SCENARIO OF A WAR

AIM, ZAGREB, February 7, 1995 Almost a month has elapsed since the decision of the Croat President, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, to call off the mandate of the UNPROFOR, an yet it is still not clear what this move really means and what its consequences will be. Almost all reactions of the world were negative and they claimed that departure of UN units could be an introduction into a new Croat-Serb war, whereby Croatia would lose many political strategic points in the Balkan game of chess. After Croatia had accepted the Z-4 plan, at least as a pattern for further negotiations, with some of its high state officials even assessing it as not too bad, Croatia had somewhat improved its rating and another component was included in the already complicated situation. Namely, opposition of the Serbs to the Croat decision to dismiss the UNPROFOR, and at the same time their rejection of the Z-4 plan even as a starting point, upset all previous assessments and suddenly, instead of Croatia, made the Serbs appear as supporters of the war.

Croatia was most interested in departure of the UNPROFOR, because in that way it would be able to restore the occupied regions protected by the "blue helmets", by military force if necessary. But, only under one precondition - by somehow keeping the FRY and Karadzic's Serbs at a distance. The assessments were that the Serbs were also in favour of the definite departure of the "blue helmets", but under the condition that noone fills in the empty space, especially not an even greater and different force, such as the NATO. The Serb party is very well aware of of the danger, as well as of the one which would threaten them after lifting of the arms ambargo for the Croat or the Boshniak party. In such a case, the Serbs would be forced to be the first to start an offensive against the Croat-Bosniak party, of all available forces on land, in the air and at sea, in order to win a quick, new victory, which would this time be decisive. This would enable them to strengthen their negotiating position in imposing the final solution of the Serb issue in the former Yugoslav space.

The Croat party is, of course, also aware of the danger, because after the withdrawal of the UN, the Croat skies would again be open to the Serbs who would be given the opportunity to use their enormous advantage in air-force, and at sea they would be given the opportunity to use the remains of the still considerably preserved former Yugoslav navy.

But, although the assessments also claim that there would be no winners in such a possible new conflict, and that one could hardly expect it would happen at all, because the NATO operation of rescuing and pulling out the "blue helmets" is actually much more than what it stands for, so that everything is pointing towards diplomatic solutions, war is not completely out of the question. Possibilities for its breaking out are at a minimum according to ones, while the others claim that it is inevitable, because no war has ever ended without a winner, and the world cannot acknowledge war conquests as an accomplished fact. What would such a war actually bring? What would its outcome be and what would be the casualties?

In the war which was fought in Croatia in 1991-92, but actually lasted a lot longer, until this day, several cities were destroyed, among which, apart from Vukovar, Pakrac, Lipik, Gospic, Osijek, Vinkovci, Zadar, Dubrovnk fared the worst, and numerous smaller towns and villages. According to the data presented by Tudjman not long ago, Croatia has suffered direct material damage amounting to 22 billion dollars, but the real damage is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that Croatian economy is now at the level of just 55 per cent of what it used to be before the war, although this does not mean that it should all be attributed to the war. There were 8,882 killed persons and 2,820 disappeared on the Croat side, and 26,448 wounded, out of which 17,802 have been disabled. In B&H, Croatia had 6,197 victims, 213 disappeared and 11,705 wounded casualties.

It is difficult to assess how many victims there were on the Boshniak side, because at first they were civilians and victims of a classic genocide, but general Karl Gorinsek assesses that the Boshniak army had 45,000 dead and 87,000 wounded out of which 30,000 were disabled until October 1994. According to the same assessments, the FR of Yugoslavia lost 30,000 soldiers, the so-called "Republic of Srpska" 29,000, and the "Republic of Serb Krajina" 10,000 soldiers, which sums up to 69,000 dead or nine thousand more that the Croats and the Bosniaks put together. At the same time, all three Serb parties in the conflict had about 90,000 wounded, which is by three thousand more than among the Croats and the Boshniaks. This means that only military losses of all the parties in the conflict reach the figure of almost 130 thousand casualties and 177 thousand wounded, so that one can hardly speak of a small-scale war. And all this was happening, presuming that the assessments of general Gorinsek are correct, at the time when only the Serb party was armed and when both Croats and Boshniaks were almost completely unarmed. It would therefore be interesting to see what would a possible war bring at this moment (the assessments from October 1994)?

