D-DAY AS THE DAY AFTER

AIM, ZAGREB, February 22, 1995 If it is not a question of further insisting on the new Croat resoluteness promoted by Dr. Franjo Tudjman himself on January 12 by withdrawing the mandate of UNPROFOR, it is difficult to look through what actually lies behind Croat rejection of the Z-4 plan. The few positive points Zagreb earned - after an avalanche of negative ones for the dismissal of peace forces - by a considerably rational attitude towards the Z-4 plan and accepting it as a starting point for negotiations, now that it has rejected the plan, have all melted again. The surprise is even greater because, due to the fact that Martic, Babic and Mikelic have not only refused to accept the plan but refused to even take it from the hands of Peter Galbraith and the other diplomats from the mini-contact group, the hot potato had remained in Knin. Cooperativeness for not refusing the plan could have been useful for Croatia at absolutely no cost. Since Knin had refused the plan, Croatia could have squeezed out changes which would have saved her honour in the face of its domestic public and showed that it had managed to convince the international community that it had not been ready to go below certain limits.

But, after the initial hesitation concerning the Z-4 plan, summarized in the formula "yes, but", Zagreb has decided to join Knin, so Galbraith and the other ambassadors got a slap on the other cheek: something like good neighbours who went to reconcile a quarrelling couple fighting in their apartment, who then turned their common rage against the conciliators.

Now that Zagreb too has rejected what was offered it by Z-4 plan, the only thing left for Croat diplomacy to do is to keep repeating like a parrot that departure of the blue helmets does not mean a war option, but on the contrary, further negotiations which might even accelerate because of it. What negotiations? Offering what and to whom? If Knin does not wish to negotiate about the Z-4 plan, offered by the international community, which quite certainly offers incomparably more than what Croatia will ever be ready to offer, why would it ever accept offers from Zagreb whose negotiating basket will with no doubt be much poorer.

The thesis according to which Tudjman has reached the decision about sending UNPROFOR off after he had got a secret hint from the Serbian President Milosevic, interpreted as his readiness to deliver the Serbs from Krajina to Zagreb, might have been true, especially if Milosevic had asked as a counterservice from Tudjman to distance himself from Izetbegovic. If it had ever existed, such an offer must have been extremely attractive for the Croat President. It had the same attractiveness as the apple for which Adam was expelled from paradise: Milosevic would give him back "Krajina", and he would also get the so much wished for portion of Bosnia of his "own". But, as even Tudjman is aware that he is not a player who can dribble the international community like Milosevic, he realized that after dismissal of UNPROFOR, a sudden estrangement with Izetbegovic and a possible new war with the Muslims would be a little bit too much even for the few Croat friends who are ready to wink at his mistakes. That is probably, why Tudjman has changed his mind, if the mentioned thesis holds (especially after Munich where Croatia was explicitly warned to leave the apple from paradise which would pay off normalization of relations with Belgrade by a bite of Bosnia). Milosevic has indeed scored again, because Tudjman who has dismissed UNPROFOR cannot turn back any more. Chances for war after departure of the peace forces will be greatly increased, and in a recent interview, the American Ambassador, Peter Galbraith, clearly stated that, should war break out, Croatia will be taken responsible. Besides, should war break out, Croatia will not be able to count on American help.

The analysis not long ago presented by Karl Gorinsek, a retired general who was the commander of the most sensitive part of the Croatian front - the one in Slavonija and Baranja - conicide with the repeated statement of the American Ambassador in Zagreb that Croatia is still militarily inferior to Serbia. Gorinsek claims that Serbia is three times more powerful than Croatia and supports this by specific data on the number of airplanes, tanks, heavy arms, but menpower too. The head of the General Staff of Croatian Army, Janko Bobetko, just waved his hand at this, but indirectly confirmed what Galbraith and Gorinsek warn about. Bobetko said that it was not all in the armament - motivation, training and togetherness of the nation are more powerful than the "bright arms". Persistent Croat emphasizing that there is a wish to reintegrate "Krajina" peacefully, is obviously motivated by this consciousness, but what will happen if withdrawal of UNPROFOR provokes a situation which might get out of hand and turn into a new escalation of war. Such an incident could most likely occur at the very point where detante between Knin and Zagreb has reached its peak - at the part of the highway which passes through UNPA "West". It is not clear at all, should UNPROFOR leave, who will take over control of the 21 kilometres of the highway, so it cannot be excluded that Martic may reach a decision about its closing down again. This is obviously a perfect opportunity for igniting a new war.

