WILL UNPROFOR REMAIN IN CROATIA?

AIM, ZAGREB, March 3, 1995

More than ever before there are rumours in Croatia that the peace process is at a stalemate, but that it can, nevertheless, be continued without the presence of UNPROFOR. On the contrary, the latest statements of the politicial representatives of UNPROFOR claim that the assumption that the peace process is in some sort of a helpless clinch, is completely wrong. According to them not only is it not at a stalemate, but it has "hardly started" and consequently no convincing strategy has been observed on the part of Croatia to "continue the peace process, start a political dialogue and avoid war in case UNPROFOR leaves after March 31". That was the harshest criticism of Croatia's internal policy so far. The position of UNPROFOR officials in Zagreb is based on the belief that Croatia cannot expect war (no matter of how weak intensity) in one month just to smoothly turn into "completely peaceful integration" already in the next.

Croatian politicians seem to think that high politics is jogging, so that one can run today and not run tomorrow. The two mentioned theses rule each other out, which is still not clear to the Croatian side. The most important oversight in Croatia's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate can be explained by the following question: In which way can Croatia prevent minor "incidents from growing into war" without the influence and mediation of UNRPOFOR? Croatian politicians have no answer to this question unless we take the undefined grinning of Defence Minister Gojko Susak when possible military action is mentioned, as an answer.

The basis of peaceful integration which would keep war at the necessary distance at least for some time, is the economic agreement between the Croatian and the Serb side, signed in Zagreb and Knin on December 2, 1994 which is being implemented for quite some time in some of its aspects and in some areas. The importance of a sound economic situation in creating a reliable basis for political dialogue and its role in the peaceful settlement of the conflict is considered indispensable and unquestionable. Who doubts that and works against that calls in question the overall process of establishing final peace in these areas. UNPROFOR's continued stay is inevitably connected with this.

The best definition of the typical order in the establishment and maintenance of peace (with emphasis on trade) comes from Jacque Grinberg, senior official for political affairs at UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb, which he made at a recent gathering in the "European Center" entitled "Croatia and UNPROFOR". He says: "First, the military situation is stabilized, then starts the process of restoring normal life and promoting the economy, which means that enemies become trade partners, thus overcoming their mutual hostility and mistrust.

Political dialogue starts when people realize that they can gain more for themselves and their children through cooperation than animosity." The economic agreement, on which Jacque Grinberg insists so much (and not without reason) has in the last months realized a number of projects (and several more are planned by the end of March), which directly positively influences the negotiating positions of the conflicting sides and represents a basis for further political agreements; the Petrinja - Sisak water supply system, the railway through Okucani, the Meline - Obrovac power transmission line, the Obrovac - Kakma - Zadar - Biograd - Filip Jakov water supply system (by the end of the summer), and the Zagreb - Lipovac highway. UNPROFOR believes that nothing special will happen on March 31. That it will be given another chance, but with a somewhat changed mandate and that Croatia will, nonetheless, continue political negotiations seeking the peaceful settlement of the crisis.

The nationalistic radicals of the ruling HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) party plan March 31 quite differently than UNPROFOR. They see it primarily in UNPROFOR's hurried preparations definitively and finally to leave, with parallel quiet changes for the renewal of the war until the "final liberation of the occupied areas". Such ideas are extremely dangerous and are very attractive for the public which expects something, even be it bad. The moderate ones engage in politically more plausible reasoning. One of them is Miomir Zuzul, Croatian delegate to the United Nations in Geneva who, in the TV show "Picture versus Picture" announced that the Croatian government was giving thought to two possible solutions for UNPROFOR's remaining in Croatia.

• The first possibility is "for UNPROFOR to remain, but with less manpower". Only observers who would "monitor the truce and economic agreement" would stay. - The second solution considered by the Croatian side is a change of mandate, but with the "same number of staff" which would be defined by different international factors, and "not only the United Nations". Croatia would agree to one of those plans "if Croatia were recognized by Serbia and if that were no longer the mask and political pose which we are used to".

The only thing that is not clear is where the statement fits in of Vladimit Seks, representative of the radical - nationalistic fraction within the government, where he says that "the recognition of Croatia by Serbia would be the greatest possible revenge".

