KOSOVO: WHAT NEXT?

The closer the beginning of the outcome of the Kosovo crisis, the more nervous its protagonists are. Since the world powers seem to have already reached a consensus concerning the principles of resolving the issue of Kosovo, and diplomatic pressures to have their compromising proposal adopted as the basis for Serb-Albanian negotiations are increasing, both Belgrade and Prishtina are busily looking for modes how real answers for the temptations that are in line for them could be found.

In both cases these pressures are causing primarily problems of "internal regrouping", since they objectively are an attack on "idylls" of national homogenizations. As it is well-known, both in Belgrade and in Prishtina full national consensus still persists. Both national platforms are "maximalist" and, of course, exclude each other. Prishtina sees the solution in independence of Kosovo and guarantees that national and cultural rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo will be protected. On the other hand, the offcial and the opositionist Belgrade considers Kosovo an indivisible part of Serbia and it is ready to talk only about a possible cultural autonomy for the Albanians.

The compromising formula of the world powers prescribes a solution in which Kosovo would remain within Serbia/Yugoslavia, but with a very high degree of political self-administration and elements of statehood. This is a bitter pill for both parties to swallow, if they do not wish to go to war.

Announcements of a compromise have returned most radical forces on to the political scene. The first to come forward were the leaders of the Kosovo "Serb resistance movement" from the eighties. They got organized again and alarmed the public, among other, due to the weakly and unconvincing announcements of the regime that concessions could be granted to the Albanians. Milosevic promised to a British diplomat in May 1994, that "there will be no problems with the autonomy of Kosovo". The Serbs in Kosovo, however, reject all possibilities of a compromise. They demand unity in national and state policy for the sake of defense of the "Serb Kosovo". The idea about establishment of a Serb National Council has been renewed, whose task would be to prevent "trading with national interests".

And yet, renewal of the "Serb resistance movement" has not nearly the effect it had in mid eighties, when Milosevic, carried on its shoulders, won absolute power in Serbia. The situation is different now, not only because Milosevic's regime has changed its political course in relation to Bosnia, but because Serbia has largely spent, in the internal and the external sphere, political and military credits it had. And just as the issue of Bosnia caused a certain split among the Serbs, it is quite possible that something similar will occur concerning Kosovo. Contours of a split can already be discerned between political realists who are ready for certain deviations and compromises on one, and radical factions who are against any agreement with the Albanians on the other side. At the moment, however, Milosevic is introducing a new wave of police repression and preparing for a massive colonization of Kosovo with a hundred thousand Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia. Is this simply tactics intended to prevent union of the opposition concerning the issue of Kosovo, or Milosevic intends to persist in his same rigid and forcible stance about Kosovo which he had started his political ascent with, remains to be seen. Maybe Milosevic himself has started to believe the fatalistic forecasts about him that everything has begun for him in Kosovo, and that is where everything will end.

A similar conflict between the "realists" and radical factions has started to emerge on the surface lately among the Albanians as well. Direct cause for conflicts was a letter of the American President Bill Clinton sent to Eliot Engel and Susan Milinari, Co-Chairmen of the Board for Kosovo. These two Albanian lobbyists in the American Congress asked the American President in December what the standpoint of his administration was cenocerning Kosovo, and what it would actually do to have this problem solved. In answer to their questions, Clinton summarized American views about Kosovo, specifying some of the topics which had previously just been indicated, such as the list of conditions for lifting of the sanctions against Serbia/ Yugoslavia. "There is a certain number of issues, including Kosovo, which I believe should be considered before Belgrade would be freed of the United Nations sanctions and returned into the international community", Clinton says, emphasizing in particular the fact that "Belgrade is aware of our seriousness concerning Kosovo", and that "efforts are made now to return the permanent mission of the OSCE to Kosovo". Clinton then informs the congressmen that the American Government will continue with sending humanitarian aid to Kosovo, that he supports opening of a representative office of Kosovo in Washington D.C., and that opening of such an American office in Kosovo is also planned, when conditions which would guarantee safety of American personnel over there are created.