Croatia does not even have any specific proposal of a "Z-4 plan of its own". Nobody from the state administration came out with any plan for peaceful reintegration which would list elements, not just a series of political phrases, for the rights "according to the highest world standards" which Zagreb offers Knin. Croatia will probably never come out with such a plan. And today, interpreters of official Croatian politics claim that everything that can be offered the Serbs from "Krajina" is already included in the peace initiative of President Tudjman and the Constitutional Law on minorities. But, these are just principles with no specific solutions, far from the operational Z-4 plan. It would be in a way convenient for Croatia if someone else came out with the plan for reintegration of UNPA, but now that such a plan was rejected, something else should be offered. Is Croatia capable of something of the kind?

One of the reasons, maybe the most important one, why Croatia refused the Z-4 plan is certainly the fact that its adoption would inevitably open the extremely unplesant question: if we are offering the Serbs in "Krajina" the "state within the state", why did not we agree to much less in 1991. The war might have been avoided, and even if not, nobody could have blamed Croatia for anything concerning rights of the Serb ethnic minority. Because they would have got what they had asked for (their demand at the time was limited to cultural autonomy), so that their "revolution" with barricades of beams across the road near Knin would have been ridiculous. Therefore the question of special money for "Krajina", and other "state" insignia such as the flag, the coat of arms, borders and its own parliament is not unacceptable for Croatia because Martic would get his "state within state" (by a wise policy of democratic opening with a tinge of economic power Croatia would make all that unnecessary in a few years anyway), but because of the unpleasant question just mentioned.

The fact that Tudjman has managed to homegenize the people again by his dismissal of UNPROFOR, to the extent which reminds only of the election victory of the HDZ in 1990, is now maintained by the thesis that the whole world has united against Croatia. The rich experience of Milosevic's propaganda founded on the resistance against "world conspiracy" is falling on fertile ground here too. At the latest press conference of the Croat President, he answered in the affirmative to a suggestive question of a journalist of one of the state media who asked him was not the American Ambassador Galbraith interfering with the internal affairs of Croatia. Tudjman did confirm this just indirectly, probably not to antagonize the Americans too much, by saying that some people in Croatia think so. The favourite platitude of former leaders of countries of real socialism about "interfering with the internal affairs" which has now come to life in Croatia sounds ridiculous: what interference means in a country patrolled by foreign military troops, whose one third is controlled by rebels, and foreign ambassadors propose a plan of reintegration which inevitably calls for writing of a new constitution.

The campaign led in the good old Communist times in Croatia (and Yugoslavia) against the harmful influnce of the West is circling Croatia again in a completely new form. The rigid law on young people, the tumult about rock 'n' roll and the Western music, the law on the names of enterprises which are forbidden to have foreign words in them, are all just a part of a wide front against the influence of the "decadent West". Although it all reminds of watering flowers in the garden while the house is on fire, it is obviously an intentional system of preparing the nation for the times which are coming. It is easier to homogenize the nation - as the instances from the close neighbourhood show - when it realizes that the enemies are all around, and the theory of "world conspiracy" is equally pleasant to Croat as it is to Serb ears. There is really nothing more pleasant for a small nation than when it challenges the world powers, their diplomacies and the frightening armed forces. Such a pleasure is worth starving, and dying and fighting for. The psychiatrist Karadzic knows it best, because what Milosevic had started he had improved and patented. There are already those who would like to get a licence to use it.

DRAGO HEDL