, whether this was actually a specific "deal" with Belgrade and actually a rerun of the "Maslenica action"?

This opinion is shared by many opposition politicians we talked to, and as an argument for this allegation, they quote the very mild reactions coming from Belgrade, which was all similar after the "Maslenica action". The Croat Independent Democrats of Stipe Mesic, Liberals of Slaven Budisa, and members of the Croat Party of Right tend to contemplate that Tudjman, just like Milosevic, has never given up the idea of dividing Bosnia & Herzegovina. An old statement of Borislav Mikelic, who is with no doubt Milosevic's man, is interesting in this sense - that neither Kordun, nor Banija, nor Lika, are important - what matters is the agreement about Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Vladimnir Seks resolutely rejects such a possibility, because, he says, if this had been the result of a secret agreement, Zagreb would not have been attacked. This argument is not too firm, because everyone knows that Martic has never agreed to be in any delegation for negotiations with Croatia and that there are serious differences and political disagreements in "Krajina". Zagreb, in fact, expects that there might be new shelling, so schools will be closed for two days as a measure of precaution, until it becomes clear how the situation will develop.

Another assessment of the opposition is that Tudjman will decide about calling the elections while this victory is still "hot", most probably for July, August at the latest, meaning a year before the term prescribed in the Constitution. It is already publicly declared that a new election law is drafted, which would suit the HDZ best and force the opposition to try to unite, which is hardly probable. There are also calculations that the HDZ could draw some quite important parties to its side, namely the HSS, but this would mean that Tudjman would have to get rid of a large portion of the present deputies who are markedly nationalistically oriented rightists.

In the meantime, the Assembly continues its session, and Croatia establishes rule over Western Slavonia, trying at the same time to continue negotiations with the representatives of "Krajina" which had begun on May 1 at Zagreb airport Pleso, in the UNCRO base. But, was this just a mini two-day war or perhaps an introduction into a broader one, and as some foreign commentators forecast, a general Croat-Serb conflict? Judging by the behavior of Belgrade so far, Croat analysts do not count on it, and Karadzic's threats about assistance to "Krajina" remained just empty promises, because he has a lot of problems in Bosnia & Herzegovina as it is. At least for the time being, there are no signs that Croatia is preparing for an action of large proportions either, which would be aimed at Knin or Eastern Slavonia and Baranja, so that Tudjman will hardly have the opportunity to fulfil the promise he made that he would travel to Split by train via Knin.

The reasons for this are twofold: first, one would have to count on reactions of the world which were quite meek this time, but also the stance of Milosevic, and there is also the question whether the Croat Army is ready for such a complex task regardless of the new arms and surprisingly well trained professional soldiers. And it is not insignificant either that this would certainly provoke serious retaliation directed towards Zagreb and other cities, because the Serbs from "Krajina" showed on Tuesday that they have arms at their disposal which enable them to shoot with great precision from a great distance. The shells that hit the surroundings of Zagreb two years ago are evidence that they also have at their disposal far more destructive and farther-reaching missiles than those used on Tuesday.

At this moment (Wednesday morning) it is quiet in Zagreb, but a tension is felt in the air. The streets are not as lively as usual, everything seems to be in a strange state of expectation. The citizens are aware of the significance of this action, but await the future with a lump in their throats.

GOJKO MARINKOVIC