UNWANTED MARRIAGE

AIM, BEOGRAD, March 3, 1995

"Technical Coalition" of Nationalistic Opposition

None of the opposition nationalistic parties which have joined the so-called "technical coalition" for the sake of joint appearance at local elections actually wishes this coalition sincerely: neither the Serbian Radical Party, nor the Democratic Party of Serbia, not the Democratic Party. Although these parties support almost the same national program - Greater Serbia and ethnic cleansing - they have a long time ago become embedded state administration and the public opinion as separate political groups and elites. For that reason they are competition one for the other in economic deals and they all strive towards monopoly.

This war opposition block may be successful at local elections, but until they are called, it must first be politically maintained. Although minor parties also participate at local elections, and have representatives in local assemblies, these three big ones would certainly be given a chance to increase their influence on the authorities on account of minor parties. But, this need not happen, however, if at the next elections, minor parties decide to attack both the ruling Socialists and the war opposition for sharing the responsibility for the political and economic catastrophe of the nation. In that case, they might increase their share of participation in the authorities, at least on account of the Socialists. But, it is not impossible that they might even win the support of many oppositionists too who have until recently voted for the nationalists, because great disappointment with the opposition is also evident.

The Serbian Renewal Movement is for the time being refusing to join the nationalistic block. This party has a peaceful orientation and it strives to present itself as a civic party of the Serbs. It is exceptionally close to the European political solutions for the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina.

After five years of joint appearance at the elections with other parties, Vuk Draskovic, the leader of this party, is still not quite sure whether he should dare lead his party in an autonomous charge for votes at the next elections. He is not satisfied with the possible ten per cent of votes, because he is afraid that the other parties will win more. The Serbian Renewal Movement, although it was a coalition party in the 1990 and 1993 elections, has always taken care to surround itself with moderate nationalists and civic politicians. That is why Draskovic is hesitating to join nationalistic extremists now, Vojislav Seselj and Vojislav Kostunica, whose political orientation is dominating the concealed extremism of Zoran Djindjic.

The leaders of all the parties in the three-member coalition, and Draskovic outside it, are strong personalities. They are burdened with images of their own personal political significance, mission and messianism. Djindjic, the President of the Democratic Party is certainly least affected by this weakness, since he is a pragmatist having almost shockingly lenient interpretation of political morality and honesty. It has been an established fact for a long time that Draskovic does not think much of Djindjic's policy - but that he is afraid of it too. Many believe that these four men cannot last together for long.

There is still a long time left for political regrouping and independent tactical maneuvering until the federal elections in 1996. And there is even more time left until the republican elections in 1997. Although some tend to underestimate the significance of local elections which are also scheduled for 1997, they can be exceptionally useful for the nationalistic opposition block. Regardless whether the country is moving towards disintegration of central authorities or a change of the present ruler in Belgrade, municipal authorities play an irreplacable logistic role. Since the nationalistic block wishes to present itself in the public as the only opposition power, it will try to defeat the remaining opposition at municipal elections, and remain with no competition.

The nationalistic opposition block believes that it will gain the greatest force to fight Milosevic's Socialists, once the regime recognizes Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina. But, Milosevic will certainly not do it before he weakens the internal resistance in Serbia and removes the belligerent generals, unreliable policemen and diplomats. Milosevic is not in a hurry with the recognition of these states for other reasons as well: the status of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina has still not been resolved, and it is still not quite clear when Serbia will free itself of the sanctions of the United Nations. Milosevic would like to see excommunication of Serbia terminate before he recognizes Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, so as to avoid interpretation that Serbia has abandoned its dream on Greater Serbia due to pressures - but to make it appear that it has never even dreamt it. He is aware that recognition of these states and the political status of the Serbs in them will condition resolving of the problem with the Albanians in Kosovo - and he would not like having to take any obligations concerning it too soon. Negotiations of Belgrade with the international community on recognition of Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina will last not less than a year, and during that time the opposition nationalistic block will be exposed to greatest temptations in the attempt to survive, awaiting the final strike of Milosevic. Before abandoning the dream about Greater Serbia, if the President of Serbia manages to draw attention of the public, by skilful propaganda, to internal economic and social issues in Serbia, he will successfully diminish the energy of the opposition and force it to deal with Serbia instead of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Croatian Serbs.

The nationalistic block has been chosen by Independent Television "Studio B" to defend it against the threats of Milosevic's Socialists that it would be returned into state ownership. These parties are incomparably superior to non-nationalistic parties and anti-war groups. But, the nationalists need "Studio B" in order to support of Karadzic in Bosnia and Martic in Knin, and not in order to prove that they are in favour of the freedom of the press and television. Indeed, Seselj openly says that the concept of freedom of the media must be interpreted in accordance with national interests supported by his party. The nationalists will not get involved in a risky conflict with the authorities on account of TV "Studio B", before the authorities say goodbye to Serbian warriors across the Drina and the Danube. The nationalists will not fight for free television, but for their own nationalistic program. Therefore, they will not develop a full political front against Milosevic until he is strongly engaged in favour of the "Serbian cause" outside Serbia, or they will see themselves as traitors and capitulants. Their primary objective is an all-Serbian union, and then resolution of internal political problems in Serbia.

Of course, this nationalistic block forces other parties to reconsider what their political tactics should be and whether they should unite. But, there is little probability that the numerous minor parties will unite, just as there is little probability that the nationalistic block can resist for long to internal centrifugal forces and its program weaknesses.

Dragan Veselinov