Clinton has obviously said extremely significant things about Kosovo. For the first time it is verified that lifting of the sanctions against Serbia is, if not strictly a conditioned, but certainly connected with the consideration of the situation in Kosovo. If the President of the world's greatest power which has the right of veto in the Security Council says so, it is not naive at all. And the decision on opening an office is also indicative and very significant, all the more so because the same initiative has appeared in Bonn, and the Kosovo Committee which gathers French intellectuals, demands opening od an office of Kosovo in France from Badinter's Government. (By the way, the Kosovo Committee nominated Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovo leader, for Nobel Peace prize.) But, there is a sentence in Clinton's letter which disturbed spirits in Kosovo. He writes: "However, althogh the USA do not support independence of Kosovo, we are resolute in the efforts to restore human and political rights to the people in Kosovo, where Dr. Ibrahim Rugova has played a significant and admirable role. Refusal of violence and patience in relation to Serb repression prove his courage and fore-sight."

This means, that the person who represents the world's greatest power, said that independence of Kosovo would get no support. This stance of the international community was known in Kosovo before, but eyes were shut to it and it was not taken seriously. However, after Clinton's letter, it cannot be disregarded any more. In the meantime, the prime minister of the Kosovo government in exile, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, in an interview published by the Kosovo weekly "Zeri", confirmed that "the West still does not support our demand for independence".

Circles close to Rugova tried to conceal the unpleasant echo of this part of Clinton's letter by their old tactics of emphasizing only favourable stances in American and internaltional policy. More sophisticated analyses, however, point out to certain ambiguity of Clinton's views. On the one hand, he actually does not support independence of Kosovo at this moment. But, on the other, the very fact that he expresses admiration towards Rugova and considers his policy far-seeing, indicates that he actually supports gradual effectuation of independence of Kosovo, since independence of Kosovo is the essence of Rugova's "far-seeing policy". (If, of course, which is hardly probable, he has another, secret and "capitulatory" policy which he is sometimes accused of by his internal opponents.)

Prime minister Bukoshi reasons in this sophisticated way when he says: "The West keeps reassuring us that it will not allow us to be massacred because of our demand for independence. Kosovo is definitely not considered to be an internal issue of Serbia. That is how we have reached a point when we must study the tactics by which we can make our strategic goal come true: independence of Kosovo." But, Bukoshi also warns: "We are hoping and we trust the West, but our trust is not blind. The example of Bosnia has shown how much blind faith may be costly. In Bosnia, everybody broke the principles and institutions of international law."

In the mentioned interview, prime minister Bukoshi puts the crucial question: "What next?" He speaks about the following dilemma: "It is true that a conflict has been avoided, which is very significant. We were even given credit for our contribution to avoiding an open conflict. But, now, as if a fetish has been made out of it. The question is, what next? Serbia has abused our patience. Independence is acquired by making a great and good impression, and diplomacy and peace policy are just a part of it. When we say Kosovo is occupied, it means that we should think about the ways to liberate it." Bukoshi does not go into consequences of this stance, but in passing and in a different context, he mentions the war option as well, anticipating that the army of Kosovo could mobilize about 300 thousand fighters.

Bukoshi does not state his opinion about the offer of autonomy, though. A reconciliatory statement was attributed to him once and he was sharply criticized for it. He is now taking the opposite stance accusing the other faction of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK), pointing to its Vice-President, Dr Fehmi Agani, as the one who is against the government as an institution and that he is the one who is propagating the option of accepting autonomy. Bukoshi claims that Agani has recently declared in Germany, at a gathering of the DSK, that "Kosovo government was established just for formal and symbolical reasons, so that we could say we have a government too". Agani denied this immediately. Concerning the conflict between Bukoshi and Agani, a commentator of the weekly "Zeri" concludes that this is in afct a race for the second position inside the DSK and the Albanian movement, since the first is still held by the inviolable Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.

But, in an article also published in "Zeri", Fehmi Agani states a sophisticated argument about the profile of the new world order as the stage where the principle of self-determination of enslaved and divided nations will be affirmed, those nations which were treated as minorities at the mercy of of states where they happened to live. Agani quotes American professor Ronnen who opposed the views of Mihailo Markovic on minority rights at a recently held gathering at the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts. The status of a minority will not even exist in the new world order "because these groups wish to be their own masters, in all the spheres of life". Agani is among those who are in favour of an optimistic version of creating a new, better and more stable world order, but he too sees the solution for Kosovo in its independence. He is just more open to evaluation of the ways how to achieve it.

