ABSURDS ABOUT Z-4 PLAN

AIM, ZAGREB, February 2, 1995 So far, the only official reaction of Croatia to the Plan Z-4 publicized on Monday, that of President Tudjman which is in various modifications repeated by the chief Croatian negotiator with the Serbs, Hrvoje Sarinic, can be reduced down to a positive stance in relation to the parts of the document concerning establishment of Croatian sovereignty on its entire territory, return of the refugees and local self-administration for the Serbian ethnic community or minority, and rejection of everything that exceeds the limits of constitutional provisions and international conventions on the rights of ethnic communities or minorities.

Croatia, therefore, accepts the plan as a starting-point for negotiations with the Serbs from Krajina, while, at the same time, the leadership in Knin refused to take the plan of 53 pages and several annexes, and the Serbian President Milosevic did not even wish to see the four ambassadors. This fact caused disappointment among the representatives of the USA, Russia, the European Union and the International Geneva Conference, so that the Americam Ambassador in Croatia, Peter Galbraith, declared that "facts speak for themselves". He explained this as follows: "One party accepted the Draft, agreed, although with certain reserves, that it was possible to negotiate on the basis of it, and the other party, after we had gone all the way to Knin, refused to take the Draft. What an irony that the party which refused to receive this plan is the one which wishes the UNRPOFOR to stay". To a journalist's question what would happen next, Galbraith replied: "It's a vicious circle".

With its cunning decision to receive the plan and treat it as a starting point for further talks, Croatia restored some of its political status it had lost after the decision to give notice to the UNPROFOR, while Knin and Belgrade, which obviously still persist with having a state in Krajina and do not wish to abandon the idea, brought themselves into an even more difficult position, especially if this rejection is put in the context of developments in Bosnia&Herzegovina where Karadzic is stubbornly refusing to accept the plan for this Republic. It all induced Mr. Galbraith to declare: "Now we can clearly say who is responsible for rejection of the plan. They claim that they have a state in Knin, but noone has recognized that state, nor ever will. Economically they are isolated and they live more primitively every day. Now they are living in a constant danger of military intervention, too, but if they adopted the plan, they would have international safety guarantees and they would be a part of the Croatian country with many possibilities for prosperity."

One could say that, so far, developments about the Plan Z-4 are a Croatian diplomatic victory, because the Serbian parties, or better to say party, since the strings are after all pulled by Milosevic and Belgrade, and Knin is just the perpetrator, identified themselves as those who are in favour of the war option and helped Croatia free itself of the accusations of having war intentions. But, although Croatia has earned a few diplomatic points, the plan met with sharp criticism in the media, which should be understood as a semi-official opinion. Namely, when that principled sentence of Tudjman's is broken down, it can be seen that even when Croatia is concerned, the plan is just a failure.

It is true that the plan in principle questions territorial integrity of Croatia and its internationally recognized borders, but in many segments - as considered here - it is unacceptable and contrary to the Croatian Constitution and legislature. There are complaints because 11 municipalities where Serbian population was in the majority according to the 1981 census, which form districts of Knin and Glina, and pursuant to the Constitutional Law, are thus given a special status, are called "Serbian krajina", although there are neither political, nor geographical, nor historical reasons for that. In the sense of legislature, the provision that the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Croatia will be valid on the territory of "krajina", but that they will have to be approved and implemented by the local authorities, sounds quite ambiguous. Croatia would also be obliged to accept the laws enacted by the "authorities in krajina". There are protests against the proposals that the territory of "krajina" might have a separate coat of arms and flag, that the National Bank of Croatia would have to issue separate money for the "krajina", with the value equal to that of kuna.

From a series of other details, such as a separate tax system, separate government agencies and election of the "president of krajina", many analysts draw the conclusion that this would be such a degree of autonomy which is actually just a step towards federation, or even confederation of Croatia. They are finding arguments for such allegations in the provisions of the plan which prescribe that "krajina" would be demilitarized, and the Croatian army could enter it only if called by the president, but also that no official in "krajina" would be responsible to any authority in Croatia.

There are complaints against the part of the agreement which refers to the region of Slavonija, Southern Baranja and Western Srem, and other parts which are occupied at the moment. It is true that the plan prescribes their full integration under jurisdiction of the Croatian Government, but only after five years, and until then, forces of the UN or some other international organization would be stationed there. During these five years, the territories would be demilitarized, with the exception of the five-kilometre zone along the international border.

Altogether, there is a lot of issues which are contrary to the present Constitution and laws, and even international provisions, which Croatia for the time being does not wish to accept, but it still wishes to negotiate. The plan has quite certainly added a new dimension to Croatian-Serbian relations, but a serious question can be put - why has the plan been publicized now, especially since it is well-known that it does not differ much from the document which was prepared back in October last year? Does it have anything to do with the decision of Croatia to terminate the mandate of the UNPROFOR, since this plan provides for engagement of international forces? Is not this an attempt to indirectly exert pressure on Croatia to change its decision, which would mean that, regardless of numerous Croatian complaints, the game of stick and carrot continues, like in the case of offering Croatia to join in European integrations? On the other hand, this is a way to meet the demand of the Serbs from Knin halfway to have the UNPROFOR stay, but in that case, it is surprising that they have refused even to take the plan, which was assessed by Mr. Galbraith as illogical, and the present situation as very dangerous.

This refusal of the Serbian party can jeopardize implementation of the second phase of the Zagreb Agreement on Economic Reintegration, as they call it in Croatia, or Cooperation, as they prefer to call it in Knin. It will be interesting to see what the destiny of the trip of Croatian Minister of the exterior, Mate Granic, to Belgrade will be, and what next move will Milosevic make, because this "No" of his could cost the FR of Yugoslavia further sanctions.

That the international community is not innocent in this affair is best proved by the French initiative for convening a new conference on former Yugoslavia, which was so far accepted by Great Britain alone. One thing is certain: by calling off the UNPROFOR's mandate and by accepting the plan which is actually unacceptable for him, Franjo Tudjman has succeeded to return Croatia into the focus of world developments. One of the reasons for the Serbian "No" could be sought in the issue of Kosovo, because what would Belgrade say if the international community demanded similar autonomy for the Albanians, so Milosevic obviously needs a time-out to set things straight. Because it certainly is absurd to reject a plan which practically almost gives the Serbs in Croatia a state of their own, and seek a real state or union with Serbia, and at the same time strive by all means to avoid the talks about Kosovo, Sandzak, and even Vojvodina.

All this points out to very tight inter-connections between the parts of the shaky Yugo space, because it should never be forgotten that problems of ethnic nature might appear in Macedonia and that the international community is wrong when it wishes just to extinguish separate centres of war, without gaining an insight into the problems as a whole and in all their complexity. Its hesitation, like in 1990, and especially like in 1991, could bring about renewal of war conflicts, but unfortunately breaking out of new ones, too. That is why only at first sight it might seem that Tudjman has managed to draw the issue of Croatia out of the Bosnian (Yugo) pot, because the war between the Serbs and the Muslims not only still rages over there, but according to many information, there are conflicts between the Croats and the Muslims again, which will greatly reflect on the situation in Croatia. After all, the announced discussion in the Assembly about the Plan Z-4 will show whether the Croatian decision was sincere or just a skilfull diplomatic move which has directly hit Belgrade this time?

GOJKO MARINKOVIC