According to these assessments, the Republic of Croatia has 85 thousand soldiers and officers, the Croatian Defense Council has 40 thousand, and the Army of B&H 210 thousand, making the total of 335 thousand armed men. The other side is just slightly stronger when it comes to figures: FR Yugolsavia has 185 armed men, "Republic of Srpska" 135 thousand, and the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" 38 thousand, which makes the total of 358 thousand. But, the assessments of the possible magnitude of the armed forces in a total war would be essentially different, because the Croats and the Boshniaks could raise an army of 700 thousand men, and all three Serb "states" even 1,655,000, out of which the greatest part (1,400,000) would be from FR Yugoslavia.

The ratio of armamemnt and equipment is also out of proportion, because the Croats and the Boshniaks have 280 tanks, and the Serb party ten times more. The Croat-Boshniak party has 1760 cannon-howitzers and heavy mortars, and the Serb as much as 6900, and the Croats and Boshniaks have 225 armour-piercing cannons, while the Serbs have 3120. There is practically no type of arms which the Serbs are not at an advantage with, which is best illustrated by the fact that they have 448 fighter planes and 171 helicopter, while their opponents (all under the precondition that they would be on the same side) have 29 planes and 12 helicopters.

The situation might have changed in the meantime, but the Croats and the Muslims could hardly have reduced this enormous difference in the equipment, and managed to reach, for example, the fantastic figure of 2900 launchers of anti-air rockets in relation to 480 they had, and not to mention the quantities and the types of rockets the Serb party has at its disposal.

Although the threat of general Bobetko that Croat army can bombard Belgrade is, therefore, quite possible, the fact that the Serbs can shoot and destroy Zagreb, Karlovac, Zadar, Sibenik, Dubrovnik, Sisak, Slavonski Brod... is even more correct. The question is whether these big Croat cities have any anti-rocket and anti-airraid defense, because it is well-known that all the defense systems, even the one which defended Zagreb, were dismantled and destroyed by the JNA when it was withdrawing. It would be a terrible war in which the war arsenals would be constantly supplemented, and which would bring even greater destruction and an enormous number of casualties. The army of the FRY is the one which would tip the balance in it, because it certainly would not remain neutral, but it can also be assumed that the Croats and the Muslims would not be left in the lurch by their potential allies.

Aware of all this, the Croat party has obviously chosen the peaceful option and an attempt to force the Serbs by negotiations to enter its state, even if it will have to give them much more than it is actually ready to do. The tactics is to get rid of the "Knin ulcer", and then see what to do next, because in that case, its soft belly would harden, and military operations would move further away from the vital part of the state, deeper into Bosnia, and closer to Serbia, with a much greater depth of the scene of war than the present fifteen kilometres from the "krajina" to the Slovenian border, for instance.

Each war has its logic, its ups and downs, and, its end, of course. The key issue is how exhausted, economically and psychologically, the warring parties are at the moment, and whether the collapse that threatens them will bring peace. Will it be just a breathing space for a new war, for a final settling of accounts? Or perhaps, the balance of fear, exhaustion and depletion will after all lead to some kind of peace? Concerning Croatia, one could say that this day is nearer every day, but one could not say so for Bosnia, because the Boshniak casualties are so great that they can hardly agree to the present version of a just peace. And in that case, it might easily happen that Croatia would enter a new war conflict even in an agreement with the Serbs, just as it is likely that it would fight a war against the Serbs together with the Boshniaks.

Therefore, an answer to the opening question: what does departure of the UNPROFOR bring, can hardly be given, because, afer all, it had never been an obstacle for war operations, either in Croatia (Maslenica, Medacki dzep), or in Bosnia&Hezregovina. It will depend on the local leaders and their assessments, and of course, the relation of forces, both domestic and international ones.

And yet, peace is possible even at international dictation, as quite a few such examples in history show, although it was always tricky and bore the germs of new war conflicts. In any case, if anything in the Balkans is predictable at all, Croatia could soon sail into calm waters, but it will hardly ever be capable of ensuring for itself such an exclusive position of an observer (or a fan) as Slovenia has done.

GOJKO MARINKOVIC