The current Croatian authorities do not place hope for a possible negotiating success in specific political instruments, but in something much less stable; "in the reason and voice of ordinary Serbian people who have had enough of war" (regular Press Conference of the President of the Republic). With this sentence Franjo Tudjman showed the absence of any strategy and confirmed the thesis following him from the very beginning - political predictability. The only existing strategy is that there is no specific strategy. What does Croatia really expect?

Is the termination of the mandate of the protection forces a wise decision of the political leadership or simply an unplanned manifestation of national frustration? However paradoxical it may seem, Croatia is simply "dreaming" about a new mandate for UNPROFOR, because the entire show of terminating its mandate was only a necessary poker bluff to improve Croatia's future negotiating positions. All international political factors who are fully aware that Croatia will not be able to manage without UNPROFOR for a long time to come, know that well. However, the Croatian leadership wishes once again to hear the old ingratiating song: "Confirm our borders and repeat once again who the master and who the servant is".

Political calculations on the part of the Croatian authorities undoubtedly exist, and are twofold. First, there is the fear that inflation might return due to the possible loss of the large revenues UNPROFOR leaves in Croatia and which would in the near future, due to the expected social unrest, endanger the existing authorities. Closely linked to inflation and fear of a general economic collapse (quite certain with the departure of the UN protection forces), is overt danger of war because of which all Croatia's credits abroad would be frozen and further investments (no matter how low they might be) prevented. That would put Croatia among the countries which would be written off.

There are frequent speculations about how much money UNPROFOR leaves in Croatia. Data show that UNPROFOR brings in a regular foreign currency inflow assessed between $ 2.5 to 3.0 million a day. Trade with INA only brought some $ 30 million last year, and HPT annually earns about $ 10 million on transactions with UNPROFOR, which ties the Croatian side to UNPROFOR's mandate whether it likes it or not. Then there is the question of this year's tourism (the largest inflow of foreign currency, the lion's share of which is spent by the Ministry of Defence) of which the Croatian state media paint a promising picture, although its this year's future does not seem bright.

The theses advanced in the media every day are inspired by repeating one and the same thing. Namely, that irrespective of UNPROFOR's departure, Croatia is preparing for a "booming touristic summer", that "preparations are evolving as usual", that "most arrangements have been made", and that "there will be no problems" with other foreign touristic partners. Indeed, "from the Austrian market there are more inquiries about touristic arrangements now" (beginning of February, note of the author) "than twenty days ago" (when Croatia had not yet terminated UNPROFOR's mandate; note of the author). On the one hand, most Croatian tourist agencies abroad are having immense problems with arrangements and on the other the Croatian state media are teeming with unrealistic pictures of the existing situation and of the economic consequences of terminating UNPROFOR's mandate.

At UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb we learned that even with "all the good will of the world it is only a question of time before the separation zone, without the presence of UNPROFOR, becomes a zone of open conflict".

The other political calculation of the Croatian authorities concerns the fear of the above stated fact which boils down to: What if UNPROFOR really leaves? That fear is justified and is difficult to control because the Croatian authorities really have no vision of the settlement and do not know how to end the crisis without UNPROFOR's assistance, unless the end of the crisis is understood as a bloody war feast for which Western governments will certainly have no understanding. That has been repeated on a number of occasions. For the first time Croatia has been put into a paradoxical position in which it will, even if the Serbs attack first, inevitably be called guilty (since it has denied UNPROFOR hospitality).

This thesis wrapped up in diplomatic vocabulary was recently advanced by the American Ambassador to Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, in an interview to the national weekly Globus.

However, all this will probably boil down to nothing. At the beginning of April President Tudjman will appear on state television and triumphantly inform the nation that a significant qualitative change in UNPROFOR's mandate to the benefit of Croatia has taken place and that the international community was forced to do that "due to the magnificent action of Croatian diplomacy". As always in the past, Franjo Tudjman will get a good price for his political coupons. The fear which scared everyone stiff till that moment has its logical path: from initial paranoia ("termination") to ("victory") farce. Everyone will then applaud the beloved President and forget what the front page of Vijesnik of January 23 looked like - "TUDJMAN: DEFINITE CANCELLATION OF UNPROFOR'S MANDATE".

ALEN ANIC