GHALI, UNCRO AND THE ELECTIONS

Zagreb Apr 25, 1995

AIM, ZAGREB, April 23, 1995 After the report of Boutros Ghali and its adoption which is expected to take place this week, finally all, or at least most of the main details of the present mandate of the peace forces in Croatia have finally become known. This mandate will so far be the longest - it will last eight months, until the end of November. Mr Ghali proposed to the Security Council that the UNCRO during this period executes the following tasks: full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, further effectuation of the economic agreement, implementation of all UN resolutions which refer to Croatia, monitoring of Croat borders, continuation of humanitarian aid delivery, and supervision of demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula.

A contingent of 8750 men is entrusted with this mandate which is by approximately four thousand smaller than it was so far, so that the surplus of the peace forces will be withdrawn by summer. And yet the determined contingent is by nearly four thousand larger than what Croatia had demanded, so obviously Mr Ghali tried to comply with the wishes of Zagreb only up to the limit which does not allow speculation that he made concessions to it. The same could be said for the self-proclaimed authorities in Knin: peace forces will not stand solely, nor mainly, on Croat borders as Zagreb demanded, and in this way one of the major requirements of Knin was satisfied. But, their opposition to the new name (UNCRO) of the peace forces was not taken into consideration, nor their demand that the control of the borders be carried out without any restrictive measures in connection with the sanctions against Yugoslavia, nor with the right of Zagreb to approve entrance of commodities on Croat territory.

Therefore, the ambiguity and the ambivalence of the mandate was persistently applied so as to somewhat satisfy, and somewhat limit both parties, and this can best be seen from the manner in which entrance of civilian and military freights into Croatia was resolved. The recently blocked tank trucks with fuel at the Yugoslav-Croat border show best that the United Nations have decided to apply the provisions of the resolutions which introduced restrictions on importation into "Krajina". But, at the same time, passages of military equipment are just registered, according to Mr Ghali's report, so that it is evident that the intention is to shaken up "Krajina" economically in order to make it accept Resolution 981, but not to disturb the relation of military forces at its expense. In the first Croat reactions, Mr Ghali's report is welcomed with approval and satisfaction, but not so frenetically to make anyone believe that this is not just a conditional reaction, and that Zagreb is satisfied perhaps only because Knin is not.

The Croat Ambassador in the United Nations, Mario Nobilo, reported from New York with the stance that "one should not be dissatisfied" with Mr Ghali's report, because it abandoned the terminology "UNPROFOR", "protected areas" and so on, and spoke only of the Republic of Croatia, making a clear distinction "between the international border of Croatia which should be controlled, and the demarcation line" with the Serbs. Nobilo does not hide his discontent that the report does not mention the number of UN monitors which will be deployed along the borders, while their task is reduced to mere observing and registering of crossings. But, he thinks that the good side of such passive monitoring is that, through the reports which will be sent to New York but also to Zagreb, Croatia will be given the opportunity to participate actively in the system of sanctions introduced against the FR of Yugoslavia, which are prolonged once again by Resolution 988.

There are still no reactions of Knin to Ghali's report, but probably they should not even be expected, since Martic has already defined his attitude towards it by rejecting in advance to have the peace forces retain the name UNCRO, and to have them deal with any serious business at the Croat Eastern border. Rage of Knin authorities was especially stirred up by the blocking of trucks with fuel at the Yugoslav-Croat border which was, according to the statement of the Russian Embassy in Zagreb, carried out by the Russian batallion of the UNCRO, at the order of the international Sanctions Committee. It is interesting, however, that the representatives of UNCRO in Zagreb still declare that all the developments in this blockade are not quite clear yet, so despite the explanation of the Russian Embassy, or maybe even because of it, it seems that the possibility that the blockade was ordered by Belgrade cannot be completely discarded. If that is true, it is obvious that the pressure is directed towards making Knin accept Resolution 981 and Ghali's report, which is probably just the objective of this stage, while the ultimate objective would be to annul the advantage Zagreb has acquired by adopting the Resolution, in order to begin pressuring it too, to accept the high level of autonomy prescribed by the Z-4 plan.

Some assessments say that Belgrade is in a hurry to have this happen, because after the introduction of the control on the Drina river it is not so urgent for it to have its relations with Pale resolved because lifting of the sanctions will depend on the fact whether it will be able to establish control of Knin. This control should be established before the brotherhood between the Bosnian and the Croat Serbs which is now pushed by Pale (it was the other way round so far) becomes so reinforced that it will be impossible to influence it. The Croat media firmly believe that strengthening of the Pale-Knin alliance could explain the recent artillery attacks of Bosnian Serbs on the surroundings of Dubrovnik, and later on Zupanja. The Bosnian Serbs wish to express their solidarity in this way and make things easier for Knin, after the units of the Croat Defence Council, probably supported by the Croat Army, have conquered the peaks of the Dinara mountain on the Bosnian side, just some fifteen kilometres from this city.

Prime Minister Valentic who was at Dubrovnik airport at the time of the second attack of Vucurevic's gunners - they shot at the airport just as he was uttering the sentence that such savage attacks would not be tolerated any more - stated later that Croatia would not allow itself to be provoked and that it would react cool-headed. This quick change of tone was probably the result of the assessment that the Bosnian Serbs who have already dragged the Croat Serbs into war, now wish to do the same with Croatia, and then with Serbia (which would not be able to remain neutral). The official Zagreb had publicly declared just a few days prior to it that it was not inclined towards rennovation of a big war, announcing that it was sending home more than thirty thousand soldiers of the Croat Army. As the highest Croat state representatives, from Tudjman on, assess that at this moment Serbia is neither capable nor feels inclined towards a big war either, it is probable that hopes are soaring sky high in Zagreb again that it is possible to make a new direct deal with Belgrade, which would on the one hand bring about a quick reintegration of Knin into Croatia, and on the other, lift the sanctions off the Yugoslav federation.

Should this deal be at least initiated in the foreseeable future, Croat leadership could catch its breath and turn its attention to the most important internal issue - the elections. In the end of last week, the Presidency of the ruling Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) made it public that Prime Minister Valentic would remain in office, although persistent rumours had been removing him from for several months already, until the elections next summer. This means that Tudjman and the HDZ are seeking the main trump card for the elections in peaceful economic recovery, but not as previously, solely on account of the already completely pauperized lower strata. That is why the Presidency of the HDZ recommends the Government to find ways as of the Day of the State, May 25, to increase the income of the pensioners and to ensure free public transportation for them. This is one of the usual pre-election moves, not only in Croatia, and apart from the fact that it is clear that the election preparations have already begun, there are speculations about the possibilities that they may be called before, maybe even a lot before the scheduled time.

MARINKO CULIC