WHAT AFTER MILOSEVIC SAID 'NO'

Contact Group at a Stalemate Again

Summary: At the meeting with the European emissaries, President Milosevic has in fact refused to accept their latest peace plan, and the international community does not seem to dare admit it. Milosevic could make up his mind to accept recognition, if he knew that it would not jeopardize his power. There are differences in viewpoints between Washington and the European countries.

AIM, Belgrade, March 4, 1995 Having met with President Milosevic on Wednesday, representatives of three European countries - members of the Contact Group, said to the journalists briefly: "The dinner was good". They were not ready to offer any other comments to the representatives of the press who had waited for hours in front of the building of the Presidency of Serbia in order to learn the results of the "latest bargaining" of the international Community with Milosevic.

The very next day, referring to diplomatic sources, pre press started to report about the failure of the attempt of representatives of Great Britain, France and Germany to convince Milosevic to accept the latest plan and recognize Bosnia and Croatia in return for suspension of the sanctions. On Thursday, a Western diplomat declared in Belgrade that Milosevic primarily opposed the sequence of moves, demanding first lifting of the sanctions, and then the beginning of talks concerning mutual recognition of former Yugoslav republics. According to the same source, President of Serbia said that it would be very difficult "to implement in practice" recognition of Bosnia and Croatia, even if he reached a decision in favour of such a resolution.

Reuter agency which carried assessments of British officials from London on Thursday, according to whom Milosevic had definitely said no, on Friday broadcast a statement of a British diplomat in Belgrade, Ivory Roberts, according to whom the doors for negotiations have afer all remained open, although Milosevic had not agreed to be the first to make the move and recognize Bosnia and Croatia.

It seems that, like on so many previous occasions, after a series of diplomatic efforts, the international community has driven into a blind alley again and now simply, does not know what to do. The mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia is coming to an end, and sporadic violations of ceasefire in Bosnia&Herzegovina are becoming more systematic and intense as spring is approaching. A new war is looming, and it seems that the world is afraid to admit that the days of another diplomatic initiative concerning Bosnia are counted off.

Disagreement among the allies

Milosevic's complaint that at this moment he simply could not recognize Bosnia&Herzegovina was taken seriously by the head of Russian diplomacy, Andrey Kozirev. According to what Belgrade weekly NIN wrote, he supported the idea that first a meeting of Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic ought to be organized and that they should sign a declaration which would oblige them not to resolve disputes by force. Then all the sanctions would be lifted, and after that, mutual recognition would come on the agenda. Such an idea certainly sits Milosevic, but it is hard to believe that the other four countries-members of the Contact Group would agree to it. Practically all the participants in the conflict in former Yugoslavia so far have signed various declarations, but they have never adhered to any of them.

European countries, primarily France and Great Britain, are also showing a certain level of understanding for the position Milosevc is in. According to diplomatic sources in Belgrade, in bargaining with the President of Serbia, London and Paris were even ready to agree to lifting of all the sanctions in exchange for recognition of Bosnia&Herzegovina and Croatia. Washington, though, has a much harder stance and does not agree to lifting, but just gradual suspension of the sanctions. It seems also that the Americans have a different view of the authorities in Sarajevo, as well. Namely, a serious controversy has arisen among the Western partners due to alleged delivery of arms to Bosnian Muslims via Tuzla airport, behind which are the Americans. UNPROFOR and the UN stated that they have "no data about it", but a number of journals in the West claim just the opposite.

Views on Bosnia

There is plenty of reason to believe that there are serious differences in views on Bosnia&Herzegovina as a state. Washington starts from the presumtion that it is a recognized state, that matters are quite clear and that it is simply necessary to exert pressure on all those who oppose its recognition, or even offer military support to the internationally recognized authorities. European countries, which have a different experience in complicated Balkan relations, demand a more cautious and pragmatic approach. Although they do not wish to admit it officially, they start from the fact that there are three bellicose parties in Bosnia, and that one of them is certainly the leadership of Bosnian Serbs. From that aspect, matters are not so clear and simple as from the one Washington is approaching, so that meeting all the requirements made by the current authorities in Sarajevo is not acceptable.

Milosevic is certainly aware of these differences among the allies and this makes him firm in his decision to refuse to accept the latest peace proposals. He also does not believe that mutual recognition of former Yugoslav republics would lead to a final peace in Bosnia and Croatia and he said so to the Contact Group. As a pragmatic politician, he would have even consented to recognition, had he been certain that this would not lead to his loss of power.

Naturally, Belgrade prefers much better the more flexible stances of European countries. Milosevic needs time to break Karadzic's resistance, and he considers lifting of the sanctions to be the best weapon to achieve this. He obviously assesses that in such conditions he would have enough arguments to exert the decisive pressure on Bosnian Serbs and force Pale to accept the plan of the Contact Group.

Generally speaking, the authorities in Belgrade cannot recognize Bosnia and Croatia if Bosnian and Krajina Serbs do not do it in this or that way. Milosevic is aware that, due to international circumstances, he will have to accept recognition in the end and that is the reason why he hectically strives to replace Karadzic and provide greater influence for himself in Pale, but in Knin too. He knows that his power in Belgrade would remain unshaken only if the Serbs on the other side of the Drina river adopt the decision on recognition.

No matter how it fears continuation of the conflict, the West cannot take the risk of lifting the sanctions in exchange for a promise that recognition of Bosnia and Croatia would follow. After all, the official stance of Belgrade has remained unchanged - former Yugoslav republics can be recognized only when the nations which live in them agree and find a political solution.

Dragan Janjic