In the meantime, other influential personalities from the Kosovo political scene reacted, though they are not members of the DSK nor are they declared as their open opponents. They support pessimistic and radical options of complete and urgent self-determination. Former communist leader from the seventies, Mahmut Bakalli, published in "Zeri" a sharply toned article concerning the current situation and the strategy for breaking the enchanted circle "of inefficiency and self-satisfaction due to the created political monopoly and policy of arresting and blockade". Bakalli thinks that the offer of autonomy should be turned down and its sponsors unmasked, as the possible "opportunist formation which could, under the slogan of 'political realism' and alleged overcoming the difficult situation of the Albanian nation in Kosovo, accept the autonomous status of Kosovo under Serb jurisdiction or the risky option of dividing Kosovo between the Serbs and the Albanians." Instead of such a fatalistic policy, Bakalli speaks in favour of a need for "a new agreement between political forces with the Albanian nation", in other words, a return to the policy of "achievement of their true and realistic aspirations". Bakalli projects three main objectives of this new/old policy: 1. complete liberation of half of the Albanian nation; 2. integration of the Albanians in one state; and 3. democratic development of the Albanian society and state. Concerning the offers of the international factors, Bakalli resolutely states: "We should clearly and loudly say that we do not accept such solutions [autonomy within Serbia], because we do not wish to sign our capitulation and sentence ourselves to new slavery". Bakalli then proposes convening of "an urgent meeting of legitimate representatives of political parties and state agencies from all Albanian regions of former Yugoslavia, for the purpose of creation a unique platform of an all-Albanian policy. The international factor will have understanding and it will support our demands "just to the extent we ourselves are organized, convincing and resolute in our effort to effectuate what we say." Bakalli directs a very indicative warning: "If the existing political formations of the Albanians do not do it, they will question their own legitimity, mandate and reason of their existence, and a need for the appearance of a new political formation will emerge, which will take the aspirations of the Albanian people as their starting point, and engage themselves to achieve them".

The article of the member of Rexhep Qosja, member of the Academy, published in the weekly "Koha" is even sharper. Known as a radical critic of the DSK and the "sitting movement" of Ibrahim Rugova, Qosja paints the current situation in Kosovo in the darkest colours. "A policy which has exchanged the oath to independence with the oath to false peace determined by the Serb and Macedonian army and police". Qosja also warns against the hypocritical policy of the great powers. He warns that President Clinton significantly lowered the level of American support to Kosovo. "Contrary to former President George Bush, Bill Clinton does not even pronounce the concept of high autonomy too often. It means that we had false hopes." Qosja, just like Bakalli, speaks of the enchanted circle of Albanian policy and inadequacy of the Albanian leaders in Kosovo and in Albania: "Great issues such as our national issue cannot be resolved by small-minded souls who are pursuing even smaller-scale policy". Qosja attacks the President of Albania, Sali Berisha especially sharply, for having "degraded the issue of Kosovo very much - to the level of human rights". Qosja sees the solution of this situation in creation of an all-Albanian council which would play the role of an executor of the Albanian national program and control and corrective of the current political elite.

And yet, the Serb and the Albanian radicalism significantly differ in one thing. Serb radicalism is armed (Miroslav Solevic recently complained that just a small amount of arms and ammunition was distributed to the Serbs in Kosovo - just a thousand bullets per capita!), while the Albanian radicalism is of a verbal nature. Serb violent and war policy in Kosovo is effective (power is maintained by force of arms), while the possibility of the Albanians starting a war is so far just a projection. But, when speaking of policy in relation to the offered compromise, temptations will be much greater for the Serb party than for the Albanian. Even if the Albanians make a concession and agree to a dependent status of Kosovo, it will not mean that they have abandoned the demand for indpendence, but that they will consider such a status just as a transitional stage on the way to their final goal. For the Serb party, however, accepting of the compromise would mean a considerable and probably permanent loss of military and political control of Kosovo.

Shkelzen Maliqi AIM Prishtina