HELP OR THREAT

AIM, ZAGREB, February 13, 1995

It seems that President Tudjman had a lot of trouble in the course of last week to check all the malcontents in the party leadership of his own Croatian Democratic Communty (HDZ). A public statement arrived from the session of the Presidency of this party, which included a sentence which stood out of the rest. "We are concerned for each member of the HDZ, but if somebody does not adhere to the fundamental provisions of the program policy of the HDZ and the Statute of the Party, the Presidency thinks that he/she may leave the party" - claimed the collective leader of the HDZ, in which the absolute domination of Tudjman was not shaken even by several open attempts of the radical right wing to impose itself as the dominant.

It could be heard afterwards among the journalists that another such attempt occurred at the last week's session, when a few members of the Presidency demanded that Croatia reject the Z-4 plan and accelerate preparations for a new war. Tudjman rejected this in a raised voice, pushing through the conclusion that the Z-4 plan should be treated as before - it remained "the starting point" for negoiationa (which was a phrase, introduced and promoted by Karadzic, as it seems), but everything leading to federalization or confederalization of Croatia was rejected, or rather, everything that exceeded the limits of the Constitutional Law on Minorities pursuant to which three years back Croatia had given a comparatively high autonomy to the Serbs, as one of the conditions for its international recognition. Tudjman's unquestioned authority was sufficient guarantee that this would be adopted, but the mntioned differences in the Presidency of the HDZ are not the onluy problem awaiting yje Croatian Prsident. The wore is the one he had with himself.

Adoption of the Z-4 plan, even conditionally, means that the UNPROFOR will remain as one of the chief subjects in charge of implementation of this plan, and its is a well-established fact that Tudjman decided more than a month ago that it should leave. The decision becomes effective on March 31, that is in less tha a month and a half. In this short period of time, Tudjman will have to harmonize with Tudjman and the prevailing inclination of the public and the opposition which have mostly supported his decision to show the UN peace forces the door. Even the strictest critics of Tudjman's decision in the world, such as the German foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, admit it will be hard for him to take back this decision, and this was justified by the latest public appearances of the Croatian President after the mentioned session of the Presidency of the HDZ. Namely, not long after that, he said at a press conference that changing of the decision about the departure of the UNPROFOR could not even be taken into consderation, even if Croatia were guaranteed recognition by the FR of Yugoslavia, which is has insisted on for several months.

Although this sounds as resolute as can be, this is the first indication that underneath the green diplomatic table attempts have been going on to "buy off" the dismissal of the UNPROFOR by a sufficiently great concession in favour of Croatia in order to make it agree to reconsider its decision at least in its radical and unconditional form. It still cannot be discerned what concession it could be, but it is evident that representatives of the Z-4 group are striving to assist Tudjman to make this diplomatic deal and receive the least possible number of blows. Sudden abandoning the decision to send the "blue helmets" away could actually create a feeling of collective frustration in the Croatian public, that the state leadership had "capitulated" and gambled away its feelings (according to certain polls, which cannot be checked easily, 86 per cent of the citizens supported this decision), and the international mediators would find that more difficult to tackle than obstinacy of the leadership.

That is how one should explain the fact that the three ambassadors in Zagreb who are directly involved in elaboration of this plan, the American Galbraith, Russian Kerestejianz and French Gaillarde, have given an unusually large number of interviews to Croatian state media, in fact five altogether. They all expressed extreme concern because of the Croatian decision and underlined that the risk of withdrawal of peace forces would affect both parties, but much more the Croatian. Since it is hard to believe that such a large number of interviews in the most controlled media (two on TV, one in Vjesnik and one in Vecernji list) could be publicized without a sign from the state leaders, it can be concluded that Tudjman wished to create the impression that the pressure exerted on him is not dimishing, but on the contrary, that it is increasing. This could make a possible revision of his decision easier, because the public could see for itself that the best task force of world diplomacy is "charging" at the resolute Croatian President, which even he can hardly resist.

The opposition, which has mostly accepted the dismissal of UNPROFOR, seems to have become suspicious about it. Zdravko Tomac (SDP) protested in the Assembly because of the "ambassadors forming" the public opinion, while the opposition is clearly informed that its opinion will not be taken into account. This reproach is obviously aimed to use the troubles of Tudjman and the ruling party if they soon appear in the public with a proposal to "capitulate". But, this would make sense only if the opposition could significantly influence formation of public opinion, which is not the case, but rather just the opposite, namely, that the opposition is just accepting the stereotype of public opinion which is mostly still formed by the HDZ. That is why it appears that the opposition has, in fact, been able to affect main political flows less and less in the past few months, so that when it believes that it has taken a position at the greatest distance in relation to the ruling party, it is, on the contrary, drawn into its orbit more than ever, with the least possible chances to free itself from its grip.

Leaders of the main opposition parties who have often kept company of leading members of the diplomatic corps in Zagreb, have now mostly closed their doors to them and in this way strenghtened Tudjman's position, who is now, willingly or not, considered abroad as the only sound partner that can seriously be dealt with. There are even speculations in this sense that some foreign partners (the USA are explicitly mentioned) who are silently accepting Tudjman's dismissal of the peace forces, using it, together with the Army of B&H, as a means of pressuring Milosevic and the Serbs to make concessions first in the B&H and then in Croatia too. But, this bold presumption can hardly be reconciled with the cooperativeness manifested by the members of Z-4, and mostly by the Americans and the Russians whose representatives seem to be arranging and synchronizing some of their key arguments which they are offering to Croatia in order to help it accept their plan and change its mind concerning the departure of the UN peace forces. Galbraith and Kerestejianz both issued a warning in their mentioned last week's interviews that the war option would mean not only war with the Serbs from Krajina, which could readily be "digested" here according to the majority of Croatian analysts, but with Serbia as well, whose army would most probably cross the Danube and take positions in Baranja and Eastern Slavonija.

This is a clear warning that Milosevic has not given up his territorial aspirations in relation to Croatia, and Galbraith was even blunt enough to say that Croatia would have to count on remaining "completely isolated" because its dismissal of the UNPROFOR would be considered as its initiation of a new war cycle. A more direct and more serious warning has not been addressed at Zagreb for a long time, but as things are now, as already said, this could rather be interpreted as a form of help offered to Tudjman than a threat.

MARINKO